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LAW & MORALITY IN AFRICA: TOWARDS A RATIONAL
PUBLIC POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING INTIMATE
HUMAN CONDUCT IN GHANA
Kwaku Agyeman-Budu*
ABSTRACT1
Law and morality have always been uneasy bedfellows; for whose morality should the
law protect and enforce? Is there a collective form or sense of morality that societies
accept and agree to be bound by at any particular point in time? If so, how is this done?
What does morality even mean? And should the law concern itself with enforcing
religious and/or cultural moral codes in the modern secular State? These and other
questions have been at the heart of philosophical and jurisprudential debates concerning
the intersection between law and morality and its impact on public policy from time
immemorial. This dissertation is therefore an attempt to revisit and review the concept of
morality from the perspective of law and public policy in a modern African State. The
main focus of the dissertation is to examine and evaluate the moral content and
underpinnings of the offence of sex work in Ghana, and propose a new neutral form of
“morality” that is more rational, devoid of stigma and is incapable of being used as
justification for criminalization of the conduct of persons who are the subject matter of
the offence in question. Ultimately, the dissertation proposes a new approach to dealing
with criminal offences that involve the balancing of individual autonomy of action and
the legitimate State interest in regulating the scope and extent of such conduct or actions,
since the old approach has not only failed, but has also led to the proliferation of sex
work in Ghana over the years.

* Doctor of Juridical Science (S.J.D.) Candidate and Doctoral Fellow, Fordham University School of Law.
The S.J.D. dissertation project of the author focuses on the intersection between law and morality in

1
1

The S.J.D. dissertation project of the author focuses on the intersection between law and morality in
Africa, and proposes a new approach to dealing with criminal offences (like sex work), which involve the
balancing of individual autonomy and legitimate State interest in regulating such conduct in Ghana.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
“As a general proposition it will be universally accepted that the law is not concerned with private morals
or with ethical sanctions. On the other hand, the law is plainly concerned with the outward conduct of
citizens in so far as the conduct injuriously affects the rights of other citizens. Certain forms of conduct it
has always been thought right to bring within the scope of the criminal law on account of the injury which
they occasion to the public in general.” The Street Offences Committee Report, 1928.

A) OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION TOPIC

The morality of laws has always been deemed critical in some quarters in terms of the
validity of laws in the first place.2 A law that conforms to certain moral precepts and
dictates was seen by many as law that was whole.3 On the contrary, laws that lacked
fundamental moral content were seen as either incomplete, or lacking the necessary
quality of law that all laws necessarily required.4 Discussions on morality however have
been a very slippery-slope from time immemorial, for many scholars and theorists have
tried in vain to fully conceptualize or understand the value and essence of law in itself,
and the idea of inherent morality of laws.5 For example, questions involving the moral
construct of law have never been fully resolved despite the vast amount of literature that
exists on that particular subject matter.6

2

Mark C. Murphy, 'Natural Law Jurisprudence', 9 LEGAL THEORY 241-67 (2003).
John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEVELAND S. L. REV. 1-13 (1990).
4
John Finnis, The “Natural Law Tradition”, 36 J. L. EDUCATION 492-95 (1986).
5
Brian Bix, On the Dividing Line Between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1613-24 (2000).
6
See for example, J.V. Gomez, The Hart Fuller Debate, PHILOSOPHY COMPASS, 9: 45-53 (2014); B.
Zipursky, Practical Positivism versus Practical Perfectionism: The Hart-Fuller Debate at Fifty, NYU LAW
3
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Also, even more fundamental questions like what morality even means remain
controversial, as there are a plethora of views and ideas in that regard. Some schools of
thought are of the view that morality refers to certain variables that dictate the inner or
inherent quality of rules and regulations.7 There are also other schools of thought that do
not necessarily ascribe any inherent quality to rules and regulations, but rather view
morality from the perspective of ideals that societies from time to time agree to have as a
sort of moral conscience that dictate day to day life.8 Others also view morality purely
and solely from a religious perspective.9 Hence, Judeo-Christian conceptions of morality
have been the foundation and fundamental basis for many laws that have been
promulgated in most parts of the world for more than two centuries.10

Similarly, for many years now, scholars and philosophers have attempted to
define what a crime is, and its essence.11 Although there isn’t a universally accepted
definition of what a crime is, it is generally understood to mean acts and omissions which
are prohibited by law, and which attract penal consequences for their breach thereof.12
Crime has also been described as a legal wrong, which is usually followed by criminal
proceedings resulting in some form of punishment.13 In the famous case of Amand v.

REV., Vol. 83: 1170 (2008); G. Dworkin, Devlin was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality, 40 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 927 (1999); J. Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harmless Wrongdoing
(1988); R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977); and P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965).
7
LON. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
8
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARVARD L. REV. 593-629 (1958).
9
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAWS AND NATURAL RIGHTS 371-413 (1980).
10
Id.
11
See COURTNEY STANHOPE KENNY, OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL LAW 16 (1936) (“crime is a wrong whose
sanction is punitive, and which is in no way remissible by any private person, but is remissible by the
crown alone, if remissible at all.”); see also, GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAW 27 (1983)
(defining crime as “a legal wrong that can be followed by criminal proceedings which may result in
punishment.”
12
WILLIAMS supra at 27.
13
Id.
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Home Secretary and Minister of Defence of Royal Netherlands Government it was held
that ‘a cause or matter is criminal in nature if it is one which if carried to its conclusion
might result in the conviction of a person charged and in a sentence or some
punishment.’ 14 The Criminal Offences Act of Ghana 15 defines a crime as ‘any act
punishable by death or imprisonment or fine.’16

In Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney General for Canada, Lord
Atkin held as follows: ‘[t]he domain of criminal jurisprudence can only be ascertained
by examining what acts at any particular period are declared by the State to be crimes,
and the only common nature they will be found to possess is that they are prohibited by
the State and that those who commit them are punished.’ 17 From the foregoing
description, we may deduce three essential elements or characteristics constituting a
crime: (1) a prohibited act; (2) prohibited by law or a statute for the time being in force;
and (3) the provision of penal consequences for breach thereof. Thus, when a State
considers an act and/or omission injurious to the public welfare, then the doing of any
such act or an omission thereof is prohibited. The prohibition must however be made
under the authority of law – a statute in force. Finally, there must be penal consequences
associated with the prohibited act.

14

Amand v. Home Secretary and Minister of Defence of Royal Netherlands Government, [1943] AC 147.
See Criminal Offences Act (Act 29) (1960) (Ghana).
16
Id. § 1.
17
Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney General for Canada, [1931] AC 310; see also id. at
324 (“the criminal quality of an act cannot be discerned by intuition; nor can it be discovered by reference
to any standard but one: is the act prohibited with penal consequences?”).
15
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The 1992 Constitution of Ghana therefore provides that: ‘[n]o person shall be
convicted of a criminal offence unless the offence is defined and the penalty for it is
prescribed in a written law.’18 An act or omission cannot therefore be a crime unless it is
expressly prohibited by law, which is known to all, and the punishment is also provided
for. This principle of legality is what has been captured by the famous Latin expression
‘nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege.’19 It must be noted that the penalties for
the infraction of the criminal law are almost never pleasant, including imprisonment, fine,
and death. It has thus been asserted, although arguable, that it is as a result of these
potentially unpleasant consequences that obedience to the criminal law is usually
achieved.20

The essence of the criminal law is therefore to regulate human conduct for social
cohesion. Without it, there will be chaos, as human beings will be free to engage in acts
that are likely to be inimical to the progress of society in general, and human
development in particular. It is important to therefore note that crimes are considered to
be injurious to the State as a whole, and not just the victim. It is therefore the State that is
usually mandated to seek redress for such wrongs, and not necessarily the individual
victim of the crime, no matter how heinous it may have been.

This dissertation is an attempt to revisit the oft-debated relationship between law
– in particular, the criminal law – and morality, and the place of both within the realm of
18

See CONSTITUTION Art. 19(11) (1992) (Ghana).
Or, “an act is not a crime unless it is expressly prohibited by law.”
20
See Annalise Acorn, Fear of Crime and Punishment, 1 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL. CRIMINOL. 79–89 (2009;
see also, Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Why do Criminals Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and
Social Networks on Active Offenders, 102 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL. CRIMINOL. 397–440 (2012).
19
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public policy making. It focuses on how conceptions of religious and cultural morality
have over the years been the driving force for the continuous criminalization of certain
conduct in Ghana, which involve individual autonomy but is fraught with moral
judgments and negative stereotypes. For example, prostitution or sex work,21 sometimes
referred to as the oldest profession in the world, remains criminalized in Ghana as in most
parts of the world.22 Many States still have restrictive laws that prohibit the act of sex
work and solicitation in public places. 23 However, to suggest that sex work thrives
despite this criminalization would actually be an understatement. For example, in Ghana,
it is a notorious fact that the “night sex trade” has become a permanent fixture of nightlife
in the urban centers like Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi, to the extent that certain areas
have become known “hotspots” and are synonymous with the sex trade.24 It is also a
known fact that the law enforcement agencies, especially the police, continuously and
consistently exploit these vulnerable women who are engaged in the trade, for monetary
gain, in light of the criminalization of the sex trade.25

The aim of this dissertation is therefore to examine in detail the social cost of the
criminalization of sex work in Ghana. It is argued for example that the continuous
criminalization of sex work on moral grounds violates fundamental human rights and is
21

Both words i.e. ‘prostitution’ and ‘sex work’ are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation, as
they connote the same activity.
22
Criminal Code §§ 107(1), 273–77, amendments consolidated in Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, No.
646 (2003).
23
See, e.g., Chi Mgbako and Laura A. Smith, Sex Work and Human Rights in Africa, 33 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1178 (2009), citing Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia,
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia as States
criminalizing prostitution and its procurement.
24
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, GHANA, BEHAVIOURAL STUDY OF FEMALE SEX
WORKERS ALONG GHANA’S TEMA‐PAGA TRANSPORT CORRIDOR 9 (2012).
25
See Kwaku Baka, Ghana Police Sweeps, INTER PRESS SERVICE THIRD WORLD NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 6,
1998) http://walnet.org/csis/news/world_98/ips-980806.html.
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contrary to constitutional dictates. Thus, a newer, more rational and morally neutral based
approach is required in regulating sex work as a profession or trade, subject to specific
rules and regulations that balance legitimate State interest (including public health and
“moral” concerns, for example) with individual liberty and autonomy of action
implicating the right to work and to make a decent, honest living, free from victimization
and stigma, as well as the rights to dignity and equality. The dissertation is therefore an
exercise in social construction that envisages a new approach to public policy, where law
and morality intersect. It proposes a new framework within which public policy is
underpinned by not just religious and cultural conceptions of morality, but by a new
neutral form of morality based on respect for the fundamental human rights principles of
dignity, individual autonomy and equality.

B) JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY

Criminal offences are important in legal systems to provide punishment for
persons who violate the underlying fundamental social norms that the society through law
seeks to protect. However, the conceptualization and framing of some of these offences,
especially those purportedly prohibited as a result of religious and culturally based
“moral” convictions especially in Africa generally and Ghana in particular, present
problems in terms of having a coherent and rational public policy regime or framework
for the regulation of particular acts. This then makes it difficult for the full realization of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the rapidly developing and increasingly
changing socio-cultural context of Ghana. In this section, I discuss my reasons for

13

pursuing this topic in the first place, and its relevance for the development of the law in
Ghana.

1. Reasons for pursuing the topic
i. Interest & Knowledge Gap
Sexual offences and those involving intimate decisions predicated on individual
autonomy have been an often-neglected area of the law in Ghana, in terms of scholarly
interest and research. This stems from the fact that it is generally assumed and agreed that
it is important to regulate such conduct, especially those acts that involve some violation,
whether as a result of the lack of consent, the age of the victim or fundamental societal
concerns regarding sexual morality and the maintenance of the religious and cultural
beliefs and values of the people. For example, the crime of rape is important in any legal
system to provide punishment for persons who sexually violate other persons without
their consent. Similarly, “defilement” or statutory rape is an important crime intended to
punish persons who sexually violate the chastity of children. Also in Ghana, the cultural
context, as well as the religious and moral inclination of an overwhelming majority of the
people means that the law prohibiting sex work is generally accepted without much
question as morally opprobrious.26

26

Jacquelyn C.A. Meshelemiah, Tourism and Prostitution in West Africa: A Glimpse of the “Roamers” in
Ghana, in, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING: AFRICA, ASIA, MIDDLE EAST,
AND OCEANIA 31, 40 (2011) (citing examples of sex workers characterized as “inferior,” “contagious,” a
generative source of all that is bad and wrong and rotten with sex,” “immoral,” “shameful,” and
“avaricious”).

14

As a result of the general acceptance of the utility of these aforementioned crimes
in preventing and punishing sexual violations of women and children (in the cases of
Rape and Defilement respectively), and maintaining the religious, cultural and moral
fiber of the society (with respect to the crime of prostitution, which effectively prohibits
sex work), there has not been any serious academic and scholarly exposition regarding
any of these offences generally over the years in Ghana.27 The jurisprudence of the courts
in Ghana also suggests that they have not critically examined any of these offences in any
great detail over the years. They have merely tended to apply the laws as they are,
without engaging in any serious critique of the conceptualization of the offences. In
particular reference to sex work, there have been few reported trials and dispositions in
the past.28 There therefore exists a serious knowledge gap that urgently needs to be filled,
in terms of critically exploring the conceptualization and framing of these types of laws
within the Ghanaian context and how they implicate human rights in general, and the
rights of specific groups of people in particular – devoid of any form of gender
stereotypes, stigma, biases and prejudice.

ii. Law Reform
The knowledge gap that exists in relation to intimate sexual offences in Ghana
also means that there is significant room for law reform to bring Ghanaian law in

27

For example, see P.K. TWUMASI, CRIMINAL LAW IN GHANA (1985); HENRIETTA J.A.N. MENSA-BONSU, 1
THE GENERAL PART OF CRIMINAL LAW – A GHANAIAN CASEBOOK (2001); HENRIETTA J.A.N. MENSABONSU, 2 THE GENERAL PART OF CRIMINAL LAW – A GHANAIAN CASEBOOK (2006) and HENRIETTA J.A.N.
MENSA-BONSU, THE ANNOTATED CRIMINAL OFFENCES ACT OF GHANA, (5th Ed., 2008), none of which
discuss sexual offences in any detail.
28
For case studies of the few prosecutions under these laws, see United States State Department, 2016
Trafficking in Persons Report, OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (June 2016),
https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258773.htm.
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consonance with contemporary realities, which have been neglected for far too long. For
example, prostitution is defined in section 279 of the Criminal Offences Act of Ghana as
including ‘the offering by a person of that person’s body commonly for acts of lewdness
for payment although there is no act or offer of an act or ordinary sexual connection.’29
Furthermore, section 276 of Act 29 prohibits solicitation or importuning by sex workers.
Specifically, section 276(1) stipulates that:

A person who persistently solicits or importunes in a public place or in sight of a
public place for the purpose of prostitution commits a criminal offence and is
liable to a fine not exceeding twenty-five penalty units and for a second or
subsequent offence shall be dealt with as for a misdemeanor.30

A reasonable inference that can be made from these provisions is that the law does not
necessarily criminalize the fact of being a sex worker or sex work generally for that
matter, rather it prohibits sex workers from seeking clients in public and other ancillary
places,31 and criminalizes the fact of ‘aiding, abetting or compelling the prostitution for
purposes of living off the earnings of prostitutes,’ (pimping)32 and keeping of brothels.33

29

Criminal Offences Act § 279.
It is however important to note that section 276(2) provides that “[a] person shall not be tried for an
offence in this section without the consent of a superior police officer but this shall not prevent the arrest,
or the issue of a warrant for the arrest, of a person in respect of any officer or the remanding in custody or
on bad of any person charged with an offence notwithstanding that such consent has not been obtained.” Id.
§ 276(2).
31
Id. § 276(1).
32
Id. § 274.
33
Id. § 277.
30
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The problem with this construction of the law not particularly criminalizing the
fact of being a sex worker or sex work but rather prohibiting acts amounting to
solicitation or importuning within the meaning of the law, and living off the earnings of
prostitutes and keeping a brothel,34 is that it is gravely ambiguous and incoherent. For
instance, section 107(1)(a), which criminalizes the offense of “procuration,” seems to
suggest the fact that it is possible for persons over the age of twenty-one years to be sex
workers or otherwise engaged in sex work. 35 Specifically, this statute prohibits the
trafficking of persons under the age of 21 for the purposes of “carnal connexion,” so long
as those persons are not considered to be ‘a prostitute or of known immoral character’.36
Similarly, section 108 of Act 29, which prohibits the seduction or prostitution of children
below sixteen years of age, acknowledges the fact of the existence of sex workers and sex
work generally.37 Section 108(2) provides that ‘For the purposes of subsection (1), a
person causes or encourages the seduction, carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal
knowledge, prostitution or commission of indecent assault on a child, if that person
knowingly allows the child to consort with, enter or continue in the employment of a
prostitute or person of known immoral character’.38 Emphasis added. It is important to
note that none of these provisions make it a criminal offence to be a sex worker or be
engaged in sex work.39

34

Id. § 107(1)(a).
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. § 108.
38
Id. § 108(2).
39
Save for solicitation or importuning in public places, and other persons assisting for the purposes of
living off the earnings of prostitutes and keeping brothels for purposes of prostitution.
35
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The above provisions notwithstanding, other provisions of the Act dealing with
prostitution criminalize the fact of living wholly or in part on the earnings of
prostitution, 40 exercising ‘control, direction or influence over the movements of a
prostitute in a manner as to aid, abet or compel the prostitution’, 41 and keeping of
brothels for the purposes of prostitution.42 Similarly, section 275 provides that:

A person commits a misdemeanor who in a public place or in sight of a public
place persistently solicits or importunes
(a) to obtain clients for a prostitute, or
(b) for any other immoral purposes.43

In the same vain, and as already noted, persons who persistently solicit or importune in
public and other ancillary places also commit a criminal offence. Therein lies the
ambiguity and incoherence in the law; for if solicitation and importuning for clients or for
other immoral purposes by or on behalf of a sex worker, and the keeping of brothels for
sex work are criminalized, what about other means of solicitation and importuning which
do not have the “public place nexus” and do not take place in a brothel?44 Is it the case
that the law recognizes “private immorality”?45 Consequently, what if a person engages
the services of a middleman who is expressly given the responsibility to “recruit” clients

40

Id. § 274(1)(a).
Id. § 274(1)(b).
42
Id. § 277.
43
Id. § 275.
44
See John Agbemabiese, Cyberfraud: A New Force and Threat to Ghana’s Image and Security. GRAPHIC
ONLINE. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://graphic.com.gh/features/ cyber-fraud-a-new-force-and-threat-to- ghanasimage-and-security.html (citing increase in child sex trafficking due to increased access to internet
communications technologies).
45
See H.L.A. HART. LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963).
41
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for said prostitute at a fee? Will the middleman be liable to prosecution for the offences
of soliciting or importuning and living off the earnings of prostitutes? What of
contemporary means of solicitation and importuning through social media platforms like
WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, or even escort websites?46 Are these platforms
to be considered “public places” for the purposes of the law?

To stoke the controversy even further, how do we place sex tourism, and other
contemporary means of sex work and sex trade that occur in not only most of the
prestigious hotels in Ghana, but also at contemporary “Movie Houses”?47 It is a notorious
fact in recent times, that some hotels and their employees engage in the recruitment of
both men and women – but especially women – for sexual purposes for their guests or
customers.48 Also, it is alleged that some persons known or alleged to be prostitutes or of
immoral character are seen frequenting hotel lounges and bars in the hopes of “hooking
up” with potential clients.49 In recent times, there has also been the proliferation of
“Movie Houses” that offer rooms for a few hours to clients, ostensibly for the purposes of
private movie screenings. It is however a known fact that these so-called movie houses
knowingly and deliberately facilitate the sex trade as well as ordinary sexual encounters
by couples, as they provide a cheaper option than hotels.50 This thus leads to the question
of what the definition of a brothel is. According to section 279 of Act 29, a brothel means
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‘any premises or room or set of rooms in any premises kept for purposes of
prostitution.’51 Since it is a notorious fact that the managers of some of the hotels and
movie houses (which for all intents and purposes are public places) in Ghana knowingly
permit or must be deemed to knowingly permit sex work within rooms in their premises,
these hotels and movie houses must also be deemed to be brothels within the meaning of
the law.52

However, aside from the proscription or prohibition of the seduction or
prostitution of minors – which is totally understandable because of the sexual violation it
portends due to their immaturity – sexual and otherwise, and sex trafficking, 53 the
question remains whether it is the proper function of the criminal law to regulate private
consensual adult sexual conduct (albeit involving payment as a quid pro quo), of which
there are no victims. How does the State even begin to enforce such an offence, the
substance of which by its nature is purely private, and thus incapable of enforcement
without incursions into the privacy of the homes and sexual lives of consenting adults?54
Moreover, technological advancement and the availability of various social media
platforms means that new means and mediums of solicitation and importuning for the
purposes of sex work are now in existence, and seemingly outside the remit of the law.
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There is also the issue of the constitutionality of the laws that altogether prohibit
sex work. The main dimension of this issue is that such prohibition violates the antidiscrimination clause of Article 17 of the Constitution of Ghana, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, social or economic status. 55 Also, the
proscription of sex work is arguably an affront to the right to work and to make a decent
living as outlined in international human rights instruments like the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights UDHR),56 the International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) 57 and the African Charter on Human & Peoples Rights’ (Banjul
Charter).58 The law also seemingly infringes on the inherent dignity that humans are
deemed to possess, and can be seen as an affront on individual autonomy/liberty as well.

Thus, the laws related to sex work are in need of fundamental reform not only
because of their potential conflict with constitutional demands, but also because their
conceptualization leads to ambiguity and incoherence, whilst social media and the
advancement of technology has rendered them practically otiose to a large degree. In
working towards reformation in this regard, there is the need for a rational and robust
public policy framework that underpins these and other similar offences that are
predicated on society’s fear of moral decay, maintenance of cultural purity and religious
sanctity. It is my contention therefore that public policy dictates that form the basis for
the regulation of the offences in question must not be solely based on religious and
cultural conceptions of morality in the pluralistic society that is Ghana. Legislation based
55
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on these conceptions of morality alone regulates human conduct in a way that fails to
ensure human progress, but rather drives the conduct that is the subject matter of the
legislation underground and practically unenforceable, whilst violating fundamental
human rights.59

Unfortunately, the Constitution Review Commission of Ghana in its report did not
touch on the issue of sex work in its various forms and manifestations.60 It is therefore
now prudent more than ever for there to be an academic discussion and scholarly
exposition grounded in law, which critically evaluates the contending positions in terms
of the conceptualization of the crime of sex work in Ghana. Accordingly, this dissertation
will serve as a useful resource of information and knowledge, and may provide the basis
upon which any future reform of the law may be grounded.

iii. Contribution to Scholarship
The existence of a knowledge gap and the consequent need for law reform makes
it imperative for the production of a work that will critically assess and examine the
offences connected to sex work in light of contemporary thinking, realities and human
rights norms and standards. As a result, this dissertation seeks to make an original and
substantial contribution to legal scholarship especially in Ghana, and thereby pave the
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way for further study and research into similarly placed and often-neglected and
controversial areas of the law in Ghana.

2. Relevance of the topic in Ghana
i. Legislative & Policy Reform
The dissertation may also possibly lead to legislative and policy reform. The goals
of the dissertation are noble ones, which seek to soberly interrogate often-neglected and
controversial issues regarding our criminal law, and thereby provide guidance on the way
forward. As a result, a proposal for a new neutral form of morality based on respect for
the fundamental human rights principles of dignity, individual autonomy and equality
(D.I.E.) is strongly advocated for to form the basis of public policy in terms of the
regulation of the offences connected to sex work and other intimate human conduct
involving sex.

ii. Enforcement and Realization of Fundamental Human Rights
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are guaranteed in Ghana by virtue of
Chapter 5 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.61 In Ghana, the upholding of, and reverence
for human rights in general has become part and parcel of our democratic dispensation
since the coming into force of the Constitution in 1993.62 However, in terms of issues
61
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involving sex, sexuality or sexual morality that have a human rights dimension,
Ghanaians generally shy away from openly or publicly discussing them, largely due to
long-held gender stereotypes, biases and prejudice. Religion and culture are also reasons
why such matters are not usually publicly discussed.

Thus, even though it is a notorious fact that many Ghanaians engage in acts that
can easily be categorized as sex work within the meaning ascribed to prostitution and
associated conduct by our criminal law, most people may nonetheless be oblivious to the
fact that those acts may in fact be proscribed, and that their criminalization is probably
even contrary to human rights as their enforcement by the State may constitute violations
in and of itself. Therefore, this dissertation is a human rights-based critique of sex work
that examines and critically analyzes certain aspects of the conceptualization of its
associated offences, by measuring their compatibility with the fundamental human rights
and freedoms provisions of the Constitution of Ghana, and thereby prescribing a new way
of dealing with such human conduct within the Ghanaian context. It is the hope that the
recommendations of this dissertation would eventually lead to litigation, in the form of
public interest cases being brought before the Supreme Court, for the purposes of
determining the constitutionality of those potentially discriminatory aspects of the
offences in question.63

courts in Ghana post-independence, in order to assess the likelihood of the future acceptance of the right to
sex work and rights of sex workers as part of the fundamental rights available in Ghana.
63
Litigation is advocated for as part of the recommendations of this dissertation only as a last resort. Other
measures and activities must first be undertaken in the pursuance of legal reform, failing which litigation
can be resorted to. Chapter Seven of this dissertation (Recommendations) thus outlines and discusses the
specific recommendations for law reform in respect of sex work in Ghana in detail.
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iii. Reference Materials for teaching and learning of Constitutional Law,
Criminal Law, Human Rights Law & Legal Philosophy
The knowledge gap that exists in relation to offences involving sexual morality in
Ghana also means that, there is an urgent need for a well-researched scholarly work in
this area of the law. This dissertation can therefore serve as a useful resource for the
teaching and learning of Criminal Law and even Constitutional, Human Rights Law and
Legal Philosophy at the many Law Faculties in Ghana, and the Ghana School of Law.64
The dearth of knowledge and scholarly works in the area of Criminal Law in general in
Ghana65 creates an urgent demand for such a work, which will contribute to illuminating
this often-neglected aspect of the criminal law.

C) METHODOLOGY & STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION
In this part, I attempt to briefly outline the methodology and structure of the
dissertation. It is important to reiterate that the dissertation seeks to propose a new public
policy standard for the regulation of intimate human conduct, and is an exercise in
dispassionately and impartially examining the utility, legality and constitutionality of one
of the most important and controversial offences that exist in Ghana: sex work.

1. Research Questions

64
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By focusing on sex work in Ghana, a major goal of this dissertation is to ascertain
the efficacy, utility and legality of this and other similarly placed offences in
contemporary Ghana, within the broader context of fundamental human rights and
freedoms guaranteed under Ghana’s Constitution and also in respect of Ghana’s regional
and international human rights obligations. My research questions in this regard are as
follows:

a) Is it possible to develop a public policy framework for regulating sexual and
private morality that is rational, devoid of stigma and incapable of being
used as justification for criminalization of the conduct of persons who are the
subject matter of offences like sex work?66

b) Is the criminalization of aspects of sexual and private morality under the

Criminal Offences Act of Ghana, 1960 (Act 29) constitutional?67

2. Challenges
The major challenges that I have encountered in writing this dissertation have
been in respect of access to legal scholarship on the subject matter from a Ghanaian
perspective. The general dearth in jurisprudential legal scholarship, and socio-legal
research in Ghana for that matter has meant that I have had to rely extensively on foreign
scholarship, especially in developing my theoretical framework (Chapters Two and
66

Chapter Three of the dissertation (Theoretical Framework: A New Morality) is devoted to answering this
question. Chapter Six (Constitutionality of Regulating Intimacy & Sexual Morality: Applying the D.I.E.
Framework) proceeds to apply the framework with particular emphasis on sex work in Ghana.
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Three) for a rational public policy regime that should underpin laws that tend to
criminalize conduct that involve private and sexual morality. Also, the lack of adequate
empirical research on the issue of law and morality in Ghana with specific reference to
intimate human conduct has also hampered my ability to address the topic from a
sociological point of view. That notwithstanding, I make references to the few available
Ghanaian research on the subject matter.

3. Dissertation Structure
The dissertation structure is essentially an outline of each of the various
constituent elements of the dissertation. What I attempt to do here therefore is to provide
a concise summary of the structure in which the dissertation takes. Thus, the various
Chapters of the dissertation are briefly summarized, highlighting the essence of these
Chapters within the grand scheme of the overall dissertation objectives.

The introductory chapter of the dissertation provides a broad and general
overview of the major themes of the topic, and the controversies that the dissertation
seeks to address. It also provides the justification for the study and its relevance for the
development of law in Ghana. Chapter One therefore provides a road map and clearly
outlines the themes that are discussed and examined throughout the dissertation,
including a statement of the research questions. Chapter Two then delves into a review of
the major works that have helped me formulate my thoughts and opinions regarding the
intersection between law and morality. In Chapter Three, I attempt to propose a new form
of morality, underpinned not just by religious and/or cultural beliefs, but also by the
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universal human rights principles of Dignity, Individual autonomy and Equality (the
D.I.E. framework for developing public policy).

Chapter Four then critically examines sex work in Ghana from a historical
perspective and traces the evolution of the practice and the law to present times. The law
of prostitution is thus discussed extensively in light of what actually pertains today, as
well as the social cost of criminalization. Chapter Five, traces the history of human rights
in Ghana since independence and examine the consistency of the laws regarding sex
work with the human rights guarantees provided for by Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, as
well as Regional and International Human Rights treaties that Ghana is a state party to. In
Chapter Six, the constitutionality of regulating sexual and private morality is analyzed
using the proposed D.I.E. framework of public policy. The ‘Right to Sex Work’ is thus
explored from a constitutional standpoint in this regard. Finally, Chapter Seven is the
concluding part of the dissertation, where I make specific recommendations with regard
to sex work and how to effectively regulate it in a rational and coherent manner.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Law and morality are two concepts that have puzzled scholars and theorists and led to
countless debates from time immemorial. Theoretically speaking, the concept of “law”
has been variously defined from many different perspectives and by many different
scholars. Morality on the other hand is also quite dynamic, due to the difficulty of
conceptualizing such a complicated idea. This state of flux regarding these two concepts
and their relationship presents problems in terms of regulating some aspects of human
behaviour through the criminal law – for example, sex work. The problem is further
compounded as many people view law through the prism of what is rightful or wrongful
moral conduct. Thus, the laws that govern societies are deemed to be some representation
of, or form of moral capital that people wish to own, as mirroring the values of their
society.68 In this Chapter of the dissertation, the concepts of law and morality are reexamined and their relationship further explored; whilst situating the discussion within
the context of the criminal offence of sex work in Ghana. I therefore attempt reviewing
and critiquing some of the most important works within the field of legal philosophy that
has shaped and continue to shape my thoughts on the subject matter of this dissertation.

A) WHAT IS LAW?

68

Kenworthey Bilz and Janice Nadler, 'Law, Psychology & Morality, Moral Cognition and Decision
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There have been several attempts in the past century and beyond by various
scholars and legal philosophers to define the essence, nature and characteristics of law.69
Some of these works have been ground breaking and continue to receive wide acclaim.70
However, the concept of “law” remains very controversial as there has not necessarily
been a general acceptance of the nature of law.71 Defining what law means is rather
elusive as several factors must be considered, and many seemingly contradictory
positions must be balanced in order to begin appreciating law’s nature and scope.72
Cairns, for example, notes the various descriptions that have been attached to law over
the centuries in the following manner:

We have been told by Plato that law is a form of social control, and instrument of
the good life, the way to the discovery of reality, the true reality of the social
structure; by Aristotle that it is a rule of conduct, a contract, an ideal of reason, a
rule of decision, a form of order; by Cicero that it is the agreement of reason and
nature, the distinction between the just and the unjust, a command or prohibition;
by Aquinas that it is an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him
who has care of the community, and promulgated; by Bacon that certainty is the
prime necessity of law; by Hobbes that law is the command of the sovereign; by
Spinoza that it is a plan of life; by Leibniz that its character is determined by the
structure of society; by Locke that it is a norm established by the commonwealth;
69
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by Hume that it is a body of precepts; by Kant that it is a harmonizing of wills by
means of universal rules in the interests of freedom; by Fichte that it is a relation
between human beings; by Hegel that it is an unfolding or realizing of the idea of
right.73

The above notwithstanding, one of the most important works in terms of the
definition, nature and scope of law is The Concept of Law by H.L.A. Hart.74 This work
however transcends legal philosophy and is a useful guide to understanding social
construction. As the author notes in the preface, ‘My aim in this book has been to further
the understanding of law, coercion, and morality as different but related social
phenomena. Though it is primarily designed for the student of jurisprudence, I hope it
may also be of use to those whose chief interests are in moral or political philosophy, or
in sociology, rather than in law.’ 75 I find the work in general intriguing, thought
provoking and stimulating, because it addresses almost all aspects of the nature of law.
As a matter of fact, this work is critical my understanding of legal philosophy generally,
which in turn leads me to propose a new form of morality as the basis of public policy
making where the criminal law is concerned in Chapter Three of this dissertation. As
such, it is prudent that I begin my literature review with Hart’s work.

In The Concept of Law, Hart devotes the first seven chapters to critical issues
concerning the essence, nature and characteristics of law. Chapter One for example
delves into a critical analysis of the age-old question – what is law? Hart suggests that for
73

Huntington Cairns, Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel (The John's Hopkins Press, 1949).
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
75
Id., The Preface.
74

31

many years several scholars, including lawyers, jurists and philosophers have pondered
over this seemingly simplistic question without ever agreeing on a universally accepted
answer. This, he attributes to the very problematic nature of law as a concept, and as a
tool of social ordering.76 Thus, he suggests that the reason this inquiry into law seems to
be a never-ending one is the fact that the concept itself is inherently vague, and somewhat
stratified into several different categories, depending on the one making the inquiry, and
the one who may perceive it from a distance.77 Hence, according to him, any inquiry
relating to what law is must first begin with a critical examination of what the nature of
law is i.e. the essential characteristics of the phenomenon.78

Hart therefore believes that there are some recurring and fundamental issues that
crop up in any discussion of the nature of law i.e. (1) that law tends to make some human
conduct non-voluntary and obligatory; (2) that law and morality are sometimes viewed as
two sides of the same coin; and (2) that law consists of rules.79 The aforementioned, in
my opinion, seem to be the general characteristics of law as we know it. However, they
present enormous problems for social ordering when applied in real life settings. For
example, Hart contends that the idea that legal systems consist of rules is problematic –
because ‘what are rules’?80 He thus tries to draw a distinction between legal rules on one
hand, and what he terms ‘mere convergent habits of behavior’ on the other hand.81 For
example, we can consider the now established social norm of “tipping” at almost all
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Western restaurants, and even in Ghana in recent times as well. In Ghana, there is no
ascertainable law or rule that requires a customer to give the waiter or waitress who
served him or her at a restaurant a tip when the bill is being paid. However, it has now
become customary to give a tip of a percentage of your total bill, regardless of the quality
of service. Indeed, at some restaurants, the tip is pre-included in the bill. Is this then
considered a rule, to which all patrons must abide by? Or is it mere convergent habits of
behavior that customers generally adhere to the social norm by providing tips for services
rendered, in Ghana for instance?

I believe therefore that, any suggestion that law is merely a system of rules is
somewhat simplistic, although it probably captures the essence of what we call “law” in
many respects. Hart then discusses the three recurrent issues that in his opinion are at the
core of any analysis of the nature and essence of law.82 These three recurrent issues or
questions, which are derivatives of the aforementioned issues that crop up in any
discussion of the nature of law, are as follows: (1) How does law differ from, and how is
it related to orders backed by threats; (2) how does legal obligation differ from, and how
is it related to, moral obligation; and (3) what are rules, and to what extent is law an affair
of rules.83 In my humble opinion, I think the Austinian conception of law, essentially as a
collection of commands backed by sanctions, is a simplistic way of examining the nature
of law.84 This is because, such a description only captures the essence of some types of
laws, primarily amongst them is the criminal law.
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However, there are other types of laws that no sanctions attach from a failure to
conform to their dictates – for example marriage laws (for the law cannot and does not
compel one to marry at all cost). Similarly, even though it has been strenuously
contended in some quarters that law and morality are essentially two sides of the same
coin, and that any law that lacks a moral component is somehow valueless or immoral,
this in my opinion is simply not true. Admittedly, law and morality have a convergence
point sometimes. But the question that ought to be greatly examined in the same way that
the question of ‘what is law’ has, is what is morality?85 For example, whose conception
of morality must law adhere to? What standards must a particular behavior be measured
against in order to be deemed moral? This list can go on. Thus, the nature and essence of
law seems to be one of those theories that are most useful to philosophers and other
similarly placed persons, whose mission is to push the frontiers of such inquiries. The
practical reality to me however is that, when one comes into contact with the law, one is
likely to understand and appreciate its full effects without necessarily engaging oneself in
theoretical and philosophical debates, even though it is these same debates that are likely
to influence and shape public policy towards the morally neutral public policy framework
which I am proposing in this dissertation.

Chapter Two of Hart’s book is essentially a critique of John Austin’s formulation
of law as a collection of commands backed by threats i.e. the command theory of law.86
Hart acknowledges that it is the theory itself that seems to be at the center of his critique,
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not Austin.87 For my part, I think, any suggestion that law only comprises of commands
that are backed by threats of sanctions, is an overly simplistic way of analyzing the
essence of law, as I have already noted. For, as I have already suggested, there are
different types of laws that do not necessarily coerce people to act one way or the other,
and are merely indicative of procedural steps available to people, if they so wish in a
given situation or context. Thus, I believe that law should not only be seen through the
lenses or prism of commands backed by sanctions, as such a state of affairs only tend to
maximize the problem of defining law.

In Chapter Three, Hart discusses three (3) major objections to the construct of law
as made up of commands or orders backed by sanctions.88 These objections, according to
Hart, relate to the content of laws; their mode of origin; and their range of application.89
In Ghana for example, there are a wide range of laws that differ in terms of their content,
as well as how they are enacted, and their applicability. For instance, the Legal
Profession Act90 was enacted by Parliament, and deals primarily with the organization
and structure of legal education in Ghana, as well the regulation of the legal profession in
Ghana.91 Thus, this Act (or, law) is therefore of little consequence and practically useless
to the head porter who plies her trade on the roads of Accra central.92 However, it is of
great importance to law students and lawyers alike.
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In fact, quite recently, the General Legal Council that is established by virtue of
this law was adjudged by the Supreme Court of Ghana as having acted unconstitutionally
in terms of its continuous organization of entrance examinations for law students seeking
entry into the Ghana School of Law.93 On the other hand, Accra Metropolitan Assembly
(A.M.A.) By-laws are passed by the Assembly itself, and not necessarily by Parliament;94
and some of these by-laws may directly affect the head porter or roadside seller. The
point is that, Hart is right to identify different categories of law as a critique of the
command theory of law. For law does not simply consist of commands, but are a much
more complex phenomenon of a variety of rules meant for social ordering (assuming we
can properly define the exact meaning of “rules” – that is).

Chapter Four on the other hand discusses the idea that in every society where law
exists there is necessarily a Sovereign, who is habitually obeyed as a result of the ‘fear of
sanctions’ but this Sovereign habitually obeys no one.95 I find this idea preposterous to
say the least, as such a situation is not tenable with constitutional democracy. In fact, the
meaning of constitutionalism itself is limited power – limited power in the sense that the
sovereign or in contemporary times, all branches of government are to be limited in terms
of the powers that they have. To suggest therefore that a sovereign habitually obeys no
one or no laws therefore, is to advocate for autocratic and dictatorial rule. I must however
hasten to add that, despite this undesirable situation, there still exist a handful of countries
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in the world where the sovereigns or political leaders are essentially unaccountable, or are
only cosmetically accountable to the people or to the law for that matter.96

According to Hart, since the command theory of law fails to mirror what actually
pertains in a legal system, it is imperative for a redefinition of law – this is the essence of
Chapter Five of his work.97 Thus, he introduces the idea of primary and secondary rules
as embryonic of the essence of law.98 He suggests that primary rules generally impose
duties, whereas secondary rules confer public or private powers.99 Similarly, primary
rules concern actions involving physical movement or changes, whereas secondary rules
provides for actions that lead to the creation or variation of duties and obligations.100 He
concludes by suggesting that these two distinct but interrelated rules are the heart of any
formal legal system, and I totally agree with him.101

Chapter Six discusses, inter alia, the rule of recognition and legal validity, and
dissects the essential characteristics of a legal system.102 Just like Hart points out, I
believe that any formal legal system must have a solid foundation. Thus, the source of
validity of the rules that make up a legal system must be necessarily ascertainable to
avoid controversies. In Ghana for example, there has been an on-going debate in the legal
academy, especially with regard constitutional jurisprudence, as to where our present
laws derive their validity. For example, there is one school of thought that believes that
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since the 1992 Constitution expresses itself to be the supreme law of the land, all other
laws must necessarily derive their validity from it.103 On the other hand, another school of
thought is of the view that the 1992 Constitution itself, being a mere schedule to the
Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana (Promulgation) Law, 1992 (P.N.D.C.L.
282), cannot be the source of validity for our present laws; and that our “grundnorm” in
Kelsenian terms, must either be P.N.D.C.L. 282, or better still, the P.N.D.C.
Establishment Proclamation.104

Chapter Seven essentially is a description of the difference between statute law
(or legislation), and case-law (or judicial precedent). 105 These are what essentially
ordinary people see as the law i.e. what the statute says, and what the judges say. Thus, it
is imperative that in any society, the law be as clear as possible so as to order the affairs
of the people. Certainty of the law, I believe, is therefore of the utmost import in any
legal system. This is because, any uncertainty whatsoever may lead to disastrous
consequences. For example, if Parliament were to pass a law prohibiting the doing of
particular acts, but the courts interpret the law to exclude certain acts, that Parliament
included in the law as part of the prohibitions laid down, there could be some confusion
in the minds of people. This raises the question of judges legislating from the bench. Is it
really the duty of judges to use their position to essentially subvert the will of Parliament
(the people’s direct representatives) through legal interpretation? This is a hard question
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to answer, as legal interpretation is an essential part of most legal systems, thus a
necessary corollary of the nature of law generally.

Moving on from Hart’s exposition on the nature of law, The Bramble Bush by
Karl N. Llewellyn (hereinafter referred to as KNL) is also a classic exposition on the
nature, characteristics and the essence of law.106 KNL introduces the concept of law to his
audience by employing humor as well as everyday examples, thereby painting a vivid but
somewhat chaotic picture of the law, in the minds of new law students, who generally
have no idea whatsoever about the complex nature, as well as the philosophical basis of
law. Right from the onset, KNL attempts to disabuse the minds of his readers by
suggesting that the study of the law is not just easily compartmentalized as the study of
some abstract rules. Rules, he acknowledges are important for the effective functioning of
any legal system; but it is how these rules are actually applied in real life situations that
gives us a semblance of the true meaning and purpose of law.107

This is an important point simply because of the misconception in the minds of
many people, as to what law really is. Thus, by breaking down the study of law into
substantive and procedural (or as he put it “adjective”) law, one is left in no doubt that the
study of law encompasses not just mere rules that regulate human conduct and behavior
on a day to day basis, but also rules as to how to proceed when a legal dispute arises.
KNL also suggests that, it is the resolution of these legal disputes, and their subsequent
study thereof that enables us to easily predict how similar disputes will be resolved in the
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future, and also somewhat forces us to act in a manner consistent with the law.108 By
cleverly suggesting that the law is what the judges, lawyers and other law officers
actually do in practice, I believe KNL exposes us to an element of judicial activism as
opposed to restraint, and this is largely in tune with his concept of legal realism which
underpin most of his works – including this one.109

KNL skillfully encourages the student to read case law, because therein lies the
law. He attempts at opening up the minds of law students to engage in critical thinking,
whilst distilling the various rules that case law inadvertently establishes. This, I believe is
necessary because of the peculiar nature of the common law legal tradition that places
particular emphasis on judicial precedent – a concept he introduces his readers to as
well. 110 By delving into the law’s ancillary issues like logic and the philosophical
underpinnings of some of the most important theories of law, KNL lays the foundation
for critical thinking as to the essence and purpose of the law. It is however my opinion
that, delving into the law’s deep ocean at such an early stage in legal studies, albeit
introductory, generally tends to make that which is confusing even more so – which to his
credit, he gracefully admits, and prescribes a remedy for.111

Ronald Dworkin, on the other hand, addresses the nature and characteristics of
law in his work Hard Cases112 from the premise of the general belief and assumption that
the authority of judges extends only to the application of law, and not the making of law.
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However, this is not always possible due to the complex nature of adjudication. For
example, judges are often confronted with novel cases and situations, which inevitably
require the making of new law and the application of conceptions of morality, if such
cases are to be resolved. Conventional wisdom however suggests that judges must not
seek to usurp the power of the legislature, which is the proper law-making institution. It
follows therefore that judges act as “deputies” to the legislature, which of itself shows a
certain level of subordination; but also in hard cases, they also actually act as a “Deputy
Legislature” in the sense that they are inadvertently required to make law on the basis of
the facts and evidence presented before them, which is likely to motivate a legislature to
make that particular law any way assuming they were faced with similar facts.

Dworkin’s central thesis however seems to me to be the fact that, he does not
think judges should be or act as a deputy legislature. He is thus of the view that, the
popular assumption that when judges go beyond political decisions already made then
they are legislating from the bench is misleading and inaccurate. According to him, it
misses the fundamental distinction between principle and policy – concepts that are
central to Dworkin’s work. According to the author, a hard case is one where there exists
no settled rule that dictates a decision one way or the other. In such situations, policy or
principle will help generate the proper and appropriate decision. Dworkin however favors
the reliance and use of principle rather than policy in judicial decision-making, especially
in the hard cases.
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Dworkin also explores the view that adjudication should be unoriginal in a
democratic community by discussing briefly the major objections to judicial originality
i.e. the fact that judges are unelected officials and as a result the concept of accountability
will be defeated if they are to legislate from the bench; and the fact that retrospective
application of new law unfairly punishes losing parties for violation of new duties created
ex post facto. He is however dismissive of these criticism, and I tend to agree with him.
The fact is that, judges in the course of adjudication will often be confronted with
numerous hard cases. The question that needs to be resolved in such situations is: how do
they go about resolving disputes without overstepping boundaries? Dworkin’s distinction
between collective goals and individual rights may be of extreme help in such situations.
Collective goals for example are grounded in policy objectives, which seek to attain some
common ideals that are of benefit to society as a whole – this may involve conceptions of
a collective form of morality. On the other hand, individuated rights often seek to uphold
and most often reaffirm individual liberty, and may be based on conceptions of private
morality.

In my opinion, these two often-competing interests are two sides of the same coin.
For example, the right to equality and freedom from discrimination is aimed at protecting
individuals from some acts that tend to impinge on the right. By extension, society as a
whole (a collection of individuals) also benefit from the existence of this right. This, in
my mind, represents a principle. However, this right may be limited in its application, in
the sense that it may be the case that it is not absolute. Thus, a policy objective may exist
which limits the right and provides for differentiation in the treatment of people, which
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actually negates the idea of equality and non-discrimination. These similar, but
competing interests I believe should be balanced on a case by case basis, so that we do
not create a system of de facto and de jure majoritarian oppression.

Judges when faced with hard cases, often have to make a choice as to the best
possible approach in the resolution of the dispute. Statutory interpretation for example
even tends to further obfuscate the lines between judicial decision-making, and legislative
functions. For when a judge interprets the law in situations where lacunas may exist, he is
in actual fact making law, whether we want to believe it or not. It would be unreasonable
therefore to suggest that cases of such nature need not be resolved simply because there is
no controlling law applicable to the novel issues that such cases generally present.

Moving on from Dworkin’s perspectives on the nature of law, Freeman suggests
that positivist philosophers such as Austin and Kelsen in their attempt to define law
adopted an essentialist approach.113 Austin's command theory of law for example has
consistently been criticized and berated, even though there remains some support and
justification for the Austinian conception of law. As already noted, Austin defines law as
a command by a sovereign backed by sanctions. Thus, commands that do not emanate
from a sovereign and are not backed by some form of sanction(s) cannot conceivably be
referred to as law. This command theory of law is put in the following manner: ‘Laws
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proper or properly so called are commands. Laws which are not commands are improper
or improperly so called.’114

Austin thus divides these commands into two broad categories – those prescribed
by God on one hand, and those enacted by man. It is this second category of commands
that he famously refers to as “positive law”.115 His definition of law is that it is ‘a rule
laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power
over him.’116 Three core ideas can be deduced from this definition, which lies at the heart
of Austin’s conception of law i.e. that in any society there are superior and inferior
subjects; secondly, that there are superiors who constitute the ruling class; and thirdly, the
relationship between the superior ruling class and inferior subjects is one premised on
politics.

However, fellow positivist theorists have criticized John Austin, notably amongst
them H.L.A. Hart on the three concepts listed above. Hart highlights the fact that laws are
not limited to commands backed by sanctions. He recognises broadly the existence of
Austinian rules as primary rules and other rules as secondary rules. According to him,
these secondary rules include laws which confer powers on private individuals to alter
their legal relationship in relation to other people via the creation of wills, contracts, or
marriages as well as laws which confer powers to officials, e.g. to a judge to try cases, to
114
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a minister to make rules and so forth. To him, treating law as a matter of orders backed
by threats obscures this feature of law.

He also challenged whether laws really express any legislator's actual desires,
intentions, or wishes. ‘Would an enactment duly passed not be law if (as must be the case
with many a section of an English Finance Act) those who voted for it did not know what
it meant?’ 117 he enquires. This question also becomes important for other critics
especially of the utilitarian school of thought in a sense that the legislator's desires wishes
and intentions may be contrary to the benefit to be derived from a particular piece of
legislation. This is because some laws may be enacted merely on the basis of utility and
not necessarily because it expresses the sovereign's desire, intentions or wishes. In its
extreme form, Hart argues that Austin's argument would deny that the rules of the
criminal law, by their usual wording, are genuine laws. Similarly, Hans Kelsen adopts the
argument that law is the primary norm that essentially stipulates sanction. He suggests
that there is no law prohibiting certain kinds of conduct but rather there are laws directing
officials to apply certain sanctions in certain circumstances to those whose actions or
inactions so require. This line of thinking implies that genuine laws are conditional orders
to officials to apply sanctions.

Kelsen's theory has been seen as the climax of Bentham and Austin's theories.
According to Kelsen, a norm becomes a legal norm only because it is birthed of a definite
procedure and a definite rule. Law is valid only as positive law i.e. a statute or
(constituted) law. He eliminates anything else and refers to them as alien elements; hence
117
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his ideology is referred to as the pure theory of law.118 Thus, theoretically, a positivist
definition of what the law is would be easier to determine in any jurisdiction because it
eschews matters of ethics, social policies, metaphysics and morality.119 Hence, law that
seems morally reprehensible will however continue to have the force of law until the law
is altered by existent legal means.120

Another interesting theorist is Karl Marx. Marx's jurisprudence focused on
studying the nature of law within a society in flux.121 He considered law as a tool
developed by persons in the ruling class to dominate members of the working class, to
their utmost benefit or to maintain their superiority. However, his theory focused on the
dependence of the formation of states on a class system. He posited that after this process
and the use of a legal system to repress the lower class, there would be a socialist
revolution that would lead to a collapse of both the classes and the repressive legal
apparatus. This would result in the withering away of the state. Marx's theory has been
criticized and classified as one that rejects the rule of law and endorses a continuous
abuse of human rights.

Could it be that based on the choice or disposition of a sex worker and to serve
the interests of those in the higher classes of society, sex work may be commercialized
either for financial, sexual or other gains? Marx described sex work as being merely a
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specific expression of the general prostitution of a labourer.122 He also perceived that the
abolition of sex work was a necessary part of ending capitalism. Moreover, in The
Communist Manifesto, he referred to prostitution as the "complement" of the bourgeois
family. However, some have used Marxist theory to defend sex work by referring to it as
the selling of a service and not of the sex worker.123

Also, it is important to remember that industrialism and modern capitalism have
incited labourers to collectively bargain for rights to ensure safe working conditions and
that there is a shield from employers who ignore the well-being of the workers in favour
of profit.124 Female sex workers, unlike other labourers, are at perpetual risk of violence
at the hands of both their employers and their clients. Notably, this risk is not incidental.
It is the consequence of the literal commodification, the woman’s body and self - and not
just her labour.125 We may view this, in light of Marx's theory as a form of oppression of
the prostitute by persons in the upper classes or persons who at any point have the upper
hand and can afford their services. Thus, the example of sex work feeds into Marx’s
conception of law as a tool used for the oppression of the working class by the ruling
class.
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Moving away from Marx's jurisprudence, the rise in modern science came an
apparent unanimity on the use of scientific methods for the study law and legal
philosophy. With this in hand, philosophers of the sociological jurisprudence school of
thought such as Montesquieu, Jhering and Roscoe Pound have laid out their thoughts on
what law is as well. However, Sociological jurisprudence has been spoken of as one that
is not necessarily legal philosophy but rather attempts to use the various social sciences to
study the role of the law as a living force in society and seeks to control this force for the
social betterment.126 It views law as an instrument of social control, backed by the
authority of the state, directed towards achieving certain ends. It seeks to achieve these
ends by methods, which may be enlarged and improved through a deliberate effort.127

Roscoe Pound talked about “the end of law” as a topic that is more political than
jurisprudential.128 He explains that in the stage of equity and natural law the prevailing
theory of the nature of law apparently answers the question of what the end of the law is.
In his view, ideas of what law is for or its ends are so largely implicit in ideas of what law
is. Based on this, he propounded twelve conceptions of what law is or how law
distinguishes itself from other social phenomena. According to him, first and foremost, a
law is the idea of a divinely ordained rule or set of rules for human action, citing the
Mosaic law, or Hammurabi’s code as examples.129
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Second is the concept of law as traditions of the old customs approved by the
gods and hence point the way in which man may walk without bringing harm upon
himself. For primitive man, for instance, acting contrary to these customs would have
incurred the wrath of the gods. Third is the concept of law as recorded from traditional
custom of decision and custom of action and wisdom of the sages of old. He cites the
example of Demosthenes in the fourth century BC describing the law of Athens in this
manner. The fourth idea of law has to do with the conception of law as a philosophically
discovered system of principles, which express the nature of things so that men conform
their conduct, accordingly. In addition, the fifth idea, conceives law as a body of
'ascertainment’s and declarations of an eternal and immutable moral code.130

The sixth idea of law is a democratic version of the identification of law. It refers
to a body of agreements of men in politically organized society as to their relations with
each other. This according to Pound supports the political idea and the inherent moral
obligation that a promise would be invoked to show why men should keep the
agreements made in their popular assemblies. 131 Seventh is the idea that law is a
reflection of the divine reason governing the universe; which determines the “ought”
addressed by that reason to human beings as moral entities, as opposed to the “must”
which it addresses to the rest of creation. 132 Such was the conception of Thomas
Aquinas.133 The eighth concept is that law is a body of commands of the sovereign
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authority in a politically organized society as to how men should conduct themselves in
that society.134

A ninth idea of law comes in variant forms and has been classified by Pound as
dividing the allegiance of jurists with the command theory.135 It conceives law as a
system of precepts discovered by human experience.136 The tenth is the idea that law is
a system of principles, discovered philosophically and developed in detail by juristic
writing and judicial decision.137 Within this ideology, the external life of man is measured
by reason, or in another phase, the will of the individual in action is harmonized with
those of his fellow men.138

The Eleventh idea of law aligns with Marx's theory. This idea portrays law as a
body or system of rules imposed on men in society by the dominant class for the time
being in furtherance, conscious or unconscious, of its own interest.139 Finally, the twelfth
idea of law is made up of the dictates of economic or social laws as regards the conduct
of men in society.140 Pound’s concept of law is thus discovered by observation, and finds
expression in precepts worked out through human experience of what is or is not feasible
in the administration of justice.141 Pound thus underscored that the aim of these theories
was that they enabled us to understand a body of law or that institution and to perceive
what the men of the time were seeking to do with them or to make of them. In sum,
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Pound thought of law as a social institution to satisfy the claims and demands involved in
the existence of civilized society. He noted that this was done by giving effect to as much
as we may, with the least sacrifice, to order human conduct in a politically organized
society or for efficacious social engineering.142

B) WHAT IS MORALITY?

Morality or moral values, as it is sometimes referred to as, points to behaviour
that may be good or bad, right or wrong. This concept of morality has evolved from a
basis or reference to deity and nature, and currently is more self-referencing perhaps, than
any other concept in legal and social philosophy. Thus, discovering what is moral from a
self-referencing perspective is difficult to achieve and is an entirely personal and
subjective exercise. Attempting to do this for a society in a manner that represents it as a
whole may prove to be a daunting task, and rather impossible to achieve. Many have
therefore argued that there is no objective moral truth or authority. Therefore, there is no
objective legal truth or authority. It is wholly a personal and subjective exercise, just as
any moral viewpoint is a wholly personal and subjective viewpoint.143

Positivists argue that private moral views are not a proper basis for legislation and
moral disapproval alone is an improper basis on which to deny rights. According to them,
given that our whole human history is essentially a litany of opposing moral camps
waging war upon one another and the most powerful moral groups oppressing and
142
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terrorizing the less powerful, positivist would prefer that societal rules be spared similar
chaos. Morality seems to lack consistency because it is largely based on people’s opinion
about good or evil. What one considers moral may change depending on the time and
many other circumstances. Law on the other hand must reflect consistent rules that
govern human behaviour.144 Where there is lack of consistency it may lead to chaos and
disrespect of the law.

However, some theorists perceive positive law classically as a very potent tool for
shaping morality of people145. In their view, it advises society on the content of morality;
provides examples of how to act morally, and actually helps people to become moral
through its unique ability to motivate people to act in accordance with the dictates of
morality.146 This advice model has to do with propositional knowledge (i.e. knowing
what to do). The second is the emulation model of moral expertise. The emulation model
is about performative knowledge (i.e. knowing how to do something). It is therefore
suggested that some experts – perhaps the best experts – know both what to do and how
to do it.147 Positive law provides the avenue to do this.148

The motivational power of law might contribute to helping people to be moral
through directly communicating coercive orders to us; through the indirect pressure to
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respect the law exerted by wider society; and through the law’s role in supporting
mutually beneficial practices by underpinning duties of reciprocity. 149 Once people
recognise a corpus of instructions as law, they inevitably experience the effects of the law
because as they abide by it, they begin to live in a particular way. Kant could not put it
more tacitly: ‘A good constitution is not to be expected from morality, but, conversely, a
good moral condition of a people is to be expected only under a good constitution.’150

Natural law doctrine generally suggests that there are principles of law stronger
than statute to which the latter must conform.151 Natural law theorists test the validity of
law by referring to “absolute value” such that any law that lacks such values or does not
match up with this threshold is wrong and unjust. Aquinas, for instance, thought of law
as an aspect of God's plan for mankind. He categorised law into lex aeterna which is
God's rational direction for all things; lex divina, which is God's law as revealed in
scripture; lex humana, which is human law which must conform with reason and God's
law; and lex naturalis; which emerges from man's exercise of his reason in light of God's
word. According to Aquinas law must be good and for the common good.152

Aquinas viewed marriage, for example, as a primary human good, which had two
ends.153 One of such ends is procreation and nurturing of children in a manner aimed at
their good. The other is fides. This word implies faithfulness in terms of exclusivity and
permanence but is not limited to it. It also implies commitment to being united with one's
149
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spouse in mind, body, and a mutually assisting domestic life. He cited fides as good and
sufficient reason to engage in usus matrimonii or the sexual act intended for a husband
and wife to experience, actualise and express the good of their marriage.154 Against this
backdrop, he described depersonalised human acts such as sex work as instances of
'willing against the good of marriage.'155 This is because, according to him, promoting
sex work would be against reason's directive to respect and pursue the good of marriage
i.e. contra bonum matrimonii.156

In Aquinas' day, as in ours, many hold the view that mutually agreed/negotiated
sex could be classified as a moral issue. Even though Aquinas did not overlook this, he
noted that acts contra bonum matrimonii were wrong because individuals and societies
depended on the institution of marriage to flourish. It is also worth noting that Aquinas
gave credence to the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of the four virtues, on which morality
and all other virtues are based. These virtues constitute: understanding the reasons and
principles behind making and implementing choices (prudentia); a steady and lasting
willingness to give others what they are entitled to (justice); the integration of passions
(not just sexual passion) with reason to avoid becoming enslaved by it (temperamento);
and the quality of keeping disinclinations in check (fortitudo). Flowing from his moral
argument, Aquinas would certainly refer to any legislation permitting sex work, as bad
law.
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Aquinas' account of law also set out four areas of focus for finding the meaning of
law. First, he notes that law is an appeal to the mind choice and moral strength of persons
subject to it. Second is that, law is for the common good of a community. Third is that
law is posited by the responsible authority. Finally, it must be coercive. However, if the
lawmaker is not concerned for the community's common good or if while acting for the
common good there is an infraction as regards the fairness of the law, then the law is
unjust and lacks moral authority. According to Aquinas, ‘Laws can be unjust because
they are contrary to the divine good. In no way is it permissible to observe them.’157
Thus, when laws are just and are made by a just State, there is an obligation to obey
them; otherwise, the obligation is extinguished. To some positivists, this dissention to
obeying law as a command is characterised by disobedience, which is arguably immoral.
Disobedience, even to a so called bad law, sets an example and inclines other people to
disobey those laws as well as break “good laws” together with “bad ones”.158

The assertion ‘an unjust law is no law at all’ has the same logic as, for instance,
‘a disloyal friend is not a friend’ or ‘a quack medicine is not medicine’.159 It assumes
that there is a particular moral standard that law must meet. This moral standard
determines the validity of the law. Thus, Kant has argued that even the most unjust laws
create an obligation to obey, which is both legal and moral. He rejects a right to resist
unjust laws and the denial that they are fully legal. 160 Immanuel Kant, although a
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naturalist, however aimed to render morality undogmatic – to ground it in the fact of
reason. This led Kant to develop a theory of subjectivity. Kant's theory of the subject
relies heavily on his theory of epistemology. In Kant's view, we only know things by our
thought of them (the phenomena). We never know the things in themselves (the
noumena). Both Kant and Aquinas believed that virtue's priority should not be reduced to
happiness or self-fulfilment, which is important but must be considered with others in our
order of priorities.161 Kant noted that the fact that humans have reason and will and not
just instinct proved this point.162

The above notwithstanding, those who consider the virtue of utility as a basis of
law hold a contrary view. According to Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism,
utility is ‘that property of any object whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage,
pleasure, good or happiness; or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil or
unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in
general, then the happiness of the community; if a particular individual, then the
happiness of that individual.’163 He equated pleasure with good, and pain with evil.164
Using his felicific calculus, an algebraic sum of all the good a person suffered together
with their pain would be calculated to arrive at whether or not an act had good or bad
tendencies.165 This arithmetic applied to societies as well such that the summation of
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individual happiness would give the social sum.166 Based on this theory, he posited that
the science of legislation is knowledge of the good and the art of legislation was his
method of arriving at the good.167 The foundation he proffered for legislation was the
principle of utility.168

According to Bentham, legislation must prevent evils or unhappiness but rather
promote happiness.169 With this aim legislation must reflect a desire to attain subsistence
or abundance, diminish inequalities and provide security.170 However, he was opposed to
natural law concepts especially that of human rights. He argued that these could not be
philosophically proven and held them out as concepts, which oppose political sovereignty
and its practices.171 However, his theory was very relevant in transforming criminal law.
His theory rather influenced the evolution of more utilitarian sanctions.172 He also posited
that acts, which had a high possibility of producing harm, ought to be prohibited.173

Pleasure and pain are very subjective and the felicific calculus seemed and was
manifestly impracticable. Riding on these as well as an attempt for a clearer view of the
moral standards set out by utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill restated the concept.174 Instead
of the quantitative approach, Mill adopted a qualitative approach.175 In this approach, he
classified pleasure into superior or high-quality ones and inferior ones so that mere
166
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pleasure would cease to be the standard of morality.176 The higher pleasures to him, were
those derived from more intellectual activities whereas the inferior ones had to do with
basic needs such as food, drink, sex and so on.177 He added that it is the true expression
of our faculties that would lead to true happiness.178 Both Bentham and Mill believed that
a person should pursue their own happiness in relation to the happiness of the community
as well.

However, as regards his views on law, Mill wished to infuse general principles
into social and legal practices.179 According to him these practices ought to balance the
interest of every individual with that of the whole.180 Also, he diverged from Bentham's
perception about rights and justice. To Mill, Justice encompassed considerations of what
was not only right or wrong to do but also that which an individual can claim as his moral
right.181 These considerations are important because legislators must decide what or
whose policy, virtue or morals must inform legislation relating to sex work, and abortion
for example. With regards to sex work, should the issue be approached as a question of
protecting rights of sex workers as victims or a question of protecting persons who should
be at liberty to do whatever they please with their bodies? Practically, how should society
react if children start saying: 'I want to be a sex worker when I grow up?’ Should society
be alarmed at this depending on the approach which it adopts?
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C) THE LAW AND MORALITY DEBATES

Hart noted in the preface of his book, The Concept of Law that his aim for writing
the book was to further the understanding of law, coercion, and morality as different but
related social phenomena.182 According to him, the essence of legal positivism is the
“separation thesis”. This thesis is illustrated below:

Having a legal right to do 'x' doesn’t entail having a moral right to do it, and vice
versa; having a legal obligation to do something doesn’t entail having a moral
right to do it, and vice versa; having a legal justification to do something doesn’t
entail having a moral justification, and vice versa; and so on.183 In order to know
what your legal rights are, you need to look at what laws your society has. In
order to know what your moral rights are, you need to figure out what is the true
morality. You might have legal rights that the true morality says you shouldn’t
have (e.g. the right be a commercial sex worker, to own slaves to have an
abortion, the right to be mutilated), and your society might deny you legal rights
that the true morality says you should have (e.g. the right to be free, to stand by
what you believe, to own one’s own body and labour power).184

In a world of relative morality, one common ground has been the fact that the law is
applicable to all within a jurisdiction. People turn and run to the law whether it speaks to
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an issue or is silent on it, and almost regardless of what field may be more applicable in
finding a solution to any dilemma in society.

Williams J. noted in a speech he delivered that, ‘My concern is that, as we turn
increasingly to the “Temple” of the law for solutions to social problems and as a guide to
conduct, we give less and less recognition to any concept of values and morality above
the law; and that is a trend which is unhealthy for the law and for the society.’185 The
heavy reliance on law should be expected because law is such a basic foundation required
in statehood, as John Locke's social contract theory suggests. However, history also
teaches us that law when allowed to be put in force and operate within a vacuum can
cause more damage than anticipated. There is also the other extreme of running into error
by basing legal operations on moral dictates. How then do we solve this dilemma? Or
must we just allow the wrangling of these concepts to continue and use the back and forth
as a vehicle to shape the law?

These questions regarding the nature of law rear their heads in the practice of the
law. These are demonstrated by what Hart refers to as an appeal by men who experience
hell-created by other men - on earth.186 Some of these difficulties are demonstrated in the
following examples. First is the case of Oppenheimer v Cattermole.187 The contention in
this case, was whether an English Court should disregard Nazi laws that stripped a
German Jewish refugee of his citizenship in line with German Basic law at the time. The
185
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House of Lords felt itself bound to hold that Oppenheimer had lost his citizenship. Lord
Cross stated in obiter that the Nazi law constituted so grave an infringement of human
rights that the Courts ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all. In light of this
Freeman writes:

But what are 'human rights'...and what is sufficiently 'grave' infringement ... Is
such a law not a law at all? And if it is not, are citizens released from their
obligation to obey? Indeed, do citizens have a reason to obey law and if so what is
the nature of this obligation and is it absolute or qualified and if qualified in
which ways?188

This example seems light compared to the genocidal atrocities committed by the Nazi
regime. However, Hart argues that the spiritual message of liberalism must not be
overvalued. He insists that Law is not morality and society could equally refuse to allow
it to supplant morality.

However, Radbruch's conception of law underscored the essential moral principle
of humanitarianism.189 This principle was applied in practice by German courts in certain
cases in which local war criminals, spies, and informers under the Nazi regime were
punished.190 Notably, persons accused of these crimes claimed that what they had done
was legal under the laws of the Nazi regime when their actions were performed.191 The
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position of the courts was that their actions lacked legal validity because their stance
contravened the fundamental principles of legality and morality.192 One of such cases
cited by Hart based on which the Hart-Fuller debate ensues is the case concerning the
Grudge informer.

In 1944 a man made insulting remarks about Hitler while home on leave from the
German army. With the aim of getting rid of her husband, his wife denounced him to the
authorities based on those remarks. His utterances were apparently in violation of statutes
that criminalized statements detrimental to the government of the Third Reich; however,
she had no legal obligation to report him. The man, upon arrest, was sentenced to death,
pursuant to these statutes. Though he was not executed upfront, he was sent to the front.
In 1949 the wife was prosecuted in a West German court for the offense of illegally
depriving a person of his freedom under the German Criminal Code of 1871, which had
remained in force since its enactment. According to the reasoning of the court, the statute
‘was contrary to the sound conscience and sense of justice of all decent human
beings.’193

Though this reasoning was followed in many cases and has been regarded as a
triumph for the doctrine of natural law, Hart spells out two other choices. Firstly, the
courts could have let the woman go unpunished; and the other was to face the fact that if
the woman were to be punished it must be pursuant to the introduction of a retrospective
law and with a full consciousness that the basic principles of Nullum crimen, nulla poena
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sine lege were sacrificed in securing her punishment in this way. Indeed, very precious
principles of morality endorsed by most legal systems had been sacrificed. Hart's point
was that there may well be moral reasons to revolt against such oppressive legal systems
but that it would be absurd to say that no legal system existed at all - because parts of it
were unjust.

However, herein lie the seeming contradictions, which Lon Fuller points out.194
Fuller explains by reiterating Hart's warning about thoughts expressed regarding the
maintenance of distinctions between positivism and morality when he posits that 'we may
lose a "precious moral ideal," that of fidelity to law.'195 Fuller notes that even though
there is no reason why the argument for a strict separation of law and morality cannot be
rested on the double ground that this separation serves both intellectual clarity and moral
integrity those who find the "positivist" position unacceptable base their argument on 'the
double ground that its intellectual clarity is specious and that its effects are, or may be,
harmful.'196

My position is that, even though law and morality are essentially different, it is
difficult and at times absurd to completely alienate them from each other. Untainted
positivism has implications of disregarding the merits or demerits of law and its effect on
society - even across different jurisdictions. Whereas the other extreme may lead to some
form of oppression as well. Thus, the Hart-Devlin Debate on the other hand was sparked
off by the Report to the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution
194
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(hereinafter, the Wolfenden Report), which recommended some changes in British law
on sexual offences. 197 The Wolfenden report was premised on these: first, that the
function of criminal law as regards prostitution and homosexual offences was to 'preserve
public order and decency, and to protect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious
and to provide sufficient safeguards against the exploitation and corruption of others.'198
The second theory was that 'unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting
through the agency of law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, there must
remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not
the law's business.'199

Even though Devlin was in favour of easing sanctions for certain homosexual
crimes, he rejected the philosophy of the report. He noted that England's criminal law had
from the beginning concerned itself with moral principles. He also contended that in the
interest of preservation of order and the smooth running of society, certain activities had
to be regulated. Hart rejected Devlin's approach decrying his views and reasoning that it
was not morally permissible to enforce the tenets of morality. Devlin inquired whether
there ought to be a public morality or whether morals were always a matter for private
judgement. Secondly, he queried whether if society had a right to pass judgment it also
maintained a right to enforce it. Third, if the second question were answered in the
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affirmative, must society use this in all cases or only in some; and for what reasons may
the cases be distinguished?200

Devlin answered his first two questions in the affirmative.201 His view was that
the Wolfenden report took the existent public morality, which condemned both
homosexuality and prostitution at the time for granted. In defending his answer to the
second question, Devlin noted that society may use its laws to protect morality in the
same manner in which it protects other things essential to the community's existence. To
the third question, he underscored the necessity to discuss how the society's moral
judgements could be ascertained making reference not necessarily to the reasonable man
but perhaps the man in the jury box or the “right thinking man”. Hart disagreed and felt
that Devlin's approach could not adequately solve the problem. Hart argued, on various
points among which was his agreement with utilitarian concepts that the punishments for
sexual misdemeanours often resulted in disproportionate social misery. Hart also
cautioned legislators to pause and think on what the nature of general morality is as well
as the concept of the “right thinking man'”.

Thus, in Chapter eight The Concept of Law,202 captioned “Justice and Morality”,
Hart once again challenges the notion that in analyzing or elucidating the concept of law,
the necessary focal point is the connection between law and morality.203 He states as
follows:
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The claim that between law and morality there is a necessary connection has
many important variants, not all of them conspicuous for their clarity. There are
many possible interpretations of the key terms ‘necessary’ and ‘morality’ and
these have not always been distinguished and separately considered by either
advocates or critics. The clearest, perhaps, because it is the most extreme form of
expression of this point of view, is that associated with the Thomist tradition of
Natural Law. This comprises a twofold contention: first, that there are certain
principles of true morality or justice, discoverable by human reason without the
aid of revelation even though they have a divine origin; secondly that man-made
laws which conflict with these principles are not valid law. “Lex iniusta non est
lex.” Other variants of this general point of view take a different view of both the
status of principles of morality and of the consequences of conflicts between law
and morality. Some conceive morality not as immutable principles of conduct or
as discoverable by reason, but as expressions of human attitudes to conduct which
may vary from society to society or from individual to individual.204

Critiquing these ideas, Hart examines the concept of justice and suggests that it is
essentially an element of morality and is subjective depending on the perspective one has.
He uses several real-life examples like race relations, slavery and inequality between the
sexes in arriving at his conclusions. He concludes that justice is only one aspect of
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morality focused not on individual conduct per se, but rather on how classes of
individuals are treated.205

Hart also suggests that moral rules and legal rules are both similar, but yet
dissimilar. Their similarity in scope is what he attributes to their “common vocabulary”,
and also the fact that conformity to both is dictated by serious social pressure. However,
he differentiates law and morality in the following manner: whereas legal rules require
external behavior, morality does not require any specific external action. He goes on
further to examine four essential features that he believes distinguishes morality not just
from law, but also from all other social rules.206 I therefore agree with his conclusions
that some aspects or derivatives of morality are personal to the individual and may not
necessarily mirror that of society. Finally, in chapter nine, Hart discusses law and
morality in some more detail and concludes that any conception of law must have at its
core the idea that the invalidity of a law can be distinguished from its immorality. This he
says will ‘enable us to see the complexity and variety of these separate issues; whereas a
narrow concept of law which denies legal validity to iniquitous rules may blind us to
them.’207 Regardless of all the criticisms to Hart’s approach, I tend to agree with him on
the distinction between law and morality.
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On the other hand, Lon Fuller’s The Morality of Law,208 one of the most oft-cited
jurisprudential works in any inquiry into the nature and character of law and its
relationship with morality, essentially challenges Hart’s views. Fuller’s central argument
revolves around eight canons of a legal system properly so-called or legal procedure for
that matter. These eight canons can be deduced from the long narrative/parable about a
good-natured King (Rex) who intends to make law for his subjects, which Fuller
describes in the book.209 The canons are as follows: (1) laws should be general; (2) laws
should be promulgated in a way that the citizens know the standards to which they are
being held; (3) retroactive laws or rule-making and application should be minimized; (4)
law should be easily comprehensible; (5) laws should not be contradictory; (6) laws
should not require behavior or conduct beyond the capabilities of those affected; (7) laws
should be stable and predictable i.e. they should remain constant for long periods; and (8)
promulgated laws and their actual application must have a convergence point.210

According to Fuller, failure to adhere to these eight canons essentially deprives a
legal system of the legality it requires, hence his idea of the ‘internal morality’ of law. He
puts it this way: ‘A total failure in any one of these eight directions does not simply result
in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at
all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void contract can still be said to
be one kind of contract.’211 This “inner” or “internal” morality of law is what according
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to Fuller makes law whole.212 Law must therefore have a moral content, which must be
ensured by those who make law, who according to Fuller have a moral duty so to do.213

Fuller has however been criticized for failing to adequately define his concept of
morality in a clear and coherent manner. Dworkin for example states that:

It is difficult to see how the argument from Rex justifies these moral
characterizations and designations: it is difficult, indeed, to see what they mean.
Fuller seems not even to recognize that such terms present difficulties of
interpretation–he moves from the language of strategy to the language of morals
without the slightest caesura of transition. We are left on our own to work out and
identify the claims latent in the terms he uses. He cannot mean, by speaking of an
“internal morality” without which even bad law would not be possible, that a
tyrant who curbs his instincts for iniquity only to the extent necessary to maintain
a legal system has done anything morally praiseworthy.214

H.L.A. Hart also criticizes Fuller’s internal morality of law as being ‘unfortunately
compatible with very great iniquity.’215

Another major work that has captivated my attention and influenced my thoughts
is The Path of the Law by Oliver Wendell Holmes.216 This work is striking for several
212
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reasons. The structure of the address and the underpinning philosophical contradictions
that I believe are inherent in the work makes for interesting, but sometimes poignant
reading. As a result, my critique is structured along the lines of Holmes’ arguments on
law & morality only; as I do not think it necessary to focus on his arguments relating to
the content and growth of the law and on the study of jurisprudence.

On Law & Morality, Holmes begins by suggesting that, law is simply the study of
‘dogma and systematized predictions.’217 By far his most famous words ‘the prophecies
of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the
law’218 exposes us to his deep-seated belief in judicial activism, by pitting two contrasting
views of law against one another i.e. judicial restraint towards legislation on one hand,
and strict constructionism of legislation on another hand. Holmes suggests that the law is
what the judges say it is, and not necessarily what the legislature intended it to be.219 To
buttress his point, Holmes spectacularly dispels the confusion naturally associated with
the law and morality by giving us “the bad man/good man” analogy.220 We must note
that, Holmes’ bad man has little or no regard for morality.221

Although, he admits that morality has played a crucial role in the development of
the law and cannot wholly be divorced from it, he nonetheless envisages a time where
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law would be devoid of the moral ambiguity that some legal concepts portend. 222
Enforceability of the law is also at the heart of Holmes argument, and I totally agree with
this aspect – for what is the value of a law that is incapable of enforcement?
Enforceability however, intrinsically is premised somewhat on morality. Holmes views
here can thus be juxtaposed with some classical natural law theorists like Augustine &
Aquinas who both suggested that an immoral law was no law at all. Thus, the right to
disobey laws that are devoid of any moral content or value/that runs counter to common
sense had long been established in legal thought before the time of Holmes.

Holmes also tries to draw a distinction between legal positivism and natural law.
In this regard, he considers some well-established legal concepts by approaching it from
the point of view of the bad man. He asks whether the bad man can draw a distinction
between a penalty and a tax.223 In my mind, to suggest that a man of little or no morals is
incapable of, or totally oblivious to the fundamental legal distinction between a tax (a
compulsory levy imposed by the State to aid development) and a penalty (a punishment
for breaking the law – which may be monetary in nature) suggests to me that Holmes
could care less about the reasoning ability of persons not conversant with the law.

D) SEX WORK, THE LAW AND MORALITY

There are various ways of viewing sex work, leading to different kinds of
reactions. If sex workers are viewed as victims it implies they have to be protected by
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society. If they are merely workers in a trade a different regime of protection arises. Also,
if they are seen as culprits and merely as an affront to the moral standards of the society a
different legal regime is employed to protect society from them. Therefore, various States
have used different approaches in dealing with sex work. Most secular States are moving
away from laws based on morality or religion to either the sex work model or the sexual
exploitation model; while others stop at some point within the continuum between the
two.

Each model corresponds with a particular legal approach. The best way to end this
industry is debatable. The sex work approach favours across-the-board decriminalization
with structured legalization. The goal of this model is to remove criminal sanctions from
all actors in the sex industry. Consequently, sex work, under this model, will become as
legitimate as any other mode of livelihood. Various countries and communities that have
adopted this model in various forms include The Netherlands, Germany, New Zealand,
and Victoria in Australia. Also, about ten counties in Nevada, United States, have
adopted versions of this approach, although some are retreating from it.224

The sexual exploitation approach seeks to abolish sex work. However, key
features of this model include criminalizing the demand (including the buyers) — as well
as the sellers (pimps and traffickers), while decriminalizing prostituted people—the
sold—and providing them services and job training that they require. This is popularly
known as the Swedish approach as it is believed to have been pioneered in Sweden.
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Countries that have adopted this model include Iceland and Norway. The U.K. seems to
be leaning in this direction as well.

In August 2014, the Guardian noted that without the correct information, myths
abound and debates on sex work become polarised. 225 This, according to the news
agency, was illustrated by the recent reactions to Amnesty International’s endorsement of
decriminalising sex work.226 The recommendations by Amnesty International included
among others the need for States to refrain from enacting and/or review and repeal laws
that make sex workers vulnerable to human rights violations.227 Also, States were to
protect every individual in their jurisdiction from discriminatory policies, laws and
practices which increase vulnerability to human rights violations while engaged in sex
work and limit options for voluntarily ceasing involvement in sex work.228 Moreover,
States were to incorporate into their strategy, the harm reduction principle.229 They are
also to prevent and combat trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and to
protect the human rights of victims of trafficking.230

Also, States have been tasked to criminalize the sexual exploitation of children;
recognizing that a child involved in commercial sex work is a victim of sexual
exploitation, entitled to support, reparations, and remedies, in line with international
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human rights law, and that States must take all appropriate measures to prevent sexual
exploitation and abuse of children.231 Finally, Amnesty International urged States to take
appropriate measures to realize the economic, social and cultural rights of all people so
that no person enters sex work against their will or is compelled to rely on it as their only
means of survival, and to ensure that people are able to stop sex work if and when they
choose.232

Some of the reactions to this have included the reiteration of public morality.
Thus, there is evidence that decriminalisation causes trafficking to skyrocket in any
country – this has been noted in countries such as the Netherlands who employ the sex
work model.233 Also, proponents of the feminist agenda such as Catherine MacKinnon,
Andrea Dworkin and Katherine Berry have done extensive work in this area and also
present formidable arguments for seeing sex workers - especially females - as victims
(the sexual exploitation model). Mackinnon, for example, notes that whichever way sex
commercialisation is regarded, it impacts not only the law but also the culture and the
policy of any people. She does not contend that States should not adopt measures to
realize the economic, social and cultural rights of all people so that no person enters sex
work unwillingly. However, she challenges the notion that people enter into or remain in
sex work willingly.
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According to research, most sex workers enter the system as minors234 who
according to many jurisdictions are incapable of consenting or willingly able to enter
such a trade. Truly few people may ever enter willingly; however, many females began
sex work as infants or many suffered abuse while they were minors and this has
catapulted them into the trade.235 According to Mackinnon, carving out a definition of
prostitution is not necessarily profitable as people usually took advantage of inadequacy
of definitions to perpetuate this level of trafficking. However, she described it as
essentially any sexual act, the consideration for which is not sex. Sexual intercourse is an
interaction (call for and response with sex) between consenting people. Therefore, she
notes, as regards the sexual act itself, that money or the consideration provided coerces
the sex worker rather than guarantees their consent. When people pay for sex, they would
demand value for their money. That demand is well against the will of any sex worker.

She proves this by noting that a vast majority of sex workers suffer from PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The degree of their suffering is comparable to that
which is suffered by victims of rape and veterans of war. This has led many of them to
become dependent on drugs and pimps who would give them more drugs to numb their
pain at the cost of their freedom. These facts are similar to facts gathered in Sweden
according to which usually young women or girls below 25 years who were sex workers
were also found to be drug addicts.236 This plunges them deeper into the sex trade. She
therefore alludes to the fact that many of the female sex workers who voluntarily engage
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in sex work are victims, essentially blinded by a false consciousness. These facts, in her
view, point to sex work as systemic dehumanisation and objectification of persons
especially females regardless of their age.237

Furthermore, the concept of “elimination of harm”, which Amnesty International
recommends, is not central to the sex work agenda because it is incoherent with sex for
sale. It has been argued that when sex work is understood as sexual exploitation we
recognise that it cannot be made safe. According to the statistics on the multiplication of
trafficking, decriminalising legislation seems to be a failed experiment.238 Where pimping
and brothel keeping were legalized, trafficking increased and the welfare of sex workers
suffered.239 In 1999, when Sweden passed a law criminalizing the buying but not the
selling of sex, many outsiders were sceptical of this regime. However, in recent times the
Swedish model has gathered lots of momentum. Norway and Iceland subsequently
adopted it. Critics are however of the view that, such laws increases the stigma on sex
workers, with occasionally grave repercussions.

On the basis of the Utilitarian theories of Mill and Bentham, and the
Deontological views of Kant, some people have suggested that sex work is unethical.240
Mill's theory of utilitarianism proposes the concept of a higher form of pleasure. He
categorised these into two: first, duties of good-will, or benevolence, and second, duties
of indebtedness or justice. Bentham subscribed to the first as well - which he referred to
237
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as altruism.241 Actions falling under the first group were benevolent; those falling under
the second are righteous and compulsory, according to Kant. Kant adds that, the chief of
these duties is respect for the rights of others. It is our duty to regard them as sacred and
to respect and maintain them as such.

Kant also proposes a test for determining whether or not something is ethical. 242
The first of these is, whether the act in question allows for the universality of moral
judgments, whether it is applicable to anyone, anywhere, and at anytime. The second test
is whether the act deals with all persons in ways that treat them as ends. In other words,
persons cannot use people for their own benefit. Applying Kant's standards, first the act
sex work will be deemed unethical because it is not universal. According to Kant, if the
intent of an action in question can without self-contradiction be universalized, it is
morally possible; if it cannot be so universalized without contradicting itself, it is morally
impossible.243 It is ridiculous to think that everyone could be a sex worker or partake in
sex work. Indeed, if children began to say to their parents that they would like to be sex
workers in future, many parents would either be in a state of shock or take really drastic
measures to avoid this.

Kant also disagreed with the use of people to satisfy the sexual desires of others.
He asked: ‘May a man for instance, mutilate his body for profit? May he surrender
himself at a price to the highest bidder?’244 Sex work, like slavery, consists of one person
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selling their body to another and this violates even their duty to themselves, according to
him. He underscored that, 'If a man for gain or profit submits to all indignities and makes
himself the plaything of another, he casts away the worth of his manhood.’ 245 Kant's
position is that sex workers give up their freedom and perhaps give away bits of their
person because of the inherent objectification. Kant adds that sexual love makes the
person an object of appetite, and as soon as that appetite has been stilled the person is cast
aside as one cast away a lemon which has been sucked dry.246

It has thus been suggested that sex workers have enormously restricted life
choices, and many of these women have been physically coerced into the profession.
Coupled with statistics on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), stigmatisation and the
prevalence of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, sex work seems to cause more pain than
pleasure. While it causes one party pleasure, which may be fleeting, it is argued that it
causes the other equal - if not more - pain. To some writers these qualities negate each
other. Using this analysis, some have argued that Bentham, Mill and Kant would oppose
sex work because of its lack of utility and because it is unethical.247

It is important to however note that most of the theoretical frameworks
regarding violence against women emanated from feminist theories.248 Feminist
theory is broad and largely inter-disciplinary in approach. Its goal is to understand
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the roles, experiences, and values of individuals on the basis of gender.249 In the
arena of sexual exploitation, the main feminist question is whether sex work or any
exchange of sex for something of financial value is or can be voluntary.250 This
discussion actually sets the tone on what legal approach should be used by States in
addressing issues regarding sex work. With regard to sexual exploitation or sex
work, scholars and advocates are generally divided into two opposing theoretical
camps. One group condemns all forms of voluntary and involuntary sex work as a
form of oppression against women. This group is usually referred to as neoabolitionists. According to them, sex work is never entirely consensual and cannot
be regarded as such.251 The other group contends that a woman has a right to
choose sex work as a form of employment or even as a career.

Out of these two camps, four strands of feminism have however been
identified, each of which approaches the issue of sex work somewhat differently,
according to Professor Patricia Cain.252 They are Liberal, Cultural, Postmodern and
Radical feminism. Liberal feminism concerns itself with equal rights and
opportunities and the intensification of constitutional rights to women. Radical
feminism on the other hand stresses that women must be perceived as one class
dominated by another (Marxist feminism), with resulting class struggle. It also
advocates changes in laws that favour the male class to curtail inequalities of
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power.253 Neo-abolitionist perspectives with regard to sexual exploitation of women
and girls emerged from Radical and Marxist feminism. Radical feminism sees social
organization and structure as inherently patriarchal, as sexism exists to maintain
male privilege and the patriarchal social order. 254 This theory stipulates that
violence against women is a systemic form of men's domination and social control of
women. Thus, assaults occur primarily because of institutionalized male privilege,
as men believe it is their right to inflict violence against women.

The perception is that sexual commerce provides a patriarchal right of access
to women's bodies. Hence, it perpetuates women's subordination to men.255 Like
radical feminism, Marxist feminism is another neo-abolitionist stance that generally
views all forms of sexual commerce as a form of violence against women. Marxist
feminists have contended that sexuality corresponds to feminism in the way work
does to Marxism i.e. that which is most one's own and yet is taken away. 256
According to Marxist feminism, women's oppression stem from economic
dependence on men in a male-centric society257 and capitalism continues to be the
overarching oppressor of women. Marxist feminists thus postulate that for so long
as capitalism exists, women will live in a patriarchal state and economically depend
on men in a society structured around social class.258
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Flowing from this, Marxist feminists believe that economic exploitation takes up
many forms such as sex work and pornography. This to them is the oppression of sex and
class as 'Women's sexuality and sexual energy is appropriated by the men who buy or
control the sexual services exchange (i.e., pimps) just as any worker's energy is
appropriated to the capitalists for their profits, leading to alienation of one's bodily
capacities and very bodily being.'259 Catherine MacKinnon, who has been described as a
Marxist feminist legal scholar, argues that all forms of pornography, sex work, and sex
trafficking are abuses of sex and a form of power taken away from women.260

Critics have however argued that these forms of feminism do not support the
autonomy of women currently or previously engaged in sex work when they choose to
leave the field or provide any subsequent form of advocacy work.261 In response to these
criticisms, and adding to an entrenched debate of feminism, choice, and freedom, a new
feminist framework arguing for women's right to choose sex work has emerged.262 The
pro-sex work perspective, or sex positivism is one of its off shoots.263 Advocates of this
perspective hold that all forms of sexuality – whether paid or unpaid is consensual in
many cases and that a woman should be free to make her own decision regarding the type
of work in which she chooses to partake.264 According to this school of thought, any
mandate or perspective dictating to women that their choice of work is wrong remains
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dangerous and inherently patriarchal.265 Sex positivists shift the model of sex work from
a typically neo-abolitionist model that rescues and protects victims from sex work and
sexual exploitation to providing services for women who work in the sex industry.266

The Neo-abolitionist view is very critical of sex positivism however, hence the
tension in the approach of dealing with pornography and sex work.267 Mackinnon argues
for example that the presence of consideration creates a demand for sex and negates
consent.268 The consent is purchased as opposed to being granted. Others have argued
that sex positivism and the issue of consent cannot be addressed without also considering
the high rates of sexual assault and abuse histories, in addition to a lack of economic
options. 269 Moreover, some religious organizations contend that this framework
jeopardizes sexual integrity on a national level because moral culture is damaged when
sex becomes commercialized. 270

Intersectionality, as another model of conceptualizing sex work, adopts various
opposing feminist views to explain a woman's varied experiences based on her race,
class, sexual orientation or other identity she holds in addition to her sex. 271 This
framework has been criticized for its lack of a defined intersectional methodology and
empirical validity, and the fact that, primarily, it has been used to address Black women's
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experience and is not politically and empirically inclusive of other identity intersections,
such as sexual orientation or race.272 It is further criticized for contributing to or creating
additional hierarchies for women.

On another hand, the political economy perspective or framework recognizes
important principles of intersectionality and argues that violence against women occurs
because of the economic welfare and political processes driving the State.273 Marxist
feminism and the political economy perspective are alike in this sense. However, the
political economy perspective is mainly based on capitalistic differences in wealth alone,
as opposed to systemic oppression against women, which are engendered by disparities in
wealth. They highlight the lack of cultural or social capital of women who struggle
against economic, social, and sexual oppressions. They believe that women are
compelled to sell sexual or erotic services because the political environment at the policy
level does not offer equal opportunities for women to gain social capital generally. 274
This framework like the Marxism or Radical Feminism also questions the woman's
ability to choose. For this reason, they face similar criticism on those grounds.

These contrasting theoretical frameworks drive the debate with regard to the
prohibition, decriminalization, partial criminalisation, partial legalization, or complete
legalization of prostitution and commercial sex work. Although various States apply the
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theories in variant forms, the debate would never really end.275 With the exception of
parts of Nevada, the United States currently maintains a prohibitionist stance on sex
work, as anyone who participates in the promotion or participation of sexual activities for
profit in the U.S. may be charged with prostitution and commercial vice. No distinction is
made between those who buy, sell, or facilitate the selling of sex acts. Exceptions include
cases that involve: (1) minors, in which any commercial sex act is illegal; and (2) adults,
only when elements of force, fraud, or coercion are present. Many other States adopt this
model.276

Those who support prohibition of sex work base their arguments on the high rates
of homelessness; mental health trauma, drug addiction and sexual/physical assault over
the course of sex work and indicate that most people engaged in sex work do not freely
consent.277 According to them, legalization and decriminalization would not decrease its
harm to women and girls.278 The Sex positivist movement however argues that countries
like the U.S. set a high standard or burden of proof for trafficking victims and criminalize
the activities of women who sell sex and those who may also be in need of services. Also,
because sex workers would have a criminal record they may never be able to exit the
trade. Others argue that these standards are detrimental to women because they are
viewed and treated as criminals unless there is proof of force or coercion. 279

275

Id.
Cheryl Overs, Sex workers' rights: mapping policy around the world (The Guardian 2015)
<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/sep/15/laws-against-sexworkers-can-a-map-help-to-move-the-discussion-forward> Accessed on 5th November, 2017
277
Gerassi, supra note 248.
278
Id.
279
Id.
276

84

CHAPTER THREE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: A NEW MORALITY

A morally neutral public policy framework underpinning laws is an ideal that many
scholars in recent times have argued is impossible to achieve and even undesirable.280
Some commentators even suggest that it amounts to a moral claim to suggest that law
ought to be neutral.281 However, in advocating for “moral neutrality” and a public policy
regime for regulating human conduct with that as its basis, I am not suggesting that there
is a universally accepted construct of morality, free from value judgments. What I
however mean and intend to do is to remove or dissociate the underlying “moral” content
of some laws which are predicated on religious and/or cultural conceptions of morality,
from the conduct that is the subject matter of the law in question or the criminal
prohibition thereof.282 Thus, the conduct devoid of religious and/or cultural overtones
will then have to be examined within the context of our pluralistic society in order to
determine the values that must replace or augment some aspects of the religious and/or
cultural values that usually frown upon or prohibit such conduct.

Social mores however are usually developed over a long period of time and in
many instances have been entrenched without much debate. In Ghana for instance, the
impact of religion is arguably part and parcel of the identity of the people.283 Many
280
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Ghanaians are therefore not afraid to tout their religious beliefs and be guided in their
day-to-day interactions adhering to religion imposed moral codes. As an undergraduate
student at the University of Ghana a few years ago, I once interacted with another student
who vehemently opposed any notion that the supreme law of Ghana was the Constitution,
1992. To this person, as a Christian, it was the Bible that was the supreme law and no
human or earthly edict could claim supremacy over it. I was at pains to explain the
position that Ghana was a secular state and as such it was the Constitution that was the
supreme law; but I was rebuked and described as a blasphemous person for daring to
suggest what I was suggesting.284 Such is the common misunderstanding and blurring of
the lines and issues that is commonplace within the Ghanaian society where secular law
and religion conflate.285

Similarly, Ghanaians are proud to boast of our culture, which we deem virtuous
and which influences our views and opinions regarding contemporary and controversial
issues.286 Cultural validity is thus a jealously guarded treasure of national import, and this
has been the justification for the condemnation of several conduct that do not meet
standards of our conception of cultural morality.287 Thus, cultural morality continues to

(4,345,723) are Muslims. Traditionalists account for 5.2% (1,270,272) of the population, whereas other
religions account for 0.8% (193,914) of the population. Interestingly, only 5.3% (1,302,077) of Ghanaians
have no religion or religious affiliation whatsoever. See GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE, 2010 POPULATION
& HOUSING CENSUS: SUMMARY REPORT OF FINAL RESULTS (2012).
284
It is a notorious fact that in Ghana, many religious people (particularly Christians) hold similar views
especially where the secular law purports to set standards that are contrary to Christian beliefs or ethics.
285
Maame A.S. Mensa-Bonsu & Samuel Nartey, ‘Though we are many, we are one body – Under the
Constitution’ (Citifmonline, 21 April 2015) <http://citifmonline.com/2015/04/21/though-we-are-many-weare-one-body-under-the-constitution/> accessed on 10 October 2017.
286
Ghana News Agency (GNA), ‘Ghana Must Sustain Culture for Future Generation’ (Peacefmonline, 2
August 2013) http://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/local/social/201308/170656.php> accessed on 10
October 2017.
287
It is not unusual to hear many Ghanaians suggest that prostitution or sex work is immoral and culturally
unacceptable, for example.

86

be one of the underlying values that influence public policy making, which in turn
justifies the existence of certain laws.288 The questions that need to be addressed as a
result are as follows: should conceptions of religious and cultural morality continue to be
the only factors that determine public policy, and subsequently determine conduct that
are deemed not to be in the public interest and as a result criminalized? If the answer to
this first question is in the negative, then what other variables must we consider in public
policy making?

In this chapter, I delve into public policy making and examine certain prima facie
“morally neutral” variables which I believe must be considered and balanced against the
religious and cultural justifications that will continue to play a role where the morality of
Ghanaian laws and specific intimate conduct are concerned.289 I thus examine sexual
morality generally, from the religious and cultural perspectives, and briefly discuss
feminist jurisprudential thoughts within this field as well. In order to propose my
framework for the proper regulation of sexual morality, I draw inspiration from the
making of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which is significant
because many diverse groups of people for the first time were able to agree on a
framework for the promotion and protection of human rights, despite their many
differences including religious, cultural, language and other barriers.290 The lessons from
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the UDHR drafting process are important because it shows the possibility of achieving a
rational public policy framework for the regulation of controversial human conduct
involving individual autonomy.291

In summary, my proposal for a new form of morality first considers that all
human beings are created and born equal. Equal in dignity, equal in rights, and equal in
terms of their individuality and the ability to potentially act in an autonomous manner
free from external influence. Thus, Dignity, Individual autonomy and Equality (D.I.E.)
are the core standards and variables that I propose must be considered when determining
the morality of laws generally. Intimate human conduct, involving no victims per se,
which is sought to be regulated through the criminal law must measure up to these
standards. Hence, the criminalization must ensure dignity, not unreasonably be an affront
to individual autonomy, and must have the quality of equality about it. I therefore
postulate that it is only when these values subsists in the law that the religious and
cultural conceptions of morality underpinning the law in question can be deemed valid.
The absence of these fundamental human values invalidate, in my opinion such
repressive laws, for religious and cultural conceptions of morality alone cannot be a good
yardstick for social ordering.

A) SEXUAL MORALITY GENERALLY
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The Black's law dictionary offers three very general definitions of the word
“morality”. It describes it as 'conformity with recognized rules of conduct' or as 'the
character of being virtuous especially in sexual matters.’ 292 According to its third
definition, “morality” is a system of duties or ethics.293 The origins of the word morality
can however be traced to the Latin word Mos (plural Mores) which means customs or
people’s values and traditions, people’s heritage or ways of life and conduct in a given
community. 294 Although these definitions seem helpful in describing morality generally,
and examples of moral conduct and behaviour, morality is generally a very subjective
concept or ideal that differ from person to person, community to community etc.
However, the general consensus is the fact that the word encompasses some core values
that individuals and communities accept as regulating their day to day lives. It is likely
for this reason that many scholars from time immemorial have equated morality to moral
law.295 They equate morality with a system of law or regard it as a species of internal
legislation.296 Taylor expresses this succinctly by suggesting as follows:

The jurist inevitably gravitates towards the view of morality as a code of rules of
conduct, either established directly by divine legislation, or revealed by reason.
For him all the significance of morality is contained in the moral law, and is
summed up in a series of comprehensive ‘Thou-shalt-not’s'.297
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The definitions of morality inevitably highlight its communal nature. Indeed the
term “public morality” has been used to describe ‘the total set of ethical-moral, legalhuman rights values, customs or traditions which define, describe, promote and defend a
given society’s or community’s common good, shared values and vision, their public
ethos, and the common pursuit of the good in order to achieve their full potential and
civilization.298 However, it must be noted that it is individuals that come together to form
communities, societies and ultimately States. Thus, a collective sense of public morality
has invariably been recognized as the standard, which regulates behaviour and values of
both the community and the individual.299

Many, including the present author, however hold the view that moral values vary
from community to community and from time to time.300 However, especially with
regard to Africa, Professor John Waliggo has noted that among people who share a
common heritage, cultures or religious beliefs, some of these values cut across
communities.301 For others, the prevalent law is the determinant of what the standard of
morality for the community is. 302 In other words, law determines what standard of
morality prevails within the time and space in which the law is operating.303 The general
idea of the link between law and morality is that in some way the law exists to ‘promote
morality, to preserve those conditions which make the moral life possible, and thus to
enable men to lead sober and industrious lives. The average man regards law as justice
298
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systematized, and justice itself as a somewhat chaotic mass of moral principles.’304 That
notwithstanding, morality is not only a community based or public phenomenon. This
idea has however been debated and questioned in legal scholarship due to the difficulty in
ascertaining especially for pluralistic communities what the moral standard is at any
given time.305 Indeed it was the crux of the debate between Hart and Devlin in regard of
the Wolfenden report.306

John Stuart Mill for instance is known for his criticisms of collective or public
morality whilst advocating for a system of individualized or personal morality.307 Mill
notes that the tyranny of the majority can likely operate not only through laws or acts of
the public authorities, but also through society’s collective tyranny over individuals
within it.308 He noted that a social tyranny, more formidable than many kinds of political
oppression, could exist where societies enforce their own commands or customs.309
Although such rules may not attract extreme penalties, Mill noted that such communitywide “accepted” norms make few exceptions, infiltrate the details of life and enslave the
soul itself. 310 His concern seems to flows directly from the manner in which these
collective commands or values infringe on the independence of individuals without
limits. Mill thus manages to secure a basis for protecting fundamental human rights of
minorities especially within Bentham's Utilitarian school of thought.311
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This human rights consideration is important because sex or sexuality are usually
very sensitive topics, and more so within an African context. Sexuality is by far the most
intimate feature of humanity.312 People usually guard their sexual secrets and intimate
experiences very closely. They may do this so well that even their partners in long-term
relationships, may never share all their sex related experiences, or admit to themselves
their longings for a particular kind of arousal or pleasure, because it seems
inappropriate. 313 In fact, a few decades ago, women usually had difficulty with
acknowledging to themselves that sex was in general something they wanted.314 In Ghana
for instance, women have been socialized from time immemorial to believe that actively
discussing sex or having sexual desires was attitude unbecoming of a good woman. Thus,
the patriarchal nature of the society dictates that it is men who should want and freely talk
about sex without any consequences whatsoever.

It is however a fallacy to pretend that only men have sexual desires, or can
appropriately voice out such desires. In fact, a few years ago a number of international
experts at a meeting convened by the World Health Organization (WHO) adopted a
definition that addresses sexuality on four different levels:315 1) Sexuality is a central
aspect of being human throughout life and encompasses sex, gender identities and roles,
sexual orientation, eroticism, pleasure, intimacy and reproduction; 2) Sexuality is
experienced and expressed in thoughts, fantasies, desires, beliefs, attitudes, values,
behaviours, practices, roles and relationships; 3) Sexuality is influenced by the interaction
312
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of biological, psychological, social, economic, political, cultural, ethical, legal, historical
and religious and spiritual factors; and 4) Sexuality includes the basic need for human
affection, touch and intimacy, as consciously and unconsciously expressed through one’s
feelings, thoughts and behaviour.316

Sexuality therefore may either bring joy, happiness and fulfilment or pain and
suffering as the case may be. Sexual experiences vary greatly and as a result it is difficult
to determine the utility of sexual acts since these are the most private of human
behaviour. However, it cannot be dismissed that certain values cut across the various
communities of the world, as a result of our common humanity, religion, culture etc. The
issues that must however be addressed regarding the morality of sexual conduct are: 1)
whether there a universally accepted construct of what is sexually moral conduct; and 2)
If there is, to what extent are they divergent? For natural law theorists and thinkers,
legislation must always be in conformity with principles of morality. After experiencing
the Nazi tragedy, the German philosopher, Gustav Radbruch, was of the view that ‘the
fundamental principles of humanitarian morality were part of the very concept of legality
and that no positive enactment or statute, however clearly it expressed and however
clearly it conformed with the formal criteria of validity of a given legal system, could be
valid if it contravened the basic principles of morality’.317
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Traditional African culture seems to embrace this position in that they emphasize
morality more than legislation.318 In Africa children are socialized from a tender age to
acquire habits, attitudes, beliefs, skills and motives that enable them fit into the
community. Morality has been and remains an integral part of African communities.319
Contrary to Austin's argument that law is a command of the sovereign backed by
sanctions, in traditional African societies, there seems to be no clear-cut distinction
between law and morality since the rules of moral conduct in a way amount to law.320
Usually, if a person behaves contrary to moral standards, they would be isolating
themselves from their community and the society was structured such that no one could
exist outside a community.321 For this reason, banishment or exclusion of a person from
their community or communal life was a grave punishment feared by all.322 This also
perhaps explains the nature of some of our laws criminalizing sexual behaviour such as
sex work and unnatural carnal knowledge.

Sexual Morality is however one of those concepts that remains very controversial
and topical all around the world. Even in countries with liberal policies regarding sex and
its many manifestations, there remains some form of State control over sex, and its
expressions thereof.323 Thus, the question of what is sexually moral generally, and to wit
private individual sexual morality takes on a whole new dimension when viewed, for
example, within the context of State laws that criminalize private consensual homosexual
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acts, private consensual heterosexual acts that are not in conformity with “traditional”
forms/notions of sex, and even sex work.324 By far, religious and cultural conceptions of
sexual morality are what have greatly influenced the outward prescription of a uniform
code of sexual morality in a country like Ghana; therefore “officially” subjugating the
individual’s inherent propensity to be “sexually immoral”, in line with the religious and
cultural proscriptions.

Feminist jurisprudential thought has also arguably contributed greatly to the issue
of sexual morality, although this is not an aspect of legal philosophy that much attention
has been paid to within the Ghanaian legal academy. However, any discussion of the
regulation of sex work will be incomplete without engaging that strand of feminist
jurisprudence that asserts that sex work fits into the patriarchal nature of almost all
societies, and that it maintains male dominance over females, is degrading, dehumanizing
and treats women merely as objects of male desire in the same way as pornography
does.325 To this strand of feminism, it is the historical heterosexual male erotic desire that
has systematically transformed women into mere pleasure objects. 326 Women who
engage in sex work freely and voluntarily are thus considered as victims who have been
coerced into that line of work as a result of societal patriarchy and male subjugation of
women generally.327 The partial truth in this statement is quite evident, as admittedly
women have generally been oppressed and discriminated against from time immemorial,
in terms of employment opportunities, for example.
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However, there has always been another wave of feminism (sex-positive
feminism) that believe that women who choose to engage in sex work must not be
considered as oppressed, coerced or even victims per se, but rather should be seen as
expressing their inherent sexual freedom and/or making rational economic decisions.328
Hence, male subjugation of women is what has actually led to female empowerment in
the field of sex work for example, manifested by the proliferation of sex worker activists
and movements across Africa for instance.329 Similarly, this movement is further fueled
by the attempt by the same male dominated society to redress the social inequalities it
created, through rehabilitation programs for sex workers, which in itself arguably
continues the trend of male dominance and female subjugation. Chi Mgbako puts it in the
following manner:

In order to be eligible for a rehabilitation program’s skills-training courses,
participating sex workers often must agree to stop engaging in sex work. But
there’s long been a running joke among sex workers that participants in these
programs do so during the day only to surreptitiously return to the streets at night
where they continue to earn more money through sex work. The reason many sex
workers in rehabilitation programs revert to sex work is that the income from
these programs’ alternative livelihoods simply can’t match the money sex workers
make. As I’ve noted in earlier chapters, African sex workers who enter the
industry are in many cases choosing sex work over other forms of low wage work
because sex work pays more. They are making economic decisions that are utterly
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rational in light of the financial pressures they face. This same economic rationale
applies to the rehabilitation context. A sex worker with financial responsibilities
will likely not permanently leave the industry if the beadwork or candle-making
skills she’s acquired through a rehabilitation program don’t generate the type of
income she enjoys as a sex worker.330

It is clear therefore that sexual morality is a contested claim even within feminist
jurisprudential thought, as the anti-pornography/anti-prostitution wing and the sexpositive feminist have engaged in the so-called “sex wars” for more than three decades.
Hence, these seemingly contradictory positions must also be briefly explored, together
with the religious and cultural conceptions and understandings of sexual morality in order
to fully appreciate the landscape regarding sexual morality generally, so as to present us
with a backdrop from which the proposal for a rational public policy framework for
regulating or de-regulating sexual morality may be made.

1. Religion and Sexual Morality331
Religion is a great force that from time immemorial has influenced and continues
to influence human conduct and behavior. As already noted, many Ghanaians profess to
be religious and thus largely belong to one religious group or another. Many therefore
acknowledge religious conceptions of morality as being the standard by which activities
like sexual conduct must be measured against. Indeed, almost all the major religions of
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this world conceive of sexual morality within the context of marriage; non-conformity
amounts to sexual immorality and is thus frowned upon.

In Christianity for example, sex is the preserve of married heterosexual couples.
Infidelity, adultery and even pre-marital sex are greatly frowned upon. Similarly,
homosexuality, sex work and other forms of non-procreative sex are all abhorred and
participants in these “deviant” expressions of sexuality are rebuked and considered
immoral persons. Thus, according to PG Nelson there are eleven (11) sexual prohibitions
in the Bible that essentially confine sexual activity to marriage with the intent of
protecting married life. 332 They are: Adultery; 333 Bestiality; 334 Homosexuality; 335
Incest;

336

Pre-Marital Sex;

337

Prostitution;

338

Rape;

339

Shrine Prostitution;

340

Transvestism;341 Unclean Acts;342 and Violation of Betrothal.343

These manifestations of sex, sexuality or incidents of both are prohibited in
Christianity because of their inherent immorality. Thus, Christians must therefore refrain
from the doing of any of these acts; and there is no doubt that Judeo-Christian beliefs in
this regard have from time immemorial been the basis for laws that seek to criminalize
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certain sexual behavior and/or regulate such conduct. But by far the most important fact
about sexual morality within the context of Christianity is the marriage nexus that it
espouses. Thus, sex or all forms of expressions of human sexuality thereof must conform
to certain laid down standards and must occur within the context of marriage between a
man and a woman.

i. Christianity and Sexual Morality
In Christianity, every moral question is necessarily connected with the Christian
God at some point because it is He that created everything including sex. For instance,
Ravi Zacharias a Christian apologist in a talk on Absolute Moral Law & the existence of
God, in answering a question on why there is so much evil if God exists noted as follows:

If there is a thing as evil, there is a thing as good. If there is a thing as good, there
is a thing as a moral law which provides the standard by which we ascertain that
there is good or evil. If there is a moral law, then there is a moral law giver.344

Indeed, Jesus Christ summed up the Christian moral law into two distinct, but
interconnected parts in the New Testament.345 First is to love God with all of one's heart,
soul, and strength and the second was to love thy neighbour as thyself.346
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Another Christian philosopher differentiates between laws.347 C. S. Lewis notes
that there are laws peculiar to man's human nature that is not shared with animals or
vegetables or inorganic things, and man can disobey if he chooses. He notes that it was
previously referred to as the law of nature because people thought that everyone knew it
by nature and did not need to be taught it. He acknowledged that just as there are a few
people who are colour-blind or have no ear for a tune there must definitely have been
some individuals who did not know this law of nature. However, generally, the human
idea of decent behaviour was obvious to everyone. According to Lewis, if these were not
right, the First World War would be nonsense. He notes that there was no sense in
‘saying the enemy were in the wrong unless right is a real thing which the Nazis at
bottom knew as well as we did and ought to have practised.’348

Due to differences in civilisations and different ages, culture, beliefs and selfrelativist ideas, the idea of a law of nature or decent behaviour known to all men appears
unsound, and many argue that there are, have been and will be different moralities. Lewis
however notes that though there have been differences between their moralities, these
have never amounted to anything like a total difference. According to him, the moral
teaching of the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Hindus, Chinese, Greeks and Romans,
are similar to each other as well as to ours.349 He also points to human anxiety as regards
their eagerness to make excuses or shift responsibility for not having behaved decently as
another pointer to human conception of a general law of nature. He underscores the two
points: ‘First, that human beings, all over the earth, have this curious idea that they
347
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ought to behave in a certain way, and cannot really get rid of it. Secondly, that they do
not in fact behave in that way. They know the Law of Nature; they break it.’350

Lewis thus fully agrees that we learn the rule of decent behaviour from parents
and teachers, and friends and books, as we learn everything else. However, according to
him, some of the things we learn are mere conventions which might have been different:
such as learning to keep to the left of the road, but it might just as well have been the rule
to keep to the right He distinguishes this from other facts of humanity such as
mathematics, which he refers to as real truths.351 He further argues that if this were not
the case, there could never be any moral progress. He defines progress not just as change,
but change for the better. Flowing from these he argues that if no set of moral ideals were
truer or better than any other, there would be no sense in preferring civilised morality to
savage morality, or Christian morality to Nazi morality. He points out the fact that all
humans believe that some moralities are better than others. He then adds that once a set
of moral ideas can be better than another, it is in fact implied that both ideas are being
measured by a standard; with the undeniable conclusion being that one of them conforms
to that standard more nearly than the other.352 Essentially he argues that it is one thing to
implicitly admit that there is some higher standard and quite another thing to admit that
because of reasons that we may give, we may prefer other standards.

With regard to Christian sexual morality, Lewis notes that this must not be
confused with the social rule of "modesty" or propriety/decency. He describes the social
350
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rule of propriety for example as those rules that lay down how much of the human body
should be displayed and what subjects can be referred to, and in what words, according to
the customs of a given social circle. He underscores that even though the rule of chastity
has been the same for all Christians at all times, the rule of propriety changes. He gave
the following example:

A girl in the Pacific islands wearing hardly any clothes and a Victorian lady
completely covered in clothes might both be equally "modest," proper, or decent,
according to the standards of their own societies: and both, for all we could tell by
their dress, might be equally chaste (or equally unchaste). Some of the language
which chaste women used in Shakespeare's time would have been used in the
nineteenth century only by a woman completely abandoned. When people break
the rule of propriety current in their own time and place, if they do so in order to
excite lust in themselves or others, then they are offending against chastity. But if
they break it through ignorance or carelessness they are guilty only of bad
manners. When, as often happens, they break it defiantly in order to shock or
embarrass others, they are not necessarily being unchaste, but they are being
uncharitable: for it is uncharitable to take pleasure in making other people
uncomfortable. I do not think that a very strict or fussy standard of propriety is
any proof of chastity or any help to it, and I therefore regard the great relaxation
and simplifying of the rule which has taken place in my own lifetime as a good
thing.'353
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Lewis also describes chastity as the most unpopular of the Christian virtues. He sums it
up as follows: ‘Either marriage, with complete faithfulness to your partner, or else total
abstinence.’ He observes that this is so difficult and so contrary to our instincts that one
may conclude that either Christianity is wrong or our sexual instinct, as it now is, has
gone wrong.354

In his view, human appetite is in ludicrous and preposterous excess of its
function. To illustrate this he notes as follows:

You can get a large audience together for a striptease act — that is, to watch a girl
undress on the stage. Now suppose you came to a country where you could fill a
theatre by simply bringing a covered plate on to the stage and then slowly lifting
the cover so as to let everyone see, just before the lights went out, that it contained
a mutton chop or a bit of bacon, would you not think that in that country
something had gone wrong with the appetite for food? And would not anyone
who had grown up in a different world think there was something equally queer
about the state of the sex instinct among us? If the evidence showed that a good
deal was being eaten, then of course we should have to abandon the hypothesis of
starvation and try to think of another one. In the same way, before accepting
sexual starvation as the cause of the strip-tease, we should have to look for
evidence that there is in fact more sexual abstinence in our age than in those ages
when things like the strip-tease were unknown. But surely there is no such
evidence. Contraceptives have made sexual indulgence far less costly within
354
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marriage and far safer outside it than ever before, and public opinion is less
hostile to illicit unions and even to perversion than it has been since Pagan times.
Nor is the hypothesis of "starvation" the only one we can imagine. Everyone
knows that the sexual appetite, like our other appetites, grows by indulgence.
Starving men may think much about food, but so do gluttons; the gorged, as well
as the famished, like titillations.355

Lewis is clearly suggesting that there is more sexual abstinence in our age than in those
ages when things like the strip-tease were unknown, and if this is so then his view is that
we could not possibly accept the starvation hypothesis because now more than ever all
forms of sexuality and sexual intercourse have been greatly facilitated. Thus, people are
less appalled at the mention of homosexuality, bestiality and other forms of sex
considered as sexually immoral by the Christian faith; some of which would have carried
a penalty of death in times past.

That notwithstanding, in Christianity, there is a clear nexus between sex and
marriage. 356 Christianity frowns on premarital and extramarital sexual activity. The
Christian standard is a rather high one such that immorality does not begin only in sexual
acts but in all lustful thoughts towards a person who is not the spouse of the one engaging
in the lustful thinking. According to the Bible, Jesus taught his followers: ‘But I tell you
that anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in
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his heart'’.357 The Bible also notes that: ‘Marriage should be honoured by all, and the
marriage bed kept pure, for God will judge the adulterer and all the sexually immoral’.358
Paul in his first letter to the Corinthians, in the 6th chapter, notes that the body was not
made for sexual immorality. Fornication, adultery and homosexuality or all forms of
sexual acts that do not conform to or are contrary to heterosexual sex within the context
of marriage, are seen as directly infringing upon the marriage covenant with the sole
purpose of satisfying immoral sexual desires.359

These arguments are in line with the Bible, specifically in the Book of Romans,
where it is noted as follows:

For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to
him, but their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened.
Although they claimed to be wise, they became fools and exchanged the glory of
the immortal God for images made to look like a mortal human being and birds
and animals and reptiles. Therefore God gave them over in the sinful desires of
their hearts to sexual impurity for the degrading of their bodies with one another.
They exchanged the truth about God for a lie, and worshiped and served created
things rather than the Creator—who is forever praised. Amen. Because of this,
God gave them over to shameful lusts. Even their women exchanged natural
sexual relations for unnatural ones. In the same way the men also abandoned
natural relations with women and were inflamed with lust for one another. Men
357
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committed shameful acts with other men, and received in themselves the due
penalty for their error.360

The Hebrew and Christian Bibles contain many examples of the moral code of the Jewish
and Christian religions. In the Book of Leviticus (20:10–17), for example, there are
explicit prohibitions against adultery, incest, sexual activity with people of one’s own
gender, and bestiality. The Bible is however seemingly silent on oral sex and
masturbation;361 although it may be inferred from the Christian conception of sexual
morality that such acts will necessarily be deemed immoral and unwholesome. However,
other parts of the Bible such as Paul's letter to the Corinthians bring to the fore the
concept that a Christian's body is a miniature temple of their God and must not be a tool
for sexual immorality or prostitution for that matter.362

ii. Islam and Sexual Morality
As a religion, Islam recognizes the sexual needs of human beings and believes
this natural instinct should be nurtured, not suppressed and be fulfilled in a responsible
way.363 In Islam, sex is neither expressly nor impliedly or apparently equated to inherent
evil or sin; as has been taught by the Qur'an, the Prophet Muhammad and his Ahlu'l-bayt.
Islam however highly recommends marriage as a good deed and thus very strongly
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opposes celibacy and monasticism.364 The legal term for marriage in Islam is "nikah"
which literally means sexual intercourse. According to the Quran 24:32, Allah says,
‘Marry the spouseless among you...if they are poor, God will enrich them of His bounty’.
The first word of this verse begins with "ankihu" (Marry). This is an imperative form of
the word ''nikah''. According to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, any
communication in imperative form from God can have two levels of meaning. It may be
an obligatory command or a very high recommendation. By implication, celibacy is not
considered a virtue. Flowing from the verse, the Prophet continues by saying that,
‘Whoever refrains from marriage because of fear of poverty, he has indeed thought badly
of God.’ Again, Allah says: ‘... Then marry such women as seem good to you two, three
or four. But if you fear that you will not do justice between your wives, then marry only
one.’365

It is also worth noting that Islam forbids celibacy366 and monasticism is also
forbidden for both men and women. 'Uthman bin Maz'un, a close companion of the
Prophet, had his wife complain that he was abstaining from sexual relations during the
night as well as the day. The Prophet was angered and is reported to have said, ‘O
'Uthman! Allah did not send me for monasticism, rather He sent me with a simple and
straight. I fast, pray and also have intimate relations with my wife. So whosoever likes my
tradition, then he should follow it; and marriage is one of my traditions.’ 367 Since
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Uthman was already married, the word "marriage” in this Hadith can only be applied to
sexual relations. Thus, marriage and sex are among the signs of God's power and
blessings in Islam. The Qur'an (30:21) says, ‘And among His signs is that He has created
for you spouses from among yourselves so that you may live in tranquillity with them;
and He has created love and mercy between you. Verily, in that are signs for those who
reflect.’ From these few verses of the Qur'an, it is apparent that according to Islam sex is
limited to marriage and marriage is a manifestation of God's power and blessings. Also,
sexual urge is a creative command of God placed in human nature and cannot be equated
with guilt, sin or evil.

In Islam, sexual desire can be enjoyed both in this life and the afterlife. In the
Qur’an [3:14], Allah says, ‘The love of desire of women has been made to seem fair to
people.’ The sexual act can however only be realized only in marriage between a man
and at most four women. Islam frowns upon divorce. It is seen as ‘the lawful thing most
hated of Allah’. A famous saying of the Prophet recommends: ‘Always marry, never
divorce. Allah certainly does not love tasters’, that is, those who marry simply to “taste”
a variety of women. The Quran also provides explicitly that: ‘Marry the spouseless
among you and your slaves and handmaidens that are righteous; if they are poor, God
will enrich them of His bounty. A pious son must watch over the chastity of a father who
has been made a widower by helping him to marry again. This duty of the ta’fif (sexual
purity) is no less important than that of the kafala (food pension).
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There are also recommendations in Islam intended to integrate fantasy in the
sexual relations between spouses and to revive extinct desire by provoked desire. An
example of this is as follows: the analogy that if a man sees a woman who attracts him,
he should run home quickly and make love with his wife, and that will appease the ardour
he feels in his heart. Islam does not therefore repress the libido. According to Islamic
beliefs, even in the afterlife or in paradise our desires will be accommodated or taken
seriously. In paradise everyone will have at least one companion, for it is believed that
there is no celibacy in paradise. Paradise, it is believed, is the time of suspended
pleasure.368 Hence, it is also the place of perpetual arousal and orgasm that is believed to
lasts for twenty-four years.369 Earthly orgasm therefore gives us a foretaste of paradise
and thus, life in paradise is potentially an infinite, eternal orgasm according to Islamic
jurisprudence.370

With regard same-sex relations, Islam views homosexuality as unnatural, impure
and against the law of nature in which we have been created. Sodomy is an atrocious sin
that warrants Allah's wrath because it is suggested that Allah will not have mercy on a
man who lusts after other men or have anal sex with a woman. These acts are considered
detestable and persons who engage in them are seen as wicked. Homosexuality is seen as
a selfish and unworthy attitude, which is both useless and positively harmful to the
collective morality.
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2. The Ghanaian Cultural Conception of Sexual Morality
It is true that sex is one of man’s basic instincts and inclinations, but nonetheless
the influence of factors such as morality, be it religious or cultural, as well as traditional
beliefs, superstitions and even folklore cannot be entirely discounted.371 Societies differ
in how sex is perceived. Even in homogeneous communities, there are usually differences
regarding sexuality and perceptions of what conduct is deemed sexually moral or
immoral. In Ghana for example, such differences persist. Therefore in some communities
in Ghana, polygamy (specifically polygyny) is accepted as generally the norm.372 In other
communities, a widow is expected to marry the brother of her deceased husband,373 and a
man can marry his wife’s sister(s). 374 The Krobos are particularly noted for their
“Coming of Age” events called “Dipo”, which is meant to showcase naked adolescent
girls to the world as a sign of their maturity and eligibility for marriage. It is therefore not
possible to point to a distinct “Ghanaian culture”, but rather it is the amalgamation of
many different and diverse cultural practices that is usually collectively referred to as
“Ghanaian culture”. The Constitution of Ghana recognizes this and provides for the
protection of all cultural practices, as long as they are not inimical or injurious to the
well-being of the individual, and do not violate provisions of the Constitution.375

Thus, even though the Ghanaian cultural and traditional perspective regarding
sexuality is often times obscured by religious judgements or prejudices, the traditional or
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cultural conception of sexual morality however differs significantly from the religious
ones discussed in the previous section. For instance, many of the ethnic groups do not
practice female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM) while the practice is prevalent in the
three most Northern regions in Ghana.376 The reasons behind the practice of FGM are
many and very complex.377 They include the belief of some parents that the practice
empowers their daughters, ensures their ability to get married and protect the family’s
reputation or serves as a rite of passage into womanhood.378 In some communities, it is
also performed to apparently preserve a woman’s chastity by restraining or curbing her
sexual behaviour and appetite/desire.379 The practice of this custom may also be due to
the patriarchal nature of African culture generally, especially in respect of how both men
and women are perceived, with regard their sexual organs i.e. the penis and the vagina.380
Generally, men can be polygamous, and are often expected to be. The penis is therefore
spoken of freely and even sang about.381 Good women however, are expected to keep
their feelings in check to the point of suppression. Female sexual pleasure is thus
disregarded or taken for granted because the vagina is seen to serve no useful purpose but
receive the male penis, for the purpose of reproduction.382
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Despite the constitutional prohibition of unwholesome cultural practices, FGM
continues to be practiced in some communities in Ghana, where it is believed to lower a
woman’s sexual desire. Moreover, in other communities, uncircumcised women are
sometimes perceived as being impure and treated as outcasts. Though the major religions
in Ghana have all condemned the practice, religion has also been used to perpetuate the
practice. Hence, some communities in Ghana still hold on to the belief that in order to be
a good Muslim, one must circumcise their daughters.383 On the other hand, among the
Sisala people, located mainly in the Northern regions of Ghana, it has been noted that
premarital sex may not necessarily be an immoral activity. As part of the Sisala custom, a
man who sees a girl he deems attractive to him may approach her with a small "love gift"
known as helating, which he purchases himself.384 Mendosa has noted that between the
time the ''love gift'' is given and when the marriage is formally conducted and
consummated the man may have had pre-marital access to her by virtue of the "love
gift".385

In light of Africa’s general attitude towards sexuality, it has been suggested that
sexual relations are not necessarily regarded as moral issues. However, Bediako-Akoto
believes that this is misleading. He argues that sexuality is a very serious subject and is
usually considered sacred. Taboos that have existed, according to him, have served as
barriers to, or limitations on unaccepted sexual behaviour. 386 Some of these taboos

383

Id.
Eugene L. Mendosa, Aspects Of Sisala Marriage Prestation,
http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Institue%20of%20African%20Studies%2
0Research%20Review/1973v9n3/asrv009003003.pdf - Accessed on 1st December, 2017, 15, 38.
385
Id.
386
Bediako-Akoto, supra note 361.
384

112

include prohibitions on oral sex, incest (mogyafra), adultery among others. The various
ethnic groups in Ghana however have different perspectives regarding sexual morality.
Pleasure for women is not necessarily immoral. However, actual or overt talk about sex is
what is usually frowned upon.387 Also, chastity may not be a virtue that cuts across these
communities. Usually it only does till before puberty, such that there are rites of passage
such as “Dipo” and “Bragoro”, which celebrate not only the girl's puberty but her
chastity as well.388

Ghanaian culture is however really an amalgamation of several different and
distinct beliefs and value systems that has over a long period of time seemingly morphed
into a somewhat homogenous one. However, the cultural conception of sexual morality
from the traditional and age-old Ghanaian context is best understood through the lenses
of polygamy; specifically polygyny. A.B. Ellis for example observes among the Akans
thus:

It is commonly supposed that where polygamy prevails conjugal fidelity is, as a
consequence, very lax; but it appears that the infidelity which prevails amongst
polygamic people is due to the low state of civilization of such peoples; to the
degraded condition of women, who are regarded as property, and frequently as
mere beasts of burden; to the absence of domestic affection; and to the general
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want of abstract ideas of morality rather than to polygamy, which does not, of
itself, seem to favour immorality….[I]n fact, the women prefer polygamy to
monogamy.389

Historically, polygamy was therefore not necessarily considered immoral in itself, or the
sexual promiscuity that occurs as a consequent thereof regarded as manifestations of
immorality. How then did ‘Ghanaian culture’ become a yardstick for the measurement of
sexual morality generally, or the acceptable norm regarding Ghanaian sexuality in
particular?

This must have occurred as a result of contact with foreigners, in particular
Europeans. The introduction of Christianity and the subsequent Missionary activities that
took place in the Gold Coast from the 17th Century thereabout had a significant impact on
the cultural practices and beliefs of the inhabitants of the Gold Coast generally. It has
been noted that:

After an intercourse of some years with Europeans, the Tshi-speaking inhabitants
of the towns and villages in the vicinity of the various forts, added to their system
of polytheism a new deity, whom they termed Nana-Nyankupon. This was the
god of the Christians, borrowed from them, and adopted under a new designation.
The great superiority manifested by the whites in their weapons, ships,
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manufactures-in short, in every respect–convinced the natives with whom they
had intercourse, that they must necessarily be protected by a deity of greater
power than any of those to which they themselves offered sacrifice; since their
own deities had not, except very remotely, helped them to attain such prosperity.
They, therefore gladly enrolled themselves amongst the followers of the god of
the whites; and, being informed that he dwelt in the heavens above, they
denominated him Nana-Nyankupon, which may be freely translated “Lord of the
Sky.”390

Hence, contact with the Europeans brought about the advent of Christianity to the Gold
Coast and this had the effect of permeating all aspects of the culture of the people,
including imposing a sexual moral code, which hitherto may have been absent as A.B.
Ellis alludes to.391

As already noted, Christian sexual morality restricts sex and sexual activities to
marriage; to wit monogamy. Thus, the importation of Christian morals into the culture of
the native people, in particular the Akan people, transformed to some extent their concept
of sexual morality, or lack thereof. Thus, even though polygamy still remains in almost
all the ethnic groups that make up present day Ghana, many people have accepted
monogamy in accordance with Christianity and its ethos in relation to sexual morality –
at least on the surface. Hence, the cultural conception of sexual morality in present-day
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Ghana has been conflated with religious conceptions of sexual morality to a large extent.

That notwithstanding, when it comes to morality within the context of sex or
sexuality, traditional Ghanaian culture that permits polygamy does not necessarily
consider a man engaged in such plural marriages immoral. In the same vain, it is a
notorious fact in contemporary Ghana, that society does not necessarily see a man in a
monogamous marriage, who has extra-marital affairs as immoral. The same goes for a
single man who maintains multiple sexual partners. However, the same cannot be said for
females; for they are rebuked, ridiculed and deemed immoral if they engage in extramarital affairs or are considered as having more than one sexual partner in the case of
single women. Ghanaian culture therefore today is generally patriarchal in its outlook in
terms of how it characterizes and differentiates what is sexually moral according to the
sexes.

3. Feminism and Sexual Morality
There are various strands of feminist ideology and they have their peculiar
perceptions on what may be moral or otherwise. According to Professor Patricia Cain,
there are four stands of feminism. These are Liberal, Cultural, Postmodern, and radical
feminism. The following paragraphs would focus briefly on the liberal and radical
feminist views on what may be right or wrong as regards sexual morality. Liberal
feminism concerns itself with equal rights and opportunities and the intensification of
constitutional rights for women. Radical feminism on the other hand stresses that women
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must be perceived as one class dominated by another (Marxist feminism), with a resulting
class struggle. It also advocates changes in laws that favour the male class, to curtail
inequalities of power.392

Thus, for more than three decades, feminist jurisprudential thought has been
dominated by the debate regarding the role of sex and sexuality in a male dominated
world. The so-called “sex-wars” between the different strands or wings of feminism,
begun as a result of the diametrically opposing nature of both points of view regarding
sex. On the one hand, sex is viewed as a tool of oppression used by the male dominated
society to subjugate women. To this school of thought therefore, depictions of sex in
pornography for example, has the aim of perpetuating the aforementioned status quo. Sex
work, however voluntary it may be, is also seen as a means of the continuous control
and/or suppression of female sexuality by men.

On another hand, there is a different school of thought who view sex from a
positive angle. The sex-positive feminists thus consider sex, female sexuality or its
expressions thereof as a means towards entrenching female independence and autonomy.
To this school of thought, sex work is not necessarily a social construct that seeks to
perpetuate inequality amongst the sexes; but even if it was, it nonetheless provides an
avenue for females who voluntarily participate in sex work the opportunity to take
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control of their sexuality and even profit from it i.e. the rational economic choice
theory.393

Radical feminism however sees social organization and structure as inherently
patriarchal, as sexism exists to maintain male privilege and the patriarchal social
order. 394 With this in mind, it is not surprising that radical feminists have been
historically associated with the lesbian-feminist community that essentially rejects male
dominated heterosexual sex.395 Radical feminists are inclined to condemn pornography,
prostitution, sadomasochism, promiscuous sex with strangers and even sexual roleplaying396 and the use of sex robots.397 This is because of the nexus they make between
dominant-subordinate power relations and the perpetuity of male dominance. For
example according to Catherine Mackinnon ‘pornography conditions male orgasm to
female subordination.'398

Liberal feminists, on the other hand support any form of consensual activity so
long as the participants derive pleasure from their activities. These may include
pornography, sex work, sadomasochism, promiscuous sex with strangers and sexual roleplaying. According to them the morals of radical feminists stigmatises sexual minorities
393
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such as the butch-femme couples, sadomasochists and man-boy lovers. The key word that
legitimises any sexual activity regardless of form is consent according to them.399 Though
this seems to be a simplistic view, consent is seen as a morally decisive factor because it
has been noted to play that role in other contexts. For instance Primoratz notes that
consent makes all the difference between murder and voluntary euthanasia, between
battery and sport, or between theft and gift.400 This liberal view that valid consent is
sufficient to morally legitimize any sexual act is challenged and disputed by three major
philosophies regarding sex: the Christian (Catholic) perception – which views sex as
ordained for procreation purposes and properly confined to marriage; the romantic view
of sex – which considers sex as a corollary of love; and the radical feminist analysis of
sex – which considers sex as perpetuating the continuous domination of women by
men.401

Catharine MacKinnon, a leader of the radical feminist school of thought has
devoted attention to sexuality, sexual morality and the subordination of women. For
example, she suggests that ‘sexuality is to feminism what work is to Marxism: that which
most one’s own, yet most taken away’.402 Here, she tries to draw out a similar trajectory
that legal theory grounded in Marxism and Feminism usually takes. For instance, she
suggests that the underlying idea of Feminism as a legal theory is the inherent and
inalienable right of females to have absolute control over their sexuality and the means
399
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they choose to express it. However, an aspect of this same expression of sexuality is what
has essentially ensured that society, according to Feminist legal theorists, is organized
into two sexes i.e. male and female.

On the other hand, Marxism has at its core the control of capital (which is the
means of production) by the bourgeoisie, who have also essentially organized society into
a class-based system, where the proletariat (the majority of the people) are manipulated
and exploited for gain. The parallel that can be drawn between Feminism and Marxism
from the point of view of feminist legal theory is that, sex roles have been somewhat predetermined and controlled by men, in the form of gender identity and conceptions of
family and family life – the end result being reproduction; and all this organized on the
basis of a heterosexual structure of society.

I thus tend to generally agree with MacKinnon especially when she suggests that
Marxism and Feminism are both theories of power resulting in the “domination of the
dominant” by the more privileged classes of society (i.e. men), the end result being social
inequality and inequity. Thus, a fundamental issue regarding these two distinct, yet
similar legal theories come to the fore: the fact that males are the common denominator.
Despite the apparent accuracy of this observation, there still exists a seemingly deepseated mistrust between proponents of these two schools of thought. Marxists for
example often accuse feminists of dividing the proletariat front, through their means of
advocacy, especially for ideals, which according to Marxists generally fits into the aims
of the bourgeoisie. However, MacKinnon raises a question: Whether it would make a
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difference if females, for example were at the forefront of running modern capitalist
systems.

In contemporary times in Africa, females have been increasingly ‘liberated’ from
the shackles of total male domination, and have in many instances taken control of, and
directed how and the means through which they express their sexuality. This is not
however to suggest that feminism as a legal theory is not valid, but rather it is a
recognition of the important and somewhat radical role and impact that feminist theory
has had on legal theory as a whole. For example, far gone are the days when a female’s
role was circumscribed – i.e. as a caregiver, the primary duty of which was to nurture and
raise children and stay at home.

In recent times, women cannot necessarily be categorized as the dominated
gender class. That is not also to suggest that chauvinistic and misogynistic attitudes have
been completely eradicated. However, even in Africa, it can be observed that many
women have on their own chosen to ‘deviate’ from the ‘pre-determined’ sex roles that
heterosexuality all but prescribes. For example, some women choose to stay single and
thereby avoid subordination in the form of the delimited gender roles that have from time
immemorial existed. Others express their sexuality in a homogeneous manner by relying
on their innate being and personality. Similarly, some females voluntarily choose to
become single mothers through the reliance on artificial insemination for example.
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Quite clearly, female autonomy has increasingly become topical, and many even
view this as a driving force for development, generally speaking. However, an important
observation seems to be the fact that, not all women have been or are generally liberated
to the point of autonomy, bodily or otherwise. This somewhat ties in with some of the
Marxist criticisms of feminist legal theory – i.e. that it emphasizes and focuses on only a
few educated women, who themselves resemble and constitute a subset of the
bourgeoisie class – thus ensuring a divided front against oppression of the minority.

Thus, Janet Halley in Split Decisions explores the contours of classical feminism
and its relationship with other movements that have drawn inspiration from it, or sought
to challenge particular tenets of its theory.403 One argument she makes that strikes a cord
is the position long adopted by “Governance Feminists” who have sought to address the
issue of sexual exploitation of women by men that tend to scar the former perpetually.
However, Halley seems to double down on the effect that this brand of feminism has on
the wider society by suggesting that: ‘Unless it Takes a Break from itself, it can’t see
injury to men. It can’t see injury to men by women. It can’t see other interests, other
forms of power, other justice projects’.404

Following from this, another important aspect of the whole feminist debate that
seems problematic, which Halley alludes to is the anti-pornography stance adopted by
MacKinnon & Dworkin. For example, the definition of pornography and the criteria of
materials that potentially have a subordinating effect in respect of women as outlined in
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the Indianapolis ordinance (which is a subject on inquiry) seem quite out of touch with
social realities in contemporary times.405 For example, all the six second second-order
criteria that according to the ordinance depict women negatively can equally be
applicable to men.406

Also, the concept of sadomasochism cannot be ignored in any discussion of
contemporary feminism. In popular culture, it is increasingly becoming a trend for
females to play the role of the sadist or the dominant person in sadomasochistic
relationships or situations, who invariably derive sexual pleasure by humiliating,
degrading and/or inflicting pain and suffering upon the subservient or submissive partner
(usually a male, or even a female). However, admittedly, women have probably been on
the receiving end of such treatment far longer than men – feminists would invariably
argue.

In traditional African societies, like Ghana for example, it is a known and
notorious fact that some women actually desire to be subordinated in ways that radical
feminists will find disgusting and probably explain away through the use of the
controversial “false consciousness” concept. However, it is not unusual to hear some
women in Ghana even suggest that their husbands do not love them if they do not
physically abuse them one way or the other. As shocking as this may seem, it remains a
constant reminder of why Halley suggests that feminism (especially, radical feminism)
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needs to take a break from itself in order to explore and internalize some of these social
realities.

On the issue of marriage for instance, it has already been noted that customary
law in Ghana permits polygamy in the sense that a man can take more than one woman as
a wife, but the reverse is not true. The point of sympathy with traditional feminists
however is the societal attitudes towards a woman who dares to explore her sexuality by
even engaging in sexual relations with more than one man at the same time. It is deemed
an abomination and a deviation from traditional and stereotypical assigned gender roles.
This tends to reinforce the classical radical feminist position of subordination of the
female.

Thus, although Halley tries to find a middle ground between radical and liberal
feminism by suggesting that the whole idea of feminism needs to take a break, it is
nonetheless difficult in practice so to do, or even reconcile these two diametrically
opposing views. It seems as if there is not much middle ground that can be found. The
critical point however is that sexual morality from the feminist perspective seems to be
bifurcated in nature, and as such very difficult to construct. This is because the ‘evils’
associated with sex work have been greatly espoused, and its nexus with human
trafficking for example, and even child prostitution cannot be overlooked – although their
confluence point seems rather fluid. At another level of abstraction however, it is difficult
to understand how and why we should theorize rational economic choices and decisions
made voluntarily (arguably), through the lenses of doctrinaire legal theory
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B) SOME LESSONS FROM THE MAKING OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (UDHR)

The many and major events that triggered both World Wars of the Twentieth
Century have been well documented. However, it was not until the aftermath of the
Second World War that the International Human Rights movement gained real traction.
This was as a direct consequence of the widespread Nazi oppression of Jews and other
minority groups as well as the rise of fascist regimes and their attendant oppressive and
discriminatory policies; reasons that united the Allies in bringing the war to an end.407
Thus, in 1942, the Allies issued a joint declaration that victory in the war was necessary
in order to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom.408 To ensure that
these ideals were jealously guarded and protected, the Allies had to overcome several
political, ideological, cultural and economic challenges.409 Hence, the initial draft of the
United Nations Charter did not expatiate on human rights per se. However, the principle
of self determination was guaranteed by the Charter,410 and it was agreed that a Human
Rights Commission be set up as a major body of the UN.411

Thus, during the drafting of the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference of
1945, representatives of Cuba, Mexico, and Panama each proposed the inclusion of a
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Nations and a Declaration on the Essential Rights
407
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of Man.412 President Harry Truman of the United States, in his final remarks for the
conference, also anticipated that an International Bill of Rights would be attached to the
Charter; whilst Field Marshall Jan Christiaan Smuts of South Africa envisioned the
addition of a human rights instrument to the Charter. However, the Conference decided to
adopt Article 55 and 56 of the Charter, which provide for the promotion of universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights, and impose obligations on member States to
take joint and separate action for the achievement of the purposes of the UN set forth in
the Charter, including the promotion of human rights.413 The Charter also refers to human
rights in the Preamble as well as in articles 1, 13, 62, 68, and 76. However the idea of
universal human rights was not enumerated on in terms of exactly what they entailed.414
An International Declaration on Human Rights or an International Bill of Rights, which
would enumerate specific instances of human rights, was deferred until the establishment
of a Commission on Human Rights by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 was
therefore arguably the most important step that was taken in the post-war era in ensuring
a common standard of treatment of individuals and states alike. This is however in no
way a suggestion that the formation of the United Nations (UN) itself was not a
monumental step towards a universal claim of human rights; for the UN paved the way
and made it possible for the adoption of the UDHR in the first place. The UDHR is
however of monumental import also in the sense that it arguably represented a first and
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somewhat successful attempt at developing a regime of human rights protections that
would be applicable to and available for all persons regardless of race, ethnicity, sex,
language, religion etc.415 It essentially reconciled varied perceptions of law and morals in
a fragmented post-war world.

However, the road towards the making of the UDHR was not a smooth one. In
fact, many obstacles and disagreements characterized the work of the Human Rights
Commission, which was the body that had been established by the ECOSOC of the UN
specifically to oversee the drafting of a binding legal document that protected and
promoted the human rights of all the peoples of the world.416 But this was a herculean
task in the sense that even though the UN Charter had announced the idea of human
rights for all, there was no categorical mention in the Charter of exactly what these rights
were as has already been noted.417 How was the Human Rights Commission therefore
going to be able to determine the substantive content of human rights that were to be
considered universal and acceptable by the diverse nations of the world at the time, and
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those yet to come? The Commission’s first task was to draft a Bill of Human Rights and
devise a means for its implementation.418

Luckily, the resolution establishing the Commission on Human Rights made
provision for reliance on a ‘Working Group of Experts’. Clause 3 of the Resolution
provided as follows: ‘The Commission is authorized to call in ad hoc working groups of
non-governmental experts in specialized fields or individual experts, without further
reference to the Council, but with the approval of the President of the Council and the
Secretary-General.’ By February 1947, a drafting committee had been set up by the
commission to produce a draft Bill on International Human Rights.419 Around this time,
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) had
also created a theoretical and philosophical committee that will prove crucial in
informing the final draft of the Declaration.

Thus, UNESCO as well as the Human Rights Commission conducted ideological
investigations to gain a picture of whether there was such a thing as universal human
rights; if the concept was not mainly a western idea; and also what the substantive
content of human rights were in different contexts. To the amazement of the UNESCO
committee, they found out through the responses they received that there generally
existed in all parts of the world certain basic rights and values, which were broadly
similar even thought their foundations were different by virtue of differences in
418
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ideology.420 Regardless of these differences the driving idea, as summed up by Glendon
was as follows:

If there are some things so terrible in practice that virtually no one will publicly
approve of them, and some things so good in practice that virtually no one will
oppose them, a common project can move forward without agreement on the
reasons for those positions. An international declaration of rights would provide a
“framework within which divergent philosophies, religious, and even economic,
social and political theories might be entertained and developed.” The challenge
was to make the framework “sufficiently definite to have real significance both as
an inspiration and a guide to practice” but “sufficiently general and flexible to
apply to all men, and to be capable of modification to suit people at different
stages of social and political development.”421

It is important to note that the UNESCO Committee had sent out questionnaires
seeking the views of the many peoples of the world with different political and sociocultural backgrounds, including but not limited to, Chinese, Indian, Hindu, America,
European and Socialist perspectives. 422 The responses the committee received were
impressive as several leading scholars and philosophers made submissions in response to
the questionnaire. These included submissions from Mohandas Ghandi, Aldous Huxley,
Benedetto Croce and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.423 Although the views and positions on
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human rights varied, the UNESCO committee concluded that they were convinced that
there was a common denominator that bound together all the varying ideologies and that
the members of the United Nations did share ‘common convictions on which human
rights depend’.424 The committee summed up what they had discovered in the following
terms:

Varied in cultures and built upon different institutions, the members of the United
Nations have, nevertheless, certain great principles in common. They believe that
men and women all over the world have the right to live a life that is free from the
haunting fear of poverty and insecurity. They believe that they should have a
more complete access to the heritage, in all its aspects and dimensions, of the
civilization so painfully built by human effort. They believe that science and the
arts should combine to serve alike peace and the well-being, spiritual as well as
material, of all men and women without discrimination of any kind.425

They thus observed that it was possible to achieve cross-cultural understanding and
agreement on the core of human rights that man ought to be entitled to.

Ghandi for example had submitted that any conception of universal rights must go
hand in hand with the idea of duties, rather than be construed as fundamental
entitlements. He posited thus: ‘I learned from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights
to be deserved and preserved came from duty well done. Thus the very right to live
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accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship of the world. From this one
fundamental statement, perhaps it is easy enough to define duties of Man and Woman
and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be first performed. Every other
right can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for’.426

Despite the many different submissions from all parts of the world, it must be
stated that at the time of the drafting of the UDHR, there weren't many independent
countries at the time in Africa.427 As a matter of fact, during the negotiating stages of the
UN Charter, there were less than 100 so states in the world at the time. However, the UN
Secretariat nonetheless forwarded the opinions of the groups without consultative status
and even individuals to the Commission on Human Rights for their consideration. During
the final vote on the draft Bill, the Commission approved the draft by 13 votes, with none
against; although the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Byelorussia, the
Ukraine and Yugoslavia all abstained.428 The General Assembly, in its third meeting,
adopted the Declaration on December 10, 1948 after 48 States approved the draft with
none against, but eight abstentions.429 The USSR, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
(UKSSR), the BSSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, Saudi Arabia and South Africa abstained.430
None of these countries voted against the Declaration. However, it is worth noting that
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abstaining delegations had participated and cooperated in the various drafting
processes.431

Some of the abstentions were revolved around the view that the UDHR did not go
far enough. For example, the communist abstentions were due to the fact that the
Declaration ought to have explicitly condemned fascism and Nazism in order to be
effective.432 They abstained because there was no such explicit condemnation in the text.
Some also called for a legal positivist approach regard human rights. To this group,
human rights should not be conceived outside the State, because the very concept of
rights and law was necessarily connected with the State. However, this positivist
interpretation of human rights is counter intuitive as the Nazi regime would thus be
deemed a legal one, acting in accordance with the basic law of Germany at the time.
Thus, the only way that Nazism could be effectively condemned was the route the
Declaration took i.e. conceptualizing human rights as rights as transcending existing
national law and geographical jurisdictions.

Also, whereas some countries with majority Muslim populations, such as Syria,
Iran, Turkey and Pakistan all voted for the Declaration, the Saudi Arabian delegation
abstained in the final vote mostly for two reasons. First, they disagreed with the wording
of Article 16 in relation to equal marriage rights for both men and women, and they also
objected to the clause in Article 18 that permitted or empowered individuals to change
their religion or belief. In a similar vein, the Union of South Africa abstained from
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approving the document, because it knew other countries such as the United States would
use it as a basis of condemning South African practices of apartheid and racial
discrimination.433 Whereas the Communists thought the Declaration did not state enough,
the South African government was of the opinion that it stated far too much.434 To them,
it was clear from the provisions that social, cultural, and economic rights had never been
intended to be included in the draft declaration.

A close examination of the South African reveals a lack philosophical basis, but
rather as an attempt to protect their system of apartheid, which clearly violated several
articles in the Declaration.435 For example, the right of a person to participate in the
government of his or her country was not a universal right according to the South African
representative on the Third Committee. 436 According to this position, the right was
conditioned not only by nationality and country, but also by qualifications of franchise
including race.437 It suffices to note that the South African Constitution at that time only
permitted individuals of European descent to be members of the House of Assembly or
the Senate.438 This abstention by the Union of South Africa, it has been argued, detracted
from the claim to universality of the Declaration. However, their abstention cannot be
said to actually detract from the universality of the UDHR as a whole, because racism
had by then been unanimously rejected as wrong and untenable.
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What then are some of the lessons that can be drawn from the work of the Human
Rights Commission, and in particular the UNESCO philosophers committee that worked
towards the adoption of the UDHR? The first important thing to note in my view is the
acceptance of culturally relative approaches towards universal human rights. What I
mean by this is that the various positions espoused during the preparatory and drafting
phases of the UDHR centered on a discussion of what was “moral” and what should be a
legal entitlement or right. Hence, many different socio-cultural perceptions of morality
clashed, but the underlying value that all races and peoples considered paramount in the
ordering of their affairs and ensuring fundamental human rights for all, was the principle
of equality and non-discrimination. Equality of cultures, and non-distinction on the basis
of specific human differences like origin, race, ethnicity, sex, religion etc.

Yet, the UDHR has been continuously criticized as ‘an arrogant attempt to
universalize a particular set of ideas and to impose them upon three-quarters of the
world’s population, most of whom were not represented at its creation’.439 Makau Mutua
for example suggests that ‘Muslims, Hindus, Africans, non-Judeo-Christians, feminists,
critical theorists, and other scholars of an inquiring bent of mind have exposed the
Declaration’s bias and exclusivity’.440 He further suggests that:

Non-Western philosophies and traditions particularly on the nature of man and the
purposes of political society were either unrepresented or marginalized during the
early formulation of human rights… There is no doubt that the current human
439
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rights corpus is well meaning. But that is beside the point…. International human
rights fall within the historical continuum of the European colonial project in
which whites pose as the saviors of a benighted and savage non-European world.
The white human rights zealot joins the unbroken chain that connects her to the
colonial administrator, the Bible-wielding missionary, and the merchant of free
enterprise…. Thus human rights reject the cross-fertilization of cultures and
instead seek the transformation of non-Western cultures by Western cultures.441

Is this statement an accurate reflection of the contemporary human rights movement
spearheaded by the UDHR? And is the Declaration really bias and not inclusive as Mutua
suggests? Evidence suggests the contrary.

For instance, even though a majority of the people of the world were not
necessarily represented in the UN at the time of its adoption, the drafting process of the
UDHR involved some of the most influential and independent minded theorists and
philosophers of the time. Thus, by the time the draft Declaration was presented to the
General

Assembly,

hundreds

of

individuals

from

diverse

backgrounds

had

participated.’442 Hence, even though not all States and peoples as we know them today
were represented during the drafting phase of the Declaration, it cannot be true that the
Declaration is biased and non-inclusive. Charles Malik thus notes:
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The genesis of each article, and each part of each article, was a dynamic process
in which many minds, interests, backgrounds, legal systems and ideological
persuasions played their respective determining roles.443

What is certain is that the drafters considered the many different philosophical, cultural
and ideological worldviews on rights, and sought to balance these in a way that was fair
and inclusive.

As a result, the Declaration has been referred to as a Dignitarian rights instrument,
which seeks a middle ground between the two most prominent competing philosophical
foundations of human rights i.e. individualism and collectivism. Mary Ann Glendon puts
this in the following manner:

Dignitarian rights instruments, with their emphasis on the family and their greater
attention to duties, are more compatible with Asian and African traditions. In
these documents, rights bearers tend to be envisioned within families and
communities; rights are formulated so as to make clear their limits and their
relation to one another as well as to the responsibilities that belong to the citizens
and the state…. In the spirit of the latter vision, the Declaration’s “Everyone” is
an individual who is constituted, in important ways, by and through relationships
with others. “Everyone” is envisioned as uniquely valuable in himself (there are
three separate references to the free development of one’s personality), but
“Everyone” is expected to act towards others “in a spirit of brotherhood.”
443
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“Everyone” is depicted as situated in a variety of specifically named, real-life
relationships of mutual dependency: families, communities, religious groups,
workplaces, associations, societies, cultures, nations, and an emerging
international order. Though its main body is devoted to basic individual freedoms,
the Declaration begins with an exhortation to act in “a spirit of brotherhood” and
ends with community, order, and society. Whatever else may be said of him or
her, the Declaration’s “Everyone” is not a lone bearer of rights…. [The] departure
from classical individualism while rejecting collectivism is the hallmark of
dignitarian instruments such as the Declaration.444

The Declaration has therefore achieved global acceptance, and some scholars even argue
that some of its principles derived from the provisions thereof have attained the status of
customary international law.445

It is important to also note that the universality of the Declaration as was
envisioned by the drafters was not one that sought to impose a uniform system of human
rights upon the peoples of the world. Rather, by adopting the principles contained therein
and practicing promotion and protection of human rights, the various States could
accumulate experiences that will all together enrich the Declaration’s purpose by
achieving its aim of human rights for all. Another important lesson that can thus be drawn
from this is the fact that the drafters recognized humanity’s commonness as a unifying
factor that transcended all barriers including racial, religious, linguistic, gender etc. The
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common humanity denominator thus manifests itself in ensuring the right balance
between individual freedoms and liberty on one hand, and the collective good of the
society as a whole on the other. Thus, it is possible to view variables such as human
dignity, individual autonomy and equality from a “morally and culturally neutral”
standpoint, just like the UDHR did.

The UDHR in contemporary times is truly seen as universal and has been to a
large extent accepted as customary international law.446 It is the UDHR that influenced
treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The UDHR
has clearly strengthened the human rights regime, specifically with respect to the
enforcement and implementation of human rights. As a result of the different
perspectives on morality, humanity, human dignity and human rights throughout the
world, various steps had to be taken in order to develop a uniform framework for defining
and enumerating human rights. There were enquiries, consultations, investigation etc. in
order to develop a rational framework to fulfil the purpose of promoting and protecting
human rights for all. Thus, to develop a rational public policy framework for regulating
human morality, a similar approach must be taken in order to incorporate the various
worldviews and take them into account when making laws.

Therefore, laws that operate to oppress minorities on the basis on general
conceptions of morality must be looked at again with an open mind. We need to repeal
446
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laws that have yielded terrible results in practice (in terms of their unenforceability
among other factors) and enact ones that will avert oppression of minorities. To borrow
the words of UNESCO, those laws that have outcomes that serve no useful purpose in
society practically, must give way to laws that protect all persons from the oppression of
the majority, which no reasonable man will oppose. Stakeholders must be assembled with
this purpose to allow a common project to move forward with or without agreement on
the reasons for their positions on the defining issues.

Ultimately the framework for developing a rational public policy approach with
regard laws that seek to regulate human morality must be one that considers divergent
philosophies, cultures, religions and even economic social and political theories. It must
be sufficiently definite to have real significance both as an inspiration and a guide to
practice. However, it must also be sufficiently general and flexible to apply to all
individuals and be capable of modification to suit people at different stages of social and
political as well as cultural development. So, even though we place great emphasis on a
particular idea of what amounts to moral conduct in Africa generally, accepting divergent
and minority views and positions on moral questions seem to be more firmly grounded in
the African context even more than we are aware. For instance, with regard the general
African misconception that human rights and human dignity are a western concepts, it
has been suggested that:

The Mandingo people of Mali, in West Africa, had proclaimed similar principles,
in 1236 that affirmed the freedom and dignity of “every human being” and not
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just the Mandingo nobility. Freedom of religious thought existed in the kingdoms
of Congo and Ndongo, in Central Africa, before the Portuguese came there in
1492. Different sexual orientations existed in the Kingdom of Buganda before
European missionaries brought Christianity to that East African kingdom, in the
late nineteenth century.447

However, genuine fears of a breakdown of morality must be anticipated and
addressed. For instance, some theorists fear that the overemphasis on human rights for all
with regard moral questions would undermine social or legal interventions in society.
One of these interventions is affirmative action. It has thus been noted that the search for
neutral principles conflicts with affirmative action and accounts for most of the hostility
and criticisms that have been expressed against it. Another fear may be based on the
theory that laws have a potential for creating a sub-culture. Thus morally neutral laws
would erode our existing culture and create an alternative sub-culture, which is
diametrically opposed to the status quo. In this regard, there must be a societal stock
taking in order to ascertain what the culture was as distinct from what the culture really is
today.

Also, perhaps a different outlook on the role culture should play must be
highlighted. For instance morality entails issues not only communal in nature but also
personal to individuals. As a result, the factor of autonomy should be looked at in light of
culture. The effects of culture in shaping individuals cannot be over-emphasized as this
generally leads to accepted norms in different cultures. However, we must not lose sight
447
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of the role the individual plays in society, and the fact that, we cannot necessarily
generalize when it comes to intimate human conduct bordering on morality. Thus, just as
the UN Charter paved the way and served as the foundation and basis of human rights for
all by including human rights lingua (albeit in general terms), the Constitution of Ghana
can serve a similar purpose. In our context however, our Constitution is replete with
human rights protections, including respect for human dignity, equality and individual
autonomy to a large extent. With these in mind we can now focus on the various
objectives that should serve as the basis of a rational public policy framework for
regulating intimate human conduct. These are: (1) the objective of preserving and
promoting the inherent dignity of the individual; (2) the objective of ensuring that the
individual’s ability to act in an autonomous manner free from social coercion is reflected
in laws; and (3) the objective of achieving equality when dealing with personal choices
that do not conform with societal standards.

C) TOWARDS MORAL NEUTRALITY

Morality entails or is an amalgamation of a collective sense of societal beliefs and
value systems, which in many instances dictates public policy and invariably influences
the types of laws in most societies. This collective sense of morality however has the
tendency of imposing what I refer to as moral oppression on minorities within that
society who may not be inclined to or be susceptible to conformity with such vague and
autocratic societal standards. Thus, for so long as the possibility of moral oppression exist
in a particular society, and they do exist more often than not, fidelity to the law demands
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a neutral form of morality, no matter how imperfect such a concept may be, in order to
balance the scales. Moreover, this type of moral oppression that societies tend to
superimpose on all is usually predicated on some variables that may not necessarily be
universally accepted after all.

For example, the proliferation of religions and religious values and standards
remain controversial, in respect of its impact on law in the modern secular state. How
then do we achieve a moral construct that considers not just such religious values and
beliefs of admittedly the majority of the people, but also the individual moral worldviews
of the minority? Let's take the example of the institution of marriage in Ghana.
Traditional conceptions of this institution envisage pluralistic marriages in the form of
polygamy, as has already been noted.448 Hence, it has been authoritatively held that
customary marriages in Ghana are potentially polygamous.449 It is therefore possible for a
Christian man to be customarily married to two women without necessarily feeling
morally blameworthy of fornication or adultery under the customary law of Ghana, even
though Christianity prescribes monogamy and considers deviations from this immoral.

Critics of this postulation may very well suggest and point to the existence of
ordinance marriages in Ghana that provides that such marriages are strictly monogamous
– hence true Christians will subscribe and adhere to that.450 Pushing the argument further,
Islamic marriages are also permitted under the Marriages Act of Ghana, under which a
448
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Muslim man is entitled to marry as many women as he is capable of looking after fairly
and equitably.451 Thus, aside the external pluralistic character of marriages in general in
Ghana (three types of marriages), there is also an internal pluralistic nature of a majority
of the types of marriages in Ghana (Customary law marriages and Islamic marriages).
How then does a society with a mixed and diverse sense of morality (when it comes to
marriage, for example), and with it – sexual morality452 purport to embody a common
strand of morality either based on religion or culture? Such a position, I believe should be
rejected and not countenanced especially in the 21st century where individual autonomy
and equality has gained much prominence in human right discourse.453

Thus, laws especially criminal laws that purport to prohibit certain intimate and
sexual conduct because "society" finds it morally opprobrious, misrepresent the public
policy demands of the 21st century. Public policy must not just reflect the religious views
and subjective cultural perceptions of the collective group; but it must also mirror the
independent moral or amoral outlook of the minority as well whatever that may be, no
matter how unflattering and controversial it may seem. Hence, it must be dignitarian in
outlook. In making public policy for the purposes of regulating human behavior, it is my
position that certain morally neutral values must be explored and should form the basis of
laws that seek to intrude and inquire into the most intimate of all human desires – sex.

451

See Qur’an, Sura 4 (An Nisa), Ayah 3.
It is important to note that even though the concept of marriage is not and does not necessarily equate to
or exemplify sexual morality, one of the fundamental tenets of marriage is sex. Sexual morality therefore is
arguably a necessary corollary of marriage; as a result, it is irrational to pretend that there is a universal
concept of sexual morality when religion and culture all have different standards in this regard as evidenced
by the example of Customary, Christian and Muslim marriages in present day Ghana.
453
See International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966.
452

143

Although it can be argued and it has indeed been argued that all principles, values,
variables and concepts at a certain abstract level are laden with subjective and/or
objective value judgments of morality, we can nonetheless attempt construing some of
these variables from a neutral standpoint, applying contemporary perspectives to the
inquiry. Three such key concepts that I propose as fundamental in ensuring a more
rational public policy framework for regulating intimate human conduct are (1) Human
Dignity; (2) Individual Autonomy; and (3) Equality. These, to me, must form the core of
any public policy approach towards the regulation of intimate human conduct. This is
because, at the heart of the debate regarding sexual morality from the perspectives of
religion, culture and feminism lay these three ideals.

As has already been discussed, both Christianity and Islam invariably preach the
need to uphold the dignity of the individual in the form of sexually moral conduct.
Religion thus considers sexual immorality in the form of adultery, pre-marital sex, sex
work, homosexuality etc. as undignified, irresponsible and reprehensible. Sexual morality
can only be attained within the confines of heterosexual marriage. Similarly, the core
ideals that the two most vocal and important wings of feminism have been fighting for
over the years with regards to sexual morality is female autonomy. Thus, radical
feminists argue that females are a subordinated sex and ought to break free of the chains
of patriarchal gender roles i.e. sex work, pornography etc., whilst liberal feminists simply
assert that most females engaged in sex work, for example, are asserting their autonomy
by making those individual choices free from coercion. Also, traditional African culture’s
prescriptions for sexual morality is more fluid as promiscuity is not necessarily prohibited
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as can be ascertained from the existence of polygyny. However, sexual morality from the
cultural perspective has been greatly influenced by religion – which as I’ve noted places a
great emphasis on the dignity of the individual and the community at large.

However, contemporary human rights place an even greater emphasis on equal
rights, equality and non-discrimination. It is for this reason that no discussion of sexual
morality can be had without considering this ideal/variable. Thus, religious, feminist and
cultural conceptions of sexual morality must be considered alongside the contemporary
and basic human need for equal rights of all persons, and non-discrimination on the basis
of sexuality and how one chooses to express it. These three variables at the core of the
discussion of sexual morality (dignity, autonomy and equality) must be re-examined and
made “morally neutral” as far as possible (having in mind the religious, feminist and
cultural viewpoints) in relation to specific intimate human conduct, This will ensure that
the framework that is developed in relation to the regulation of criminalized intimate
human conduct of a sexual nature, is more productive and will be a far better basis than
what presently exists, which only has religious and/or cultural conceptions of morality
alone as its backbone and justification.

1. Human Dignity
In human rights discourse, the idea of human dignity is a reference to the primary
characteristic of human beings i.e. their humanity, which entitles us to respect so we are
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not taken for granted or abused by others.454 The idea of human dignity is a nod to the
recognition and respect for the inherent humanity that all humans possess, and an
affirmation of the inherent or fundamental value of human beings generally.455 This
concept is universally accepted as a basic ethical and legal principle, and a yardstick for
assessing the efficacy of human rights. As Lebech has noted, 'it clearly is in everyone’s
interest to be respected as having human dignity, i.e. as having the highest value due to
an inalienable humanity.'456 The principle of human dignity, as a universal affirmation
that human beings have the highest value, has thus been the basis and underlying
principle for many international human rights instruments. Consequently it has been
adopted in the national legislations and constitutions of a vast majority of the States of
the world.457

One of the first applications of human dignity however in international
instruments can be found in the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations (1945),
where it states in part that:

We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
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worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small…458

Also, parts of the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provide that
‘Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world..’.459 Article One of the UDHR also states: ‘All human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) further
reiterate the point that the inherent dignity of humans is to be recognized as the
foundation of human rights itself. Thus, both Covenants provide in their preamble the
following words: ‘Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person...’.460 Furthermore, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man (1948) declared that ‘the American peoples have acknowledged the dignity of the
individual, and their national constitutions recognize that juridical and political
institutions, which regulate life in human society, have as their principal aim the
protection of the essential rights of man and the creation of circumstances that will
permit him to achieve spiritual and material progress and attain happiness’. 461 This
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convention also provides that ‘All men are born free and equal, in dignity and in rights,
and, being endowed by nature with reason and conscience, they should conduct
themselves as brothers one to another’.462

In Africa, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, also known as the
Banjul Charter, stipulates that, ‘Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the
dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of
exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited’.463 The inherent
and inalienable nature of human dignity is therefore not in doubt as all the major human
rights instruments confirm.

464

Human dignity thus encompasses the essential

characteristics of human beings. It is important to however note that all these human
rights instruments do not state what exactly human dignity consists of. 465 That
notwithstanding, the bottom line is that human dignity is fundamental, essential and
inalienable to all humans. Some authors have also argued that the specific incidents of
human dignity are socially constructed in accordance with particular cultural and
historical contexts and that it is not possible to ascertain only one “true” meaning of
human dignity.466 The argument is that what constitutes human dignity is culturally
determined in each society and thereby widely differs. Shultziner for instance has posited
that the term human dignity is used in the legal parlance – as a justification for human
462
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rights in legal documents; and in the moral-philosophical parlance – as related to rights
and duties, honour and a degrading attitude or humiliation of human worth.467 However,
because human dignity provides a minimum legal standard by which people should be
treated, it seems a reliable basis for neutrality.

In promoting the respect for and promotion and protection of human rights for all,
it has been suggested that theoretical examinations of the concept of human dignity may
be troublesome, irrelevant and even a distraction.468 For example, Kateb summarizes the
postulations of this school of thought as follows:

[T]he first contention is that despite the efforts of Kant, the idea of human dignity
adds nothing but a phrase to the theory of human rights; it surely does not
provide, or help to provide, an indispensable foundation. The second is that the
historical record shows such human savagery toward human beings that to speak
of human dignity is to mock human suffering by refusing to make paramount the
moral difference between victims and victimizers; we must grant dignity only to
those persons who have acted morally. The only human beings who have human
dignity are those who are morally blameless or at least much less guilty; violators
of rights, the victimizers, have forfeited their chance to acquire dignity. The
theory of rights must distinguish between those who have dignity and those who
have (not yet) lost it. The third contention is that the affirmation of human dignity
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is dangerous because, when extended to the human species vis-à-vis other species,
it leads to monstrous human pride, which drives people to exploit nature for
human purposes and hence to ravage nature and ultimately make the earth
uninhabitable for many species, including humanity. The fourth contention is that
human species’ pride is not only dangerous but false: there is no basis for thinking
that the human species is anything special; or that it alone has dignity among all
the species; or that if the human species does have dignity, that its dignity is
greater than, or even incomparably greater than, the dignity of any other
species.469

In response to these arguments, Kateb notes that the human species is indeed something
special, and ‘possesses valuable, commendable uniqueness or distinctiveness that is
unlike the uniqueness of any other species’.470 To him, human dignity is higher than the
dignity of all other species, or is a qualitatively different dignity from all others.471 He
adds that the two basic propositions that make up the concept of human dignity are that:
‘All individuals are equal; no other species is equal to humanity’.472

Kateb also observes that in comparison to other species, humanity has a stature
beyond comparison. He also posits that human dignity is an existential value and that ‘the
idea of human dignity insists on recognizing the proper identity of individual or species;
recognizing what a person is in relation to all other persons and what the species is in
469
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relation to all other species’.473. He adds that:

The truth of personal identity is at stake when any individual is treated as if he or
she is not a human being like any other, and therefore treated as more or less than
human. The truth of identity is also at stake when a person is treated as if he or she
is just one more human being in a species, and not, instead, a unique individual
who is irreplaceable and not exchangeable for another.474

Therefore, these two notions of commonness and distinctiveness, according to Kateb,
work together in constituting the idea of equal individual status.475

Many other scholars have however in recent times also identified three general
characterizations of human dignity in human rights discourse. The first of these is the
idea that human dignity and human rights bear some equivalency and are similar in
certain respects i.e. regarding the standards or norms that fall under both. So for example,
Tobin cites language used in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
as evidence of such equivalence.476 The second characterization or function of human
dignity is succinctly captured by Jürgen Habermas. 477 Tasioulas sums it up in the
following manner:
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[T]he idea of human dignity is a “portal” or “conceptual hinge”, one that
discharges a ‘mediating function’ between a morality of duties that pervades all
human life, on the one hand, and the limited schedule of enforceable legal rights
properly enacted by a democratic constitutional state, on the other. So understood,
human dignity is a threshold at which the operative grounding values – the
morality of equal respect – give rise to the rights that individuals can claim in
virtue of their status as citizens of a democratic state.478

This idea of human dignity constituting enforceable legal rights has been rightly
criticized as “offering little in the way of substantive criteria for determining the content
of those rights”.479

The third meaning of human dignity treats the concept as the most fundamental
value of human rights, or even as its exclusive normative basis. 480 Thus, both the
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights has been pointed to as evidence of human rights in general deriving from the
inherent dignity of man.481 This characterization of human dignity places emphasis on the
fact that all human rights derive from the dignity of man. Can we therefore say that the
inherent dignity of man is a principle or value that is neutral? Better still, can human
rights really be claimed to deriving from inherent human dignity?
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The answers to the aforementioned questions seems obvious to the idealistic prohuman rights advocate. The neutrality of human dignity is seen, for example, in the fact
that regardless of the circumstances of one’s birth, that quality of life that is personified
by the individual must remain intact and be guaranteed by the State. It is also as a result
of the inherent dignity associated with man that the idea of human rights is manifested –
for if humans have no dignity, there will be no need for rights in the first place. The
inherent dignity of man, to me, is therefore a neutral value in the sense that it is the
fundamental basis for the existence of human rights in the first place, and this is
manifested in both the commonness and distinctiveness notions of equal individual status,
as espoused by Kateb.

Human dignity is therefore neutral, as no one can convincingly argue that humans
are bereft of dignity. As a matter of fact, even the down trodden and poor in society retain
this essential characteristic of humanity. It is therefore not surprising for example that,
aside age restrictions or mental health hindrances, all persons in society are given the
opportunity to take part, whether through their representatives or otherwise, in making
policies and governing the society generally. Inherent dignity of man should thus be
above subjective analysis and unnecessary theorizing, although I admit that theoretical
discussions can advance the frontiers of the concept generally and enhance
understanding. Therefore, even though human dignity can be considered as a moral ideal,
it is also morally neutral because its conceptualization places strong emphasis on the
value and worth of man, without any distinction whatsoever.
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2. Individual Autonomy
In recent times the European Court of Human rights has been noted for suggesting
autonomy as the underlying principle of the European Human Rights Convention.482
Even though it has not clearly defined it within its jurisprudence, its prevailing notion of
autonomy originated in a case concerning the United Kingdom.483 The legal system of the
UK is that of the common law. Autonomy has featured within its jurisprudence and that
of analogous systems.484 The principle of autonomy was given legal effect in the ECtHR
by virtue of the often-cited dictum of judge Cardozo J.: ‘every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.'485
In the decision of United Pacific Railway Co v. Botsford,486 the Supreme Court of the
United States of America noted that:

No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint of interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.487
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Again, in the case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey488 it was held that ‘matters, involving
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
amendment.’489

Autonomy is the quality of deserving respect for one's own ability to decide for
oneself, control one's life, and absorb the costs and benefits of one's choices.490 Children for instance lack autonomy, and as a result invite sympathy, pity, or invasive
paternalism.491 There are various notions of Autonomy. There is the distinction between
local and global autonomy, for instance. 492 The former has to do with autonomy as
applied to a person's life as a whole; whereas the latter has to do with autonomy
associated with specific actions or decisions.493 There is the idea of basic autonomy that
is the minimal status of being responsible, independent and able to speak for oneself.494
There is also ideal autonomy: “an achievement that serves as a goal to which we might
aspire and according to which a person is maximally authentic and free of manipulative,
self-distorting influences.”495
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Individual autonomy thus connotes the idea that human beings are capable of
acting in an autonomous manner, and free from external influences or pressures. The
ability of an individual to make rational decisions based on the choices he or she is
presented with on a daily basis is what epitomizes this concept. Admittedly, at an abstract
level, all life decisions and choices are influenced one way or the other by external
forces. One’s experiences therefore shape his or her worldview, sometimes even subconsciously. Thus the question is: Is there really individual autonomy?

My answer to this question is two-fold. First, the sum total of once experiences is
what distinguishes an individual from another person. As a result of the internalization of
life’s lessons, experiences or even inherent beliefs or those made on the basis of mere
whims, an individual’s autonomous nature is created. This autonomy is easily manifested
when that person is faced with choices regarding what school to go to, what kind of
employment to seek etc. Hence, the first dimension of my response is that external
influences and forces inevitably shape the ‘inherent’ autonomous nature of an individual.

Secondly, individual autonomy exists because humans are mostly motivated by
self-interest. Thus, when faced with a difficult decision, human beings have the
propensity of choosing the path that will lead to some benefit, or at least will provide the
least unpleasant consequences – especially in situations where the options available are
equally bad. Although, any decision made under the circumstances just described could
be based on some external influences that have been internalized by the person
concerned, I believe that humans are instinctively wired to pursue self-preservation and
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place their self-interest above any other; and this is an inherent characteristic of humanity
generally.

Thus, it is my belief that Individual Autonomy as a variable of social construction
can be neutral in the sense that all humans, absent the exceptions in relation to mental
capacity and lack of maturity, must be deemed as possessing the free will to acting in a
rational manner. The neutrality of the autonomous behavior of an individual must thus be
respected within broad and rational public policy dictates. Thus, although societal
influences are a major factor in shaping the behavior of people generally, the capacity to
act in an autonomous manner in promoting the self-interest of individuals and their
individuality should be generally respected and not infringed upon. Therefore, even
though individual autonomy can also be considered as a moral ideal, it is also morally
neutral because its conceptualization places strong emphasis on the ability of human
beings to make rational individual choices.

3. Equality
The concept of equality is probably the easiest right to explain, but the most
difficult to achieve in our contemporary world. This is because the classical idea of
equality suggests that all persons are born equal. Equal in rights, and equal in dignity.
Thus, they must be treated the same without any distinction whatsoever. The problem
with this is that in actual fact human beings have never been deemed to be equal from
time immemorial. Hence, humans have been often divided into classes i.e. the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat, men and women, white and black, king and subject etc.
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Hence, inequality has been one of the essential characteristics of human existence since
the beginning of time.

Recently in Ghana, the Supreme Court in discussing notions of equality limited
equality to non-discrimination among equals. According to the court, only equals could
be treated equally. One would have thought that if humans are human and therefore
equal, they ought to be treated equally regardless of their different status. The court
however reasoned as follows:

No two human beings are equal in all respects. Accordingly, if the law were to
treat all human beings rigidly equally, it would in fact result in unequal
outcomes. Rigid equal treatment would often result in unfair and unequal
results. Accordingly, it is widely recognized that equality before the law requires
equal treatment of those similarly placed, implying different treatment in respect
of those with different characteristics. In simple terms, equals must be treated
equally, while the treatment of unequals must be different. The law must be able
to differentiate between unequals and accord them the differentiated treatment
which will result in enabling them, as far as practicable, to attain the objective of
equality of outcomes or of fairness. In effect, equality of opportunity will often
entail the law treating people differently in order to give them a fighting chance of
attaining equality of outcomes or of fairness. If the differentiated legal rights
arising from such an approach to the law were to be struck down as not
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conforming with the constitutional prescription that all persons are equal before
the law, it would be thoroughly counterproductive.496

If equality were explained as inherently intertwined with the concept of
inequality, it would imply that a state would be able to infringe on the rights of a citizen
once the state discovers a loophole. One such instance is where a criterion for
discrimination has not been spelled out. On the other hand, this interpretation seems to
make room for the operation and justification of concepts such as affirmative action. This
seems to make the debate a tough one. However it is helpful to remember that it is not the
apparent inequality within the concept of affirmative action that is the basis of this
intervention.497 It is rather based on compensatory and distributive principles of justice
applied in order to restore social equilibrium.

The questions that remain to be answered as a result are: how do we conceptualize
the idea of equality? Does equality mean treating similarly placed persons in an equal
manner? Is it right to treat persons not similarly placed differently? My view is that,
equality as a variable of social construction is fraught with inherent problems, as has been
witnessed as a result of the inequality that has been part and parcel of man’s history.
However, when we consider equality within the context of discussions of law and
morality, we must elevate this variable to the point where rational public policy choices
are made on the basis of the classical conception of the principle of equality and nondiscrimination.
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Thus, laws promulgated in modern secular States must be rational, and equally
applicable to all persons. Further, law must ensure that the interests of no one individual
or groups of persons are elevated above others. This conceptualization of equality is
neutral in the sense that it treats all persons in an equal manner without any distinction
whatsoever. In practice, this may be impossible to achieve, as a result of systemic
inequality that has been ingrained in the social ethos of most societies. However,
pursuing public policy on the basis of an equal applicable standard for all persons
presents the best opportunity in ensuring and safeguarding individual liberty generally.
Equality as a principle can therefore be made neutral if adopted and vigorously pursued
as an inherent good in itself, which all persons are entitled to by virtue of their
membership of the human race alone. No other qualification factor, in my opinion, is
required in theorizing that the principle of equality can and must indeed be morally
neutral. Therefore, even though equality can also be considered as a moral ideal, it is
nonetheless also morally neutral because of its concern with individual liberty.

D) THE DIGNITY, INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND EQUALITY (D.I.E.) FRAMEWORK

Having theorized about moral neutrality, it is important to reiterate that there are
many who believe that neutrality is itself not neutral. That notwithstanding, some
scholars regard concepts such as the Rule of Law as value-neutral, even though they
believe neutrality as a concept is far from neutral.498 However, it has been noted that
insofar as some people perceive a concept as desirable, they will believe it has some
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value.499 The difference is however in relation to the exact character of that value, in
particular, whether the Rule of Law as an example offers moral value.500 It has also been
argued that the neutralists are mistaken, and that theirs is a costly mistake.501 According
to Smith, governance by the Rule of Law is a valid ideal only because it is a moral good
that serves a morally worthy purpose.502 Thus, the conception of the Rule of Law as
value-neutral actually thwarts our ability to enjoy the benefits that it can and should
provide.503 Smith goes on to suggest that:
More exactly, its ideal-ness is ambiguous. Is it an ideal which, when satisfied,
delivers a positive good? A state of affairs desirable in its own right? Such that a
government that provides the Rule of Law is, in virtue of that, morally superior to
a government that does not? Or is its value relative to the particular ends of the
government that it serves, a strictly internal and instrumental value, such that a
regime that conforms to Rule of Law standards is not thereby better than
alternatives in any very robust sense? .... [T]he Rule of Law has become
something of a gold standard of legitimacy. Domestically, as well, over the last
decade in the U.S., many on both the left and right have charged our government
with serious breaches of the Rule of Law, whether in regard to detention and
surveillance policies adopted in the war on terror, the powers assumed by central
bankers at the Federal Reserve and Treasury Departments in the face of the 2008
financial crisis, uses of Presidential signing statements, executive privilege,
reconciliation processes for enacting legislation, or the Supreme Court’s ruling in
499
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Bush v. Gore. My contention is that a hazy grasp of the character of the Rule of
Law will naturally infect our understanding of its precise requirements and the
value that is attained by satisfying them. Without a clear understanding of the
value of this ideal, we cannot accurately identify its necessary conditions, and
thus we will lack a sound basis for judging whether a given government is or is
not upholding it.504

Even though her argument centers on the Rule of Law, she highlights the intrinsic
superiority a principle conveys once it is recognized as better than others. This seems to
establish rather that the conception of morally neutral concepts may rather be tantamount
to imposing a ‘new normal moral.’

Again, in a report on neutrality in Germany, Human Rights Watch defined the
principle of State neutrality as the duty of the State to preserve neutrality in ideology and
religion. Some proponents of State legislation restricting the headscarf and other religious
clothing claim that it is designed to ensure the neutrality of the teaching environment and
public services as well as the political and religious peace of schools and of the State.
They argue that the wearing of headscarves by teachers must be prohibited. Some Church
representatives and mainly Christian Democrat politicians justify privileging Christianity
in terms of such restrictions on the grounds that it is an integral part of German culture
and the German value system. To them, the headscarf represents a threat to the Christian
heritage that underpins German constitutional values. By this logic, Christian symbols are
504
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not considered a threat to the principles of the Constitution because they are cultural
rather than religious and therefore neutral. Based on this some may argue that underlying
every concept of neutrality is some standard which renders the concept non-neutral. This
may not necessarily be the case. The form of moral neutrality as has been discussed must
necessarily be applicable to individuals because it must respect their autonomy, dignity
and must have equality as its basis. This leaves no room for the operation of such public
or mass concepts of morality in general, which leads to the oppression of minorities.

The Dignity, Individual Autonomy and Equality framework for public policy
making, which I propose, drawing on the lessons from the UDHR drafting process (in
particular, the work of the UNESCO Committee) therefore, can be summarized as
follows:

1) All laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct must have at its core the
objective of preserving and promoting the inherent dignity of the individual;

2) The individual’s ability to act in an autonomous manner free from social coercion
must be reflected in laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct; and

3) All laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct must have the quality of
equality about it i.e. it should not criminalize particular groups of people because
of personal choices that do not conform to societal standards.
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This framework for public policy making must be applied, employed and be the basis of
analysis in determining whether laws that seek to regulate morality are generally sound,
and accord with the public policy demands of the 21st Century.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE REGULATION OF INTIMACY AND SEXUAL
MORALITY

The Legal System of Ghana as it is today is modeled along the lines of the British
common law system. Ghana, formerly referred to as the Gold Coast, attained
independence in 1957. Prior to that, the entity was a colony of Great Britain between
1843 and 1957. The British thus imported aspects of their political and legal system to
their colonies, including the Gold Coast, by virtue of their “indirect rule” governance
style.

A) THE GHANA LEGAL SYSTEM

1. Historical Foundations of the Ghanaian Legal System
The Gold Coast, now Ghana, is located on the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa. It is
estimated that the indigenous peoples of this territory first came into contact with
Europeans somewhere in the fifteenth century.505 The first to arrive were the Portuguese,
who were subsequently followed by the Danes, Dutch and the British. The early
Europeans were mainly traders, who sought trade relations with the indigenous people.
William B. Harvey captures this initial phase of colonialism in the following words:506
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The first to arrive were the Portuguese, and in the centuries that followed, the
English, French, Dutch, Swedes, Danes and Brandenburgers competed for
footholds on the Guinea Coast from which to pursue their trading activities. The
pattern of contact and exploitation was fairly uniform. The European traders
established coastal fortified posts, many of which remain today, and developed
working relations with the chiefs and people of the surrounding area. European
guns, cloth and spirits were traded for slaves, gold, ivory and pepper. Trade was
not limited to the people in the immediate environs of the forts, however. Native
traders from far in the interior brought their human, or other, cargoes to the coast
to trade with the Europeans. As the region’s early name indicated, gold was an
important export, as it is today. Through the dark period of the slave trade,
however, enormous numbers of Africans were sold at the forts and loaded aboard
ships bound for the new world.

Missionary activity was also an important fixture in the history of the Gold Coast, as the
so-called ‘explorer-traders’ believed themselves to be “the bearers of Christianity and
civilization to the pagan people.” 507 However, it was not until the middle of the
eighteenth century that there begun organized missionary activity in the Gold Coast.508
These included representations from the Society of the Propagation of the Gospel; the
Basel Missionaries; the Methodist Missionaries; the Breman Missionaries; and the
Catholic Missionaries.509
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It is important to note that by the early parts of the nineteenth century, the British
were virtually the last ‘surviving’ European power in the Gold Coast. Prior to 1821
however, it was the Company of Merchants trading to Africa (successors to the Royal
African Company of England) that governed the British trading forts and posts in the
Gold Coast.510 However, the abolishing of the slave trade in Britain in 1807511 meant that
the Company lacked the necessary funding and incentive to continuously maintain the
British forts, and as a result required governmental subsidy for same.512 As a result of
allegations and accusations of misuse of this subsidy, as well as its failure to prevent
‘black market’ trade in slaves, the West Africa Act of 1821 was passed. This Act
dissolved the Company of Merchants, and vested its forts and other possessions in the
Crown. Furthermore, these possessions of the Crown, as well as future ones located
between latitudes 20 degrees North and 20 degrees South along the West Coast of Africa,
were to be annexed and made dependencies of the Colony of Sierra Leone.513 Thus,
formal British rule in the Gold Coast dates back to 1821, although the territory was at this
time a dependency of the Colony of Sierra Leone.

In 1828, the British government decided to hand over the administration of the
Gold Coast to a Committee of Merchants it selected.514 Under the leadership of Captain
George Maclean, the Committee extended its powers beyond the forts and settlements. In
1842 however, a Parliamentary Select Committee recommended that the Crown resume
administration of the Gold Coast, and that it be severed from the Colony of Sierra
510
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Leone.515 The idea was to regularize the “irregular judicial jurisdiction de facto exercised
by Maclean and the magistrates at the forts.”516 This was intended to be achieved through
pacts and agreements with the native chiefs, and with the appointment of a British judge
“who, in administering justice to the African population, should follow the principles,
while not being restricted to the technicalities, of English law and should be allowed a
large discretion.” 517 The Report of this Parliamentary Select Committee therefore
outlined the envisaged relationship between the Crown and the natives in the following
terms:518

… not the allegiance of subjects, to which we have no right to pretend, and which
it would entail an inconvenient responsibility to possess, but the deference of
weaker powers to a stronger and more enlightened neighbor, whose protection
and counsel they seek, and to whom they are bound by certain definite
obligations.

Thus, in 1843, the Crown resumed control of the Gold Coast. To enable the effective
administration of the Gold Coast, there was the enactment of the British Settlements Act
of 1843519 and the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843.520 Collectively, these Acts made it
possible for the British to exercise legal and political control over the Gold Coast.
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In order to solidify and legitimize their claim to the political and legal
administration of the Gold Coast, the British entered into an agreement with some coastal
chiefs (mainly Fanti chiefs) in 1844. This is what has come to be famously known as the
Bond of 1844, whereby the chiefs sought the protection of the British against attacks
from the inland by the Ashanti and other ethnic groups. Thus, irrespective of the many
British laws that were passed concerning the administration of the Gold Coast, it is this
agreement that signifies, to a large extent, the cession of the legal administration of the
Gold Coast to the British, by the natives themselves represented by their chiefs. As a
result of the importance of this agreement in the legal development of the Gold Coast, it
is imperative that the full text of the Bond is reproduced below:

1. Whereas power and jurisdiction have been exercised for and on behalf of Her
Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, within divers countries and
places adjacent to Her Majesty’s forts and settlements on the Gold Coast; we,
chiefs of countries and places so referred to, adjacent to the said forts and
settlements, do hereby acknowledge that power and jurisdiction, and declare that
the first objects of law are the protection of individuals and of property, that,
2. Human sacrifices, and other barbarous customs, such as panyarring, are
abominations and contrary to law, and, that,
3. Murders, robberies, and other crimes and offences, will be tried and inquired
before the Queen’s judicial officers and the chiefs of the districts, moulding the
customs of the country to the general principles of English law.
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Done at Cape Coast Castle before his Excellency the Lieutenant Governor; on this
6th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1844.

From this point onwards, a juridical link was formed between Britain and the Gold Coast
that paved the way for the introduction of the common law, previously unknown to the
Gold Coast.

Thus, by 1844 the British had essentially ensured that the people of the Gold
Coast were subject to British rule. However, the official creation of the ‘Gold Coast
Colony’ was not until 1874, following the defeat of the Ashantis in the Anglo-Ashanti
war that began on 22nd January 1873, and ended on 13th February 1874.521 The 1874
Treaty of Fomena that ended the war provided that the Asantehene522 had renounced all
claims to the coastal territories, including Elmina.523 On the formal creation of the
Colony, Bennion notes the following:

Having at last achieved the position of sole European power on the Gold Coast,
and having, at considerable cost in life and resources, at last brought about the
decisive defeat of the Ashantis, the British Government, disregarding those who
still pleaded for the abandonment of this troublesome region, decided that further
temporizing was impossible. By a Royal Charter signed on July 24th, 1874, the
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Gold Coast and Lagos were separated from Sierra Leone and together constituted
a separate colony under the title of the Gold Coast Colony.524

The Royal Charter of 1874 also provided for the position of a Governor, and
established the Legislative and Executive Councils. The Supreme Court of the Gold
Coast was also re-established by virtue of the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1876, having
been initially established pursuant to the Ordinance of 1853. The Chief Justice and not
more than four puisne judges525 constituted the court. The court had both civil and
criminal jurisdiction within the colony, similar to that of the Courts of Queen’s Bench,
Common Pleas and Exchequer in Britain.526 Thus, the court’s jurisdiction was equivalent
to that of the then recently created High Court of Justice in England.

There were to be three divisional courts of the Supreme Court that were to sit in
each of the three Provinces that the colony had been sub-divided into for the purposes of
administration. The “Full Court” of the Supreme Court, comprising the Chief Justice and
one or two puisne judges, was to act as a Court of Appeal, sitting in both Accra and
Lagos. Also, district commissioners were ex officio commissioners of the Supreme Court
and, as such, they exercised the powers of a judge of the Supreme Court within their
respective districts. Decisions of the Supreme Court could be appealed to the Privy
Council in Britain; and the Petition of Right Ordinance of 1877 made it possible for
claims to be brought against the colonial Government in the Supreme Court.
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The Gold Coast Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, 1883 (No. 5) regulated the
administration and dispensation of justice at the local level through the native tribunals
system. The head chiefs and other divisional and sub-divisional chiefs and their advisors
within particular localities constituted these tribunals. They exercised both civil and
criminal jurisdiction, and appeals from their decisions lay in the Supreme Court. A police
force was also established in the colony pursuant to the Police Ordinance of 1894. This
ensured that by the beginning of the twentieth century, the formal structure of the Gold
Coast legal system had taken shape, and was up and running.

2. Structure of the Ghana Legal System
By the time the Gold Coast became independent in 1957, the legal system that
had been put in place in the mid-nineteenth century had taken root. The Ghana Legal
System today is thus a complex system comprising formal as well as traditional courts
and written and unwritten laws. The English common law still plays a significant role in
justice delivery in Ghana today, as many areas of the law have remained unaffected by
statutory incursions – for example contract law and the law of torts.

i.

Sources of Law

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana provides a definitive list of all the sources of law
underpinning the legal system in present day Ghana.527 Article 11 of the Constitution
provides as follows:
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The laws of Ghana shall comprise–
(a) this Constitution;
(b) enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established by
this Constitution;
(c) any Orders, Rules and Regulations made by any person or authority under a
power conferred by this Constitution;
(d) the existing law; and
(e) the common law.

The Constitution is therefore at the apex of the hierarchy of laws in Ghana, as set forth in
article 1(2), which provides that ‘This Constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana
and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall,
to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.’ Acts of Parliament or statutory law is second
in the hierarchy of laws, followed by subsidiary legislation in the form of Orders, Rules
and Regulations.

The Constitution defines the “existing law” to comprise ‘the written and
unwritten laws of Ghana as they existed immediately before the coming into force of this
Constitution, and any Act, Decree, Law or statutory instrument issued or made before
that date, which is to come into force on or after that date.’528 Therefore, all the previous
enactments of the previous Parliaments of Ghana and the Military Regimes as well as
customary law, to the extent that they are consistent with the present Constitution, are all
legally valid laws. In terms of the common law, the Constitution states that: ‘The common
528
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law of Ghana shall comprise the rules of law generally known as the common law, the
rules generally known as the doctrines of equity and the rules of customary law including
those determined by the Superior Court of Judicature.’529

The English common law rules and doctrines of equity that were introduced and
assimilated into the legal system of the Gold Coast have endured to this day. However,
the “common law of Ghana” is defined to include customary law.530 Customary law is
then defined as ‘the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular
communities in Ghana.’ 531 It is important to note that modern day Ghana is an
amalgamation of several distinct ethnic groups, most of them having distinct cultural
norms, practices and beliefs. The Constitution therefore seeks to recognize these diverse
cultural systems and their inherent rules so long as they do not offend the Constitution
and/or ‘dehumanize or are injurious to the physical and mental well-being of a
person.’532

ii.

Court Structure

Judicial power in Ghana is vested in the Judiciary and ‘neither the President nor
Parliament nor any organ or agency of the President or Parliament shall have or be
given final judicial power.’533 The Judiciary consists of the Superior Courts of Judicature
and the Lower Courts. The Superior Courts of Judicature comprises the Supreme Court,
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the Court of Appeal and the High Court.534 The Lower Court structure is made up of the
Circuit Court and the District Magistrates Court.535 There is also the traditional “court”
system that primarily deals with causes or matters affecting the institution of Chieftaincy
in Ghana. These “courts” are made up of the National House of Chiefs;536 the Regional
Houses of Chiefs 537 for each of the ten administrative regions of the country; and
traditional and divisional councils.538

The Supreme Court consists of the Chief Justice and a minimum of nine other
Justices.539 The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extends to all matters relating
to the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution, as well as matters regarding
whether or not an enactment was made in excess of the powers of Parliament or the
enacting authority, as the case may be. 540 The Supreme Court also has appellate
jurisdiction in respect of decisions of the Court of Appeal and those from the National
House of Chiefs.541 The Court of Appeal is primarily an appellate Court that hears
appeals from the High Court and Circuit Court.542 The High Court is a court of first
instance in some matters and has civil as well as criminal jurisdiction, including original
jurisdiction in terms of the enforcement of the fundamental human rights and freedoms
provisions contained in the Constitution.543 The Circuit and District Magistrates Courts,
including the Family Tribunals and Juvenile Tribunals, handle most of the cases in Ghana
534
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since they are more easily accessible to the masses, and are more widely distributed
across the country.

3. Overview of the Criminal Justice System
The Criminal Justice System of Ghana is made up of the sum total of laws and
institutions that exist for the purposes of maintaining social stability, in terms of
preventing the commission of the criminal offences promulgated, and prosecuting
offenders. The major institutions that make up the Criminal Justice System of Ghana are
as follows: the Courts (i.e. District Courts, Circuit Courts and High Courts);544 the Ghana
Police Service; the Ghana Prisons Service; and the Attorney General’s Department &
Ministry of Justice.545 On the other hand, the major laws that set out the criminal offences
in Ghana, and its procedural aspects are: the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29); and
the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30).546

Crimes in Ghana are classified as follows: offences punishable by death i.e.
capital offences; first and second-degree felonies; misdemeanours; and offences
punishable by a fine. These classifications are important because they determine the
punishment to which one is liable for the commission of a particular offence.547 At
common law, the offence of treason was the most serious of offences for which a person
544
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was liable to suffer a death. Under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and the Criminal
Offences, 1960 (Act 29), the offences that are punishable by death are: high treason,
treason and murder.

Felonies on the other hand are offences that are punishable by terms of
imprisonment of up to life imprisonment. Under the Criminal and Other Offences
(Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30), there are two kinds of felonies: first-degree felonies and
second-degree felonies. Section 296 of Act 30 provides that the punishment for a firstdegree felony is a term of imprisonment from one day to life imprisonment. A seconddegree felony is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years.

At common law, misdemeanours were offences that were not very serious and
were thus not felonies. The rule was such that it covered whatever openly outraged
decency and was injurious to public morals. In Ghana, an offence that is classified as a
misdemeanour is tried by summary proceedings, and is punishable by a term of
imprisonment not exceeding three years. Examples of misdemeanours are offences
against public order such as fighting in a public place. Finally, a fine is a sum of money,
the payment of which is imposed on an individual for the commission of an offence.
Under section 297 of Act 30, it may be imposed in addition to any term of imprisonment.
Where the only penalty for the commission of an offence is a fine, then that offence is a
very minor one.
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B) SEX WORK AND THE LAW IN GHANA

1. The History of Sex Work in Ghana
It has been suggested that sexuality is too powerful a force to leave
unregulated.548 Regulating sexuality is however a complex task due to the private and
intimate nature of sex. However, an aspect of human sexuality that from time
immemorial has been “cosmetically” regulated through the criminal law is the sale and
purchase of sex. The first comprehensive statute on such matters introduced to the Gold
Coast by the British, was the Criminal Code of 1892.549 This law was expressed as ‘An
Ordinance to establish a Code of Offences punishable on Summary Conviction and on
information.’550 At this point, it must be noted that during the early parts of the nineteenth
century, the British had already begun a movement towards comprehensively codifying
sexual offences for its colonies, beginning with India. It is well known, for example, that
Thomas Babington Macaulay was the one tasked in 1825 to do this.551 He was the
Chairperson of the first Law Commission of India, and led the drafting process of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC), which is believed to be the first comprehensive penal code
produced within the British Empire.552 The draft Indian Penal Code was completed in
1837 but did not come into force until 1860.553
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It is however believed that Section 372 and 373 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860,
captioned “Selling minor for purposes of prostitution, etc.” and “Buying minor for
purposes of prostitution, etc.” respectively, is what in many diverse forms, influenced
colonial prostitution laws within the British Empire. 554 For ease of reference these
provisions are reproduced in full below:

Selling minor for the purposes of prostitution, etc. – Whoever sells, lets to hire, or
otherwise disposes of any person under the age of eighteen years with intent that
such person shall at any age be employed or used for the purpose of prostitution
or illicit intercourse with any person or for any unlawful and immoral purpose, or
knowing it to be likely that such a person will at any age be employed or used for
any such purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.555

Similarly, the offence of buying minor for purposes of prostitution, etc. provided that
‘Whoever buys, hires or otherwise obtains possession of any person under the age of
eighteen years with intent that such person shall at any age be employed or used for the
purpose of prostitution or illicit intercourse with any person or for any unlawful and
immoral purpose, or knowing it to be likely that such person will at any age be employed

554

Id. However, it must be noted that the IPC’s influence within the British Colonies was not absolute. This
is as a result of the fact that even though the penal codes in colonies like Pakistan, Mauritius, Sri Lanka,
Malaysia and Singapore were largely influenced by the IPC, other later codes like the Queensland Code of
1899 as well as R.S. Wright’s Draft Criminal Code for Jamaica of 1877 and Albert Ehrhardt’s 1925
Colonial Office Model Code were the basis for the Penal Codes in some of the other British colonies in
Africa.
555
Section 372 of Indian Penal Code of 1860.

179

or used for any such purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of wither description
for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine’.556

Remnants of this provision and other similar provisions in other codes are what
still pertain on the statute books in a majority of former British colonies in Africa
today.557 In the Gold Coast therefore, the Criminal Code of 1892 for the first time
introduced to the colony, the offence known as ‘Procuration’. Section 183 of the Criminal
Code (No. 12 of 1892) i.e. ‘Procuration’ provided as follows:

Whoever–
(1) Procures any female under twenty-one years of age, not being a common
prostitute or of known immoral character, to have unlawful carnal connexion,
either within or without Her Majesty’s dominions, with any other person; or
(2) Procures any female to become, either within or without Her Majesty’s
dominions, a common prostitute; or
(3) Procures any female to leave this Colony, with intent that she may become an
inmate of a brothel elsewhere; or
(4) Procures any female to leave her usual place of abode in this Colony (such
place not being a brothel) with intent that she may, for the purposes of
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prostitution, become an inmate of a brothel, either within or without Her
Majesty’s dominions,
shall be liable to imprisonment for two years: Provided that no person shall be
convicted of any offence under this section upon the evidence of one witness,
unless such witness is corroborated in some material particular by evidence
implicating the accused person.558

This provision in this Criminal Code of 1892 is what marked the beginning of the
criminalization of sex work generally in Ghana that has endured to this day. Following
the introduction of this law, the Criminal Code was re-enacted in 1898 as Chapter 16 of
the Laws of the Gold Coast Colony.559 Section 185 (Procuration) of this Ordinance, is
identical to the corresponding provisions of the 1892 Ordinance. Just like the law of
Britain at the time, the Criminal Code of the Gold Coast criminalized and punished
enforced sex work. From the records of decided Gold Coast cases, it is doubtful that there
was ever a reported case of ‘Procuration’, although this is by no means indicative of the
absence of such acts in the colony.

That notwithstanding, in Africa today, sex work is generally viewed as immoral,
and African cultural apologists are quick to add that such behaviour (voluntary or
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enforced sex work) is foreign and un-African.560 However, this is far from the truth, as
research has established the existence of traditional forms of enforced sex work for
example, in pre-colonial African societies; one scholar aptly referring to the sex workers
within this context as ‘conscripted public servants.’561 The fact therefore is that, enforced
sex work must have existed prior to the introduction of colonial procuration laws that
only sought to prohibit this form of sex work. Akyeampong refers to the traditional sex
workers as “public women”.562 He distinguishes between pre-colonial sex work and postcolonial sex work in the following manner:

A distinguishing feature of prostitution in the Gold Coast is the relative absence
of male pimps. Mention can be made of male intermediaries like the ‘pilot boys’
of Sekondi-Takoradi in the 1940’s, but they were more like ‘brokers’ who
brought potential clients to prostitutes for a commission. Their activities peaked
during World War II with the presence of foreign sailors and soldiers. But the
pilot boys lacked the control that characterizes the relationship between pimps
and prostitutes. Instead, prostitutes in the Gold Coast sometimes formed informal
associations for mutual support; moreover, they controlled their sexuality and
their earnings. Therein lies one important difference between prostitutes and what
I refer to as the ‘public women’ of the pre-colonial Gold Coast. Public women
were often female slaves acquired by the political elite of Akan villages and
towns, and compelled to provide sexual services for the local bachelors. Their
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institutionalized role – indeed, their very existence – sheds important light on how
perceptions of sexuality informed gender relations.

Quite clearly, sex work existed in pre-colonial Africa, but its nature must have evolved
from the public women phase or conscripted civil servants era, to a more autonomous
phase, where sex workers controlled their sexuality and earnings, beginning the wave of
voluntary sex work as distinct from enforced sex work in Ghana.

There is ample proof to buttress Akyeampong’s assertion of the existence of
traditional forms of sex work in pre-colonial Gold Coast.563 Olfert Dapper for instance
had this to say about the people of Axim in the 1660’s, albeit in somewhat crude but
vivid terms:

Although the Blacks along this coast and in the interior marry as many wives as
they can maintain, it is customary in Atzijn [Axim] and all the surrounding areas,
as far as the Quaqua Coast, for every village to maintain two or three whores,
whom they call Abrakrees. They are initiated and confirmed for the conduct of
this work by their Kabaseros or headmen in the presence of a large crowd of
people, in the following manner. First, they place these whores, who are certain
purchased slaves, with many foolish and ridiculous ceremonies upon a straw mat
and display them. Then one of the oldest among them, standing up, takes a young
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hen, opens its beak with a knife and lets a few drops of blood drip on her head,
shoulders and arms. At the same time, she utters upon it terrible adjurations,
saying that [she?] shall die unless she accept as lover for three or four kakraven
(worth two or three stuivers), notwithstanding the applicants be of rich means;
and this without excluding their own blood relatives. Everything she gains in this
way she must hand to the Kabasero, and in return she enjoys the liberty of being
allowed to take food, whether it stands in someone’s house or in the market, for
her sustenance, and nobody may prevent her from doing so, upon a fixed penalty.
When this has happened, one person from the crowd is sent to one side with her
and, upon their return, testifies that she has been found to be not a man but a
woman. Then her companion, namely the other Abrakree or whore, takes her
home; she is washed, and a clean bed-sheet is wrapped around her. She then sits
down on the mat, a bracelet of beads is put on her arm, and her shoulders, arms
and breast are painted with lime or chalk. Finally this Abrakree is put on a stool
and carried by two young men on their shoulders; they run into the village with
much cheering by those following them, and they greatly enjoy themselves
dancing and drinking palm or bordon wine. On eight consecutive days thereafter
she goes to sit at her appointed place, where all passers-by must giver her two or
three kakraven.564

This elaborate initiation process as described by Dapper gives credence to Akyeampong’s
assertion that such public women were conscripted public servants; for they existed to
satisfy the sexual desires of the men in the village.
564

Olfert Dapper, Naukeurige beschrijvinge der afrikaensche gewesten, 2nd edn (Amsterdam, 1676) 106.

184

By all indications, this was a system that had been instituted as a means of
curbing adultery among married men, and providing sexual satisfaction and gratification
for the unmarried young men in society. Akyeampong, paraphrasing Godot’s discovery
of the role of public women in the area to the West of Axim, and now present day Ivory
Coast, states that, ‘the King of Assini maintained six young women in every village and
town who gave themselves to bachelors. In addition to these six, the French Governor
was also obliged, according to his means, to maintain one or two more. These women
went through the towns and villages of Assini and did not risk turning anyone away for
fear of severe punishment. In order to be distinguished from other women, they wore a
piece of white linen around their heads. They lived on the outskirts of the towns and
villages, where they welcomed all bachelors. Married men who were caught patronizing
them were heavily fined. It was forbidden for these women to demand anything from their
male visitors, although they could accept gifts when offered.’565

The final proof of the existence of sex work in post-colonial Africa generally and
in the Gold Coast in particular, comes from the account of Bosman. Although his
description of the institution of traditional sex work in Axim comes more than thirty
years after Dapper’s account, the similarities are far too glaring to ignore. He states as
follows:

When the Mancevos find they want a common whore, they go and petition the
Caboceroes that they will please graciously to buy one for the publick: upon
which they buy a beautiful female slave, or else the Mancevos buy one
565
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themselves. The woman no matter by whom she was bought, is brought to the
publick market-place, accompanied by another already experienced in that trade,
in order to instruct her how she should deport herself for the future: which being
perfectly accomplished, the Novice is smeared all over with earth, and several
offerings offered in order that she may be happy in her future station and earn
much Money. This over, a little Boy, yet immature for love affairs, makes a feint
or representation of lying with her before all the people both young and old; by
which ‘tis hinted to her that from this time forwards, she is obliged to receive all
persons indistinguishable who offer themselves to her, not excepting little boys.
Then a little out of the way, a hut is built for her; in which she is obliged to
confine herself for eight or ten days, and lye with every man who comes thither:
After which, she obtains the Honourable name of Abelcre or Abelecre, signifying
a common or public whore; and she has a dwelling place assigned her near one of
her Masters, or in a separated part of the Village, she being for the remainder of
her life obliged to refuse no man the use of her Body; though he offers never so
small a sum.566

It is important to note that the mancevos were the young men in the community and the
caboceroes were the chiefs and elders of the community.

Aside the existence and proliferation of the so-called public women within certain
parts of the Gold Coast in pre-colonial times, there are other accounts that describe
contemporary forms of sex work that existed in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
566
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among the Akan. For instance, some scholars believed that the coastal Akan women were
quite promiscuous where Dutchmen were concerned, and were even prone to
whoredom.567 Others have noted that, etiguafo (prostitutes) were different from other
women by virtue of their ‘fine appearance and their clothing’.568 There were also some
Elmina, Fetu, Asebu and Fante women who were notorious for providing sexual favours
for negotiated amounts.569 Bowdich also observed among the early nineteenth century
Ashanti that ‘Prostitutes are numerous and countenanced. No Ashantee forces his
daughter to become the wife of the man he wishes, but he instantly disclaims her support
and protection on her refusal, and would persecute the mother if she afforded it; thus
abandoned, they would have no resource but prostitution’.570

Despite the various accounts of the existence of contemporary forms of sex work
between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries in the Gold Coast, there seems to be a
lack of information that would have made it possible to compare this institution with that
of the public women. However, what is clear is that this category of sex workers were not
slaves, but as Akyeampong puts it ‘they were insiders with kinship ties who had been
forced into prostitution because they asserted their autonomy’.571 Thus, they engaged in
sex work within their own communities. The public women as described by the accounts
of Dapper, Bosman and Godot on the other hand, were acquired as slaves from
elsewhere, and conscripted to provide sexual services in places where they had no kinship
567
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ties.572 This peculiar feature seems to create parallels with enforced sex work or sex
trafficking in contemporary times, which is generally prohibited.

It is my belief that it was this peculiar nature of the traditional conception of sex
work that led to the adoption or imposition of British standards in the Gold Coast in terms
of the criminalization of procuration during colonial rule. As has already been noted,
section 183 of the 1892 Criminal Code of the Gold Coast provided that:

Whoever–
(1) Procures any female under twenty-one years of age, not being a common
prostitute or of known immoral character, to have unlawful carnal connexion,
either within or without Her Majesty’s dominions, with any other person; or
(2) Procures any female to become, either within or without Her Majesty’s
dominions, a common prostitute; or
(3) Procures any female to leave this Colony, with intent that she may become an
inmate of a brothel elsewhere; or
(4) Procures any female to leave her usual place of abode in this Colony (such
place not being a brothel) with intent that she may, for the purposes of
prostitution, become an inmate of a brothel, either within or without Her
Majesty’s dominions,
shall be liable to imprisonment for two years: Provided that no person shall be
convicted of any offences under this section upon the evidence of one witness,
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unless such witness is corroborated in some material particular by evidence
implicating the accused person.573

Despite the criminalization, it will be an understatement to suggest that sex work thrived
in the Gold Coast in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. This is because, as already
noted, female sex workers were controlling their earnings in the trade – which was a
means of asserting their autonomy unlike in previous times.

In fact, the rapid urbanization that was characteristic of colonial rule and the
proliferation of European as well as other migrant male workers in the Gold Coast
Colony brought about economic opportunities for women in the sex trade. By rendering
sexual favours, some women found a way of surviving in the big cities, thereby asserting
their autonomy and not conforming to the prevailing gender stereotypes. It has been
noted that ‘the sale of sexual services could secure migrant women their first, temporary
residence. Unlike the sale of foodstuffs or liquor, prostitution did not necessarily require
start-up capital’.574 A notable fact that was discovered in both post-colonial and colonial
Ashanti was the large number of Krobo women engaged in the sex trade.575 It is this fact
that led to the belief that Okomfo Anokye, a traditional Ashanti priest who helped
establish the Ashanti Kingdom, had cursed Krobo women with prostitution.576
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However, this assertion is merely symptomatic of the fact that women in postcolonial and colonial Gold Coast mainly migrated from their towns and villages to
engage in sex work in other places. Thus, Kru women from Liberia begun migrating to
Ghana and settled in Takoradi where they engaged in sex work. 577 Akyeampong
summarizes increased female autonomy in colonial Gold Coast in the following manner:

The absence of social barriers between ‘prostitutes’ and ‘respectable women’ in
working-class leisure activities in Sekondi-Takoradi facilitated the exchange of
beliefs and mannerisms. Social life in Takoradi in the 1930s and 1940s revolved
around spots like Columbia Hotel, famous for its dances. The ‘Liberian Bar’,
owned by a Liberian in Takoradi, was another active social spot in the 1930s and
1940s … [A]s prostitutes and non-prostitutes patronized these places, mannerisms
were exchanged. The ability to chew gum and make it snap was introduced into
Sekondi-Takoradi by Kru women, but it expanded to become the badge of female
nonchalance. With their social drinking at popular bars and their fashionable
clothing, Kru and Nigerian women became the pace-setters where female
autonomy was concerned.578

Thus, sex work thrived in colonial Gold Coast, a major reason being the money that these
sex workers were making from the trade. Even though it was not a given that one could
acquire wealth by engaging in sex work, it is believed that the average amount that was
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made on a monthly basis by sex workers ranged between ten and thirty pounds.579 It has
also been noted that the average charge for sexual intercourse was two shillings.580 This
is what earned sex workers in Ghana the infamous tag of “two-two women”.581

In contemporary Ghana, sex work still thrives in the major urban centers. The
lack of economic opportunities, and even the meager income generated from the little
opportunities that are available to women generally, seems to be an important factor in
the proliferation of sex workers and sex work in Ghana. Rural-urban migration has
further exacerbated the problem, as many young girls move to urban areas in search of
opportunities, and sometimes end up in the sex trade. It has been suggested for instance
that ‘increased urbanization, increased mobility and high cost of living have brought
significant changes in sexual ethos in the urban centres. It also exposes young women to
new socio-sexual lifestyles such as attending night clubs and bars, parties etc.’582 The
law prohibiting sex work seems to have done little in curbing the practice, as it remains
practically and purposefully unenforceable – due, in part, to the high demand for sex, and
the posture of law enforcement generally.

2. The Law of ‘Prostitution’ in Ghana and the ‘Living Law’
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As already noted, Act 29 is the major piece of legislation that deals with criminal
offences in Ghana.583 In Ghana, sex work is essentially criminalized, in the form of the
proscription of “prostitution”.584 Although Act 29 does not mention the phrase “sex
work”, its emphasis on the prohibition of “prostitution” leads to the reasonable
conclusion that sex work is prohibited in Ghana. Thus, section 279 of Act 29 as amended
by Act 554 defines prostitution to ‘include the offering by a person of his body commonly
for acts of lewdness for payment although there is no act or offer of an act of ordinary
sexual connexion.’585 As such, “sex work”, which involves the exchange of sex for
monetary compensation, and “prostitution” can be used interchangeably, and in Ghana it
includes performing, offering, or agreeing to perform a sexual act for money, property,
token, favour, article, or anything of value by a person through bargaining. Sex work has
also been referred to as paid sexual relations between a woman and her client; the
remuneration providing part of the woman’s entire livelihood.586 However, the definition
of prostitution in Act 29 does not focus on a particular gender. Nevertheless, in Africa
generally and Ghana in particular, female sex workers seems to be predominant as
compared to male sex workers.

Chapter 7 of Act 29 is captioned “Offences against Public Morals” and deals inter
alia with Brothels and Sex work. This heading suggests that Ghanaian society abhors
such conducts, hence their criminalization. According to Section 277 therefore, the
keeping of a brothel is illegal and amounts to a misdemeanor. Furthermore, managing or
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assisting in the management of a brothel, and also being a tenant, lessee, lessor or a
landlord and allowing use of premise for a brothel are criminal offences.587 A brothel is
however defined to mean “any premise or room or set of rooms in any premises kept for
purposes of prostitution”. 588 It seems therefore that regular hotels given certain
circumstances can be characterized as brothels within the meaning of the law.

Section 274 on the other hand specifically prohibits persons from trading in
prostitution. Thus, trading in prostitution amounts to a misdemeanor.589 A person who
knowingly lives wholly or in part on earnings of sex work, or exercises control or
influence over movements of a sex worker in a manner to aid or compel the sex work
being engaged in with any other person, is trading in prostitution.590 Section 274 aims at
punishing all persons who benefit from earnings of a sex worker knowingly. However,
implementation of this provision becomes complicated in situations where minors or
elderly persons who are usually dependent on the earnings of sex workers are concerned.
Can they be considered as trading in prostitution, and thus be potentially liable for the
commission of a criminal offence? Pimps on the other hand, clearly fall within this
provision.

The law on prostitution as such actually widens those considered to trade in
prostitution to include all persons who benefit directly and indirectly by an act of

587

Section 279 of Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29).
Id.
589
Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29).
590
Section 274 of Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29).
588

193

prostitution.591 Persons also commit a misdemeanor if in a public place or in sight of a
public place they persistently solicit to obtain clients for a sex worker or for any other
immoral purpose. 592 The above notwithstanding, sex work, considered the oldest
profession in the world, has evolved over time; as such persons can still operate brothels
and trade in prostitution without being noticed in public. This is the main challenge in
enforcing the law against sex work, especially as a result of the increase in technology
particularly the proliferation of social media platforms where solicitation and
importuning is easily done.

Despite the criminal prohibition, sex work is prevalent in Ghana and occurs in all
major towns and cities, for example Accra, Takoradi, Tamale, Kumasi etc. – just like it
did in pre-colonial and colonial Gold Coast. In Ghana, like some other countries, sex
work is not necessarily illegal but rather the soliciting for sex in public places, brothel
keeping, and living on the earnings of sex work are what are deemed illegal. The law
however heavily restricts the life of the sex worker and the only sex work that cannot
conceivably attract prosecution is that which is carried out by a person working alone in a
house or flat that he or she owns.593 It is important therefore to consider the categories of
sex workers that exist in Ghana in contemporary times. Generally, classification of sex
workers is based on four important factors: (1) their appearance (dressing and grooming);
(2) their means of soliciting clients; (3) the type of clients who patronize their services;
and (4) their range of prices for sexual acts. However in 1980, a report submitted to the
591
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National Council on Women and Development, identified five main categories of sex
workers in Ghana: (1) Mame-I-Come/”Tuutuu” women; (2) Bobby-Stand girls; (3) the
Monkey Don; (4) the Diga; and (5) the Krobo group.594

That notwithstanding, one Ghanaian researcher has classified sex workers into
two main categories: (1) Seaters or Home-based sex workers; and (2) Roamers or Bar,
Hotel and Street-based sex workers.595 According to her, Seaters or Home-based sex
workers ‘operate from their living quarters, usually in densely populated areas of cities
and towns, e.g. the Zongos or immigrant areas’.596 On the other hand, the Roamers or
Bar, Hotel and Street-based sex workers ‘usually operate at night and can be found in
drinking bars, hotel waiting areas, popular eating and drinking spots, and on some
streets well known as pick-up spots’.597 In recent times, it seems as though the Seaters are
becoming extinct or are increasingly being more discreet. On the other hand, there is a
proliferation of the Roamers. Another group that can be added to the category of sex
workers in Ghana today are what I call the “Freelance/High Class” sex workers. This
group, originally a subset of the Roamers, can be classified separately due to their modus
operandi.
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The hunting grounds for the Freelance/High Class sex workers are usually the
most prestigious hotels, due to the fact that Ghanaian men of substantial means and
foreigners often patronize these places. It has been observed for example that ‘Every
hotel or night club has at least one worker who is designated to deal with prostitutes and
pimps who operate on the premises’.598 However, their activities are more discreet in
recent times, where it is believed that all the prestigious hotels maintain a list of these
Freelance/High Class sex workers (some of whom are believed to be local celebrities),
and often engage their services on behalf of their guests. This assertion, although
obviously difficult to prove, must not be discounted, as it is more likely than not to be in
existence. In recent times, it seems as though a further sub-group within the
Freelance/High Class sex workers, mainly made up of local celebrities (especially
actresses), are engaged in trans-national sex work, with Dubai as the prime destination.599

It is believed, for example that some of these so-called celebrities earn around five
thousand dollars ($5,000) for a weekend when engaged mainly as escorts. 600 The
accusations and counter-accusations of prostitution between some celebrities that have
characterized the entertainment industry in recent times must not therefore be entirely
discounted.601 What is interesting is that in the midst of all this, we have laws that are
supposed to essentially prohibit sex work. Is it that the law is just not realistic in light of
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societal changes? Also, regardless of the above categories of sex workers, does it amount
to sex work where a woman engages in sexual intercourse with a man (be it casual sex or
within the context of a non-marital relationship), ostensibly in exchange for some
pecuniary reward? This trend seems to be popular in Ghana as captured by Ankomah and
Ford:

While not every sexual contact of single women in the urban centre of Ghana is
commercial, sexual services tend to be regarded as something which is obtained
by favour or bargaining, a practice quite different from prostitution in the classic
Western sense. Pecuniary interest may, in expediency, take precedence over the
relationship itself. Economic pressures provide the background for most sexual
relationships from which material gain is expected.602

It is however inconceivable to categorize such sexual encounters as amounting to sex
work. However, the socio-cultural shift from traditional conceptions of moral conduct to
a more modern and generally fluent amoral outlook may be the reason why the law
prohibiting sex work, as well as those prohibiting other intimate sexual conduct, like
same-sex relations remain practically unenforceable.

For example, despite the prohibition of unnatural carnal knowledge, the
prevalence of male same-sex desire as well as lesbianism has become a permanent fixture
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of contemporary “Ghanaian culture” as has been recently pointed out by empirical
research.603 The research findings showed that:

Looking at religious orientation and sexuality, it was revealed that 184/442 (42%)
of Christians and 45/108 (42%) of Moslems reported being bi-sexual. Among
those aged between 16 and 20, 53% of them had had bi-sexual encounter before,
while only 39% of those aged 21 and 25, and 48% of those aged between 26 and
30 reported being bi-sexual. Despite their small number, 7/38 (18%) of those aged
46 and above said that they were homosexuals, with another 13/38 (34%)
reporting bi-sexuality among both sexes. A separate look at gender revealed that,
134/344 (39%) of the females were bi-sexual, while the males were even greater,
recording 149/357 (42%) as bi-sexual. Marital status was not a bar to bi-sexuality.
Among the married, 68/205 (33%) reported being bi-sexual with another 6/205
(3%) being homosexual. This could simply mean that even though the individual
is married, he or she considers himself or herself as a homosexual. Homosexuality
amongst the divorced was 10/63 (16%) and bi-sexuality in their group was 29/63
(46%).604

It is fair to admit that there are Ghanaians who are homosexuals. However, it is irrational
to erroneously suggest that it is culturally an abomination to be lesbian or gay. Even if
that was the case, the dynamic nature of culture and the influence of external forces and
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factors means that homosexuality has come to stay, and no amount of criminalization can
automatically or magically convert self-proclaimed homosexuals into heterosexuals.

The socio-cultural shift regarding perspectives of morality and moral behavior,
essentially invalidate the criminal prohibitions that seek to root out moral decay. In fact,
the decadence is already in motion and entrenched as a result of the over-sexualization of
Ghanaian society, which has been appropriately described as a paradox.605 On this point,
it has been further argued that, ‘though many cultural artefacts such as Ghanaian
traditional fables, tales and ‘high life’ music, dances, jokes, and gibes were frequently
woven around sex, the topic hardly came into the forefront for any formal discussion.
Music, dance, jokes and gibes are not contradictory, neurotic or evanescent expressions.
They are alternative media through which communication is established as a means of
aggregation and abstraction of current socio-economic developments and its influences
on the body politic.’606 As a matter of fact, sexual promiscuity and the exchange of sexual
favours for pecuniary rewards are as present today as they were at the time Ankomah and
Ford made their observation in 1993, that increased urbanization, mobility and the high
cost of living had brought a significant change in sexual ethos in the urban centres in
Ghana.607 A recent list of the top twenty songs that received the most airplay on radio in
Ghana in 2017 revealed that the most played song was one entitled “Sponsor” – (a song
that glorifies sexual relationships with older men for pecuniary rewards) by the now
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deceased female dancehall artiste named Ebony.608 Interestingly, not even one gospel
song made it on this list; which seems strange for a country where we pride ourselves
with our religious faith. This however goes to buttress my earlier point of the oversexualization of Ghanaian society, epitomized by indigenous music, which Norman tells
us are a means of determining socio-economic developments and its influence on society
as a whole.609

In light of the obvious socio-cultural changes occurring rapidly in Ghana, intimate
human conducts that are criminalized have been given renewed attention. For example, a
lot of discussions have focused on whether sex work should be legalized as exists in
some countries.610 It has been recommended, for example, that all national legislation,
which in intent or in practice, results in the placing of sex workers outside the scope of
the rule of law, should be repealed. The sex industry continues to be heavily stigmatised
and most sex workers take care to keep their occupation secret from their families.
Projects established to provide sexual health services to sex workers report that health
service personnel generally treat sex workers with disrespect.611 Recently, the Ghana
Tourism Authority in collaboration with the National Security and the Ghana Police
Service closed down a hotel in Gbawe, a suburb of Accra where sex parties were being
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arranged and advertised.612 The Ghana Tourism Authority condemned the increasing
spate of advertising of sex parties and other related sex activities in hotels, nightclubs,
movie houses, pubs and other tourism establishments in the country.613 It cautioned
stakeholders and the public that it was established and tasked among other things to
investigate and take measures to eliminate illegal, dishonorable, unsound and improper
activities in relation to any activity regulated under the Act.614

The fact remains that, commercial sex is extremely difficult to regulate or curtail
in contemporary times as a result of technological advancement, and the general
difficulty in regulating such human conduct. The moral reprehensibility that is usually
attached to sex work as the basis for its criminalization is irrational in the face of the
rational economic decisions that participants in the trade make. How is society affected if
some people decide to make ends meet by trading their bodies for sex i.e. through the
legitimate and voluntary commercialization of sex? Is it that morally reprehensible to
make ends meet through such means? As a result of the fact that criminalization has not
really addressed these questions, sex work is on the increase generally in Ghana, and
newer forms of solicitation for sex have been devised along the way, fueled by the
proliferation of social media – and the countless opportunities for online interactions that
it presents. To make matters worse, there seems to be no reported case of actual
prosecution of sex workers for engaging in the trade.615 The trend of abuse of sex workers
612
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by law enforcement authorities is however not uncommon throughout Africa.616 As a
result, it is imperative that we turn to human rights to ascertain whether we can
reasonably deduce a right to sex work, thereby ensuring the protection of the rights of
legitimate sex workers.

extend protection to sex workers in exchange for sexual and other favours, from time to time. See, Kwaku
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CHAPTER FIVE
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GHANA

From time immemorial sex has been a currency of commerce. The relationship between
sex work and the law has often revolved around the debate regarding its morality;
whether it should be criminalized or not. In today’s liberal world the discussion on the
relationship between law and sex work is shifting to a rights based discussion. Can there
exist a right to sex work? Is sex work supposed to be considered as a human rights issue?
These are however questions that can only be answered based on a finite understanding
of the idea of human rights. Interestingly, the idea of human rights only became
entrenched as part of International Law discourse not too long ago. The devastating
consequence of the Second World War was what led to a renewed wave of human rights
protection globally as well as movements towards decolonization.617

In this Chapter, I continue the discussion pertaining to the criminalization of sex
work by focusing on human rights in Ghana; and whether the legal and institutional
framework that exists today is receptive to the idea of sex workers’ rights and the right to
sex work. In order to do this, I examine the historical evolution of human rights in postindependence Ghana, to ascertain the attitude and posture of the country, and the courts
in particular, with regard to the promotion and protection of general fundamental human
rights and freedoms. By tracing the various phases of human rights development in the
country through some of the most seminal cases adjudicated, we may be able to ascertain
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the posture of the courts in human rights matters, and whether there is room for the
acceptance of sex work and the rights of sex workers as deserving of protection in
contemporary Ghana.

A) HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

There is a general belief in contemporary times that by virtue of our humanity, all
human beings are entitled to certain fundamental rights and freedoms. However, it has
been long suggested that the idea of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
persons has its roots and origins in antiquity. The belief that there existed certain norms
and principles inherent by virtue of humanity alone can be traced as far back as the
writings of the Greek philosophers Aristotle and Plato, and is firmly rooted in traditions
and cultures of past. Throughout human history, politically organized societies have
invariably developed various systems of justice, with the welfare of the society being of
paramount interest. Even all the major religions of the world have one unifying factor –
the idea that justice must be done to all.

Although the modern idea and conception of human rights is usually attributed to
the writings of philosophers such as John Locke, we cannot dismiss the monumental role
that certain foundational documents in the history of man have played in asserting
fundamental human rights and freedoms. Some of the precursors to our modern
understanding and appreciation of human rights include: the Magna Carta of 1215; the
English Bill of Rights of 1689; the French Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen
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of 1789; and the United States Constitution & Bill of Rights of 1791. The historical irony
manifest in these so-called precursors to fundamental human rights is the fact that, most
of them excluded rights and freedoms for women and many other minority groups. This
inherent discrimination transcended social, religious and political barriers. For instance,
the effect of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade meant that African Americans were not fully
recognized under the Bill of Rights in the United States.

It was only during the latter parts of the 19th Century and the early 20th Century
that there begun a wave and movement towards ‘internationalizing’ human rights. This
movement gathered steam probably as a result of the abolishing of the slave trade, and
also as a response to the scourge of war. Thus, the International Labour Organization
(ILO) was established in 1919 to protect the rights of workers everywhere; and most
importantly, the League of Nations was formed in the aftermath of the First World War.
Unfortunately, the League of Nations failed in its mission of ensuring a peaceful world,
free from abuse of human rights and fundamental freedoms – due to the outbreak of the
Second World War in 1939.

The extermination of over six million Jewish people, Sinti, Roma as well as many
other civilians during the course of this war shocked the collective conscience of the
world like never before.618 The world had to act in the wake of the monstrous atrocities
committed by the Nazi Regime and its allies. Thus, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
of the United States famously captured the emerging concept of human rights at the time
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in his “four essential freedoms” speech to Congress. 619 Hence, the United Nations
Organization was formed in 1945 in San Francisco, with the principal aim of maintaining
international peace and security.620

The establishment of the United Nations signified the global resolve that had been
harnessed to ensure that the atrocities that had occurred during the war were never again
repeated.621 The colonies of the Allied powers, including the Gold Coast, contributed
immensely towards the war efforts as “native” soldiers fought side by side with soldiers
from the colonial powers. This, it has been argued, was one of the reasons that led to the
demand for self-governance in many of the colonies, including the Gold Coast. The right
to self-determination in the United Nations Charter was therefore one of the founding
principles that fueled the independence movement across Africa. As a result, many
former African colonies attained independence within twenty years after the
establishment of the United Nations.

One of the first things that the UN did that gave further impetus to the demand for
self governance across the world, was the establishment of a Human Rights Commission
under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, with the task of drafting a document spelling
out the meaning, scope and content of the fundamental rights and freedoms that the UN
Charter had made mention of but failed to define. This show of renewed commitment to
the human rights agenda during this post-war period led to the adoption of the Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 in Paris, France as already noted in
Chapter Three. 622 In Africa, this new wave of international human rights that had
coincided with the struggle for self-government and fight for independence from the
colonial powers, mainly Britain and France, led to self-government soon thereafter. The
main focus of most of the African colonies at the time, and subsequently the newly
independent African States was economic development. Respect for, and promotion and
protection of human rights were therefore not on the political agenda of the independence
leaders of Africa, and were thus relegated to the backburner. The consequential effect
would be the absence of human rights provisions in Constitutions and abuse of rights by
these same leaders, who had been hailed as liberating their countries from colonialism
and its attendant injustices.623

That notwithstanding, the UDHR continued to be standard bearer in terms of the
acknowledgment of fundamental human rights for all. For example, article 1 of the
UDHR provides that:624

All human beings are born equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.
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In a similar vain, the UDHR provides for the principle of non-discrimination in terms of
the enjoyment of the fundamental human rights and freedoms available to all. 625
Unfortunately, the UDHR being a declaration did not have binding legal effect. 626
Therefore, it was not until 1966, that there would be the adoption of legally binding
global treaties on fundamental human rights and freedoms.627 The International Covenant
on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR) in particular provides for equality and nondiscrimination.628

Several provisions of the ICCPR thus prohibit discrimination on stated grounds,
and guarantees equal protection of the law. For example, Article 2(1) states: “Each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Article 17(1)
provides that: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and
reputation.” Article 17(2) then states: “Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.” Finally, article 26 provides as follows:
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All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Article 28 of the ICCPR establishes the Human Rights Committee, which is mandated to
deal with issues involving alleged violations of the rights contained in the ICCPR by
States Parties to the Covenant, and by so doing, interpret the provisions of the Covenant
Human rights are therefore fundamental, inherent and inalienable rights that people are
entitled to due to the mere fact that they are human beings. In Ghana, the rights and
freedoms that people are guaranteed, which can be traced largely to the UDHR, ICCPR
and the ICESCR, can be found primarily in the 1992 Constitution, in chapters 5 and 6 to
be specific. But this was not always the case, as Ghana had to endure some bitter periods
of suppression and wanton disregard of human rights by successive regimes.

B) HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN GHANA

The posture of Ghanaian courts in the aftermath of independence up until recent
times has been topsy-turvy to say the least. The shocking dereliction of duty by the courts
is explored through the seminal cases that laid the groundwork for systemic and
constitutionally sanctioned abuse of human rights in Ghana. I will first discuss the
immediate post-independence period between 1957 and 1966, and then deal with the
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post-first Republican and 1969 Constitutional era, between 1966 and 1972. Here, we
realize the courts becoming emboldened in holding the government to account for
infringements of human rights unlike what pertained in the immediate post-independence
period. I then examine the post 1969 period as well as the 1979 Constitutional period
between 1972 and 1981 to gain further insights into the attitude of the courts towards
human rights. I also examine the post-1979 Constitutional period, between 1982 and
1992 where Ghana experienced the longest period of military rule, ironically under the
Provisional National Defence Council.

1. The Immediate Post-Independence Period (1957 – 1966)

From the onset, it must be noted that independence was largely at the behest of
the British Parliament, by virtue of its enactment of the Ghana Independence Act. The
Ghana (Constitution) Order-in-Council of 1957 629 however had its main provisions
coming into force on 6th March 1957.630 Section 54 of this Order-in-Council made
provision for the existence of the Supreme Court and contemplated the existence of a
Court of Appeal as well. This was created by an Ordinance dividing the Supreme Court
into the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal with effect from 6th March 1957.
By another Ordinance, which came into force at the same time, detailed provisions were
made for the jurisdiction of the new Court of Appeal, and the right of recourse to the
West African Court of Appeal (which was regarded as inconsistent with independence
and existed hitherto) was abolished.631 The Constitution did not however contain a Bill of
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Rights hence it can be argued that, persons resident in Ghana were not legally entitled to
human rights.

The first case that the courts had to deal with during this era concerning human
rights was the case of Lardan v. Attorney-General. 632 This case had to do with a
deportation order that had been made pursuant to the Deportation Act of 1957. The order
purported to deport the plaintiff from Ghana because it was the position of the
government that his presence in Ghana threatened the public good. The plaintiff therefore
brought an action in the High Court, seeking a declaration to the effect that the order was
null and void as a result of the fact that the Deportation Act itself could not be applied to
him because he was a Ghanaian citizen by birth. During the pendency of the matter
before the High Court, the National Assembly (Parliament) enacted the Deportation
(Othman Larden and Amadu Baba) Act, 1957. This law specifically authorized the
Minister of Interior to deport the two named individuals from Ghana. Furthermore, the
law purported to terminate proceedings in any court, which had been instituted for the
purpose of challenging the validity of the deportation order made against the persons
affected by the new law.

Section 4(2) of this new law stated as follows: ‘On any order of deportation being
made hereunder, any deportation order made under the Deportation Act, 1957, in respect
of the same deportee shall be automatically revoked and if the deportee is in custody
under the provisions of the Deportation Act, 1957, he may, notwithstanding any
proceedings in any court, whether pending or determined, be retained in custody for the
632
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purposes of this Act without being released and such custody shall be deemed to be legal
custody; and any proceedings in any court instituted for the purpose of impugning the
validity of the Alhaji Alufa Othman Larden Lalemie Deportation Order, 1957, or the
Alhaji Amadu Baba Deportation Order, 1957, shall be automatically determined.’633

The High Court therefore had to determine whether the new law was contrary to
the dictates of the Constitution of Ghana, and whether a citizen by birth could be
deprived of his right to citizenship. Smith J. (a British judge) however held as follows:

I have considered all the other authorities cited to me and they illustrate the same
point that 'the words "peace, order and good government" with no reservation
attached, no restriction as to specific subjects and without qualification, give to
any country the same plenary powers as are possessed by the Imperial Parliament
in England. It was conceded that this Act of Deportation, and that was a
momentary indulgence in fantasy, if passed by the Imperial Government would be
a matter for Parliament only and the English courts would be powerless to
interfere. If, as I hold, the words "peace, order and good government," unqualified
in any way, are plenary powers possessed by Parliament and no less than the
powers possessed by the Imperial Parliament, then it follows just as it would in
England that the court here has no power to inquire into such an Act. I consider,
'therefore, that any law which comes within the ambit of the Ghana (Constitution)
Order in Council, s. 31, and which does not contravene any other provision in the
constitution can only be challenged in a court of 1aw if it violates or purports to
633
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violate sub-section (2) or (3) of the section. On that view, the Act deporting these
two persons, not being in contravention of any expressed limitation in the Ghana
(Constitution) Order in Council, 1957, is a matter for Parliament … In England it
is not open to the court to invalidate a law on the ground that it seeks to deprive a
person of his life or liberty contrary to the court's notions of justice and, so far as
the Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council, s. 31 (1), is concerned, that is the
position in which I find myself. For these reasons I hold that it is not for the court
to inquire into this particular Act and the pending actions before the Kumasi
Divisional Court are determined under the provisions of section 4 (2) of the
Act.634

This decision by Smith J, to essentially prioritize the speedy actions of
government over the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals laid the groundwork
for the Executive impunity that subsequently ensued. Ghana will not be the same again,
for essentially the court was announcing that the Government could basically do
whatever it deemed fit and necessary for the governance of the State, and as a result had
the Judiciary’s blessings to disregard one of the most fundamental human rights that
exists – the right to citizenship. It must however be reiterated that, the independence
constitution of Ghana did not necessarily have a Bill of Rights, and may have been the
reason why the court chose to turn a blind eye on obvious abuse of human right;
justifying it on the basis of Parliamentary sovereignty.

The second case that we must consider in this era is the case of Balogun v
634
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Edusei,635 which also involved the implementation of the Deportation Act of 1957. The
facts of this case were that, four individuals, including Wahabi Balogun, had been
arrested pursuant to a deportation order that had been made under the Deportation Act.
An ex parte motion for the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum was filed on their
behalf on the ground that all the applicants were Ghanaian citizens and as such they could
not be the subject matter of the deportation order. The court directed that notice of this
motion be served on the Minister of Interior, the Acting Commissioner of Police as well
as the Director of Prisons. However, on the day the notice was served, the applicants had
already been deported to Nigeria. The court therefore held the Respondents to be in
contempt of court, but stayed execution of their committal to prison, ostensibly in the
hope that they would be advised to apologize and be remorseful for their actions.

However, on the morning of the day that the respondents were to appear before
the court, the Parliament of Ghana purported to hold an emergency session where it
enacted the Deportation (Indemnity) Act (No. 47 of 1958). Section 2 of this Act provided
as follows: ‘The Honourable Krobo Edusei, formerly Minister of the Interior, and
Erasmus Ransford Tawiah Madjitey, Commissioner of Police, shall be indemnified from
all penalties for contempt of court and exonerated from all other liabilities in respect of
any action taken by them in carrying out the deportation order in the Schedule of this Act
after the institution by the persons named in those orders of proceedings by way of
habeas corpus.’ Smith J. (the same British judge from the Lardan case) now found
himself in a quagmire created by his reluctance to hold the government to account in the
Lardan case.
635
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Obviously annoyed by the blatant interference in the administration of justice by
the Executive and the Legislature, he delivered a judgment that was poignant but totally
irrelevant in the grand scheme of things. Clearly, he had regretted his actions in the
earlier case but could do little to rectify the irreparable harm that he had willingly and
knowingly caused. This is what he had to say:

By the passing of this Act I take it that the court's finding that the respondents are
in contempt is not challenged by Parliament, but that the intention is to neutralise
any consequential order that I might make. It is plain that Parliament prefers that
the respondents should not apologise, and it has passed this Act in order to nullify
any order which I might make in the absence of the apology. The Courts of
Justice exist to fulfill, not to destroy, the law, and it would not make sense for me
to record an order which is incapable of being carried out. As to the deportations
while the applications for habeas corpus were still sub judicae, I cannot overemphasize the undesirability of interference by the Executive with the functions
of the court. Persistent indulgence in such a practice could not have any other
than the most serious ill-effect on the well-being of the country. Decisions of a
court are as binding upon the Executive as the laws which Parliament passes are
binding upon the ordinary citizen, and it is the court that enforces upon the people
obedience to these laws, thereby aiding Parliament in the ordering of the country.
In the result, the finding of contempt stands, but I make no further order.636

It is not in doubt that the court’s decisions in both the Lardan and Balogun cases
636
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provided a great platform for Executive and Legislative impunity in Ghana, in respect of
the wanton abuse of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In fact, it emboldened the
Executive to act recklessly with the tacit approval and blessings of the Judiciary; and this
enabled it to enact the Preventive Detention Act in 1958, which sought to indefinitely
detain persons whose actions or suspected actions were deemed to be prejudicial to the
security of the State.

The case of In Re Akoto and Seven Others,637 is probably the most important case
in the post-independence era that captures the extent of the judiciary’s endorsement of
impunity. The case had to do with some individuals who had been arrested and detained
pursuant to the Preventive Detention Act of 1958. The writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum was applied for on their behalf, but was denied by the High Court. The
applicants therefore filed an appeal with the Supreme Court on the grounds, inter alia,
that the Preventive Detention Act was enacted in excess of the powers conferred on
Parliament by the Constitution, and that it contravened the provisions of article 13 of the
1960 Constitution of Ghana.638 In characteristic fashion, the Supreme Court held that the
declaration that was to be made by the President upon his assumption of office was akin
to the Coronation Oath subscribed to by the British Monarch upon his or her ascension to
the throne. The Court therefore held that the declaration was of no constitutional import,
unlike a proper Bill of Rights, and as a result no legally enforceable obligation was
created and imposed on the President.
637
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It is clear that the Supreme Court wholly adopted the position that had earlier
been advanced by Smith J., that Parliament was a power unto itself, and that no courts
was competent to challenge the legality of an Act of Parliament, or actions of the
Executive for that matter. On the idea that article 13(1) provided a Bill of Rights
guaranteed for the protection of the people from governmental abuse, the Supreme Court
went stated as follows:

This contention, however, is based on a misconception of the intent, purpose and
effect of Article 13(1) the provisions of which are, in our view, similar to the
Coronation Oath taken by the Queen of England during the Coronation
Service. In the one case the President is required to make a solemn declaration,
in the other the Queen is required to take a solemn oath. Neither the oath nor the
declaration can be said to have a statutory effect of an enactment of
Parliament. The suggestion that the declarations made by the President on
assumption of office constitute a "Bill of Rights" in the sense in which the
expression is understood under the Constitution of the United States of America
is therefore untenable … In our view the declaration merely represents the goal
which every President must pledge himself to attempt to achieve …. The
declarations however impose on every President a moral obligation, and provide
a political yardstick by which the conduct of the Head of State can be measured
by the electorate. The people’s remedy from any departure from the principles of
the declaration, is through the use of the ballot box, and not through the courts.639
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This decision marked the final nail in the coffin of human rights in the immediate postindependence era. Impunity became the order of the day, as with the Judiciary’s
blessings, the government could essentially do any and everything they wanted without
any recourse to conceptions of what was just and right.

The case of In Re Dumoga and 12 Others640 also had to do with the application of
the Preventive Detention Act of 1958. The facts were that, on or about the 14th March,
1960, Kofi Dumoga and twelve others were arrested and detained by virtue of two
preventive detention orders, Executive Instruments 69 and 70 of 1960, made under
powers conferred by section 2 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1958. On the 18th March
1960, the applicants were duly served with the grounds of detention in compliance with
the said Act of 1958. The applicants therefore applied to the High Court for orders of
habeas corpus directed to the Minister of the Interior and the Director of Prisons to show
cause why the applicants should not be released from detention. The court however held
that, where a person was in lawful custody an application for habeas corpus does not lie,
and that, ‘where a statute confers a discretion upon an executive officer to arrest and
detain persons, the court cannot enquire into the exercise of that discretion, provided the
officer acts in good faith.’641

The court in this case further entrenched the ability of the Executive to abuse the
rights of individuals without having to provide reasons for the curtailment of these rights.
In understanding the extent to which these cases were damaging for human rights in
640
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Ghana at the time, it is important to understand the fact that human rights are inherent
rights and all persons are entitled to them based solely and primarily on the fact that they
are human beings. In essence, what the Preventive Detention Act did was to deprive
individuals of their freedom of movement, and also deny them of their right to be heard
or afforded a fair trial. The courts failure to uphold these rights and even recognize the
fact that these people were entitled to them in the first place shows the nonchalant
attitude of the courts towards human rights at the time.

2. The Post-First Republican and 1969 Constitutional Period (1966 – 1972)
On February 24th 1966, the Military with the collaboration of the Police and other
security agencies ceased political power in Ghana through a coup d’état. The military
regime of the National Liberation Council (NLC) thus ruled Ghana between February
1966 and August 1969. The 1960 Constitution was suspended during this period, but the
NLC Establishment Proclamation ensured that the courts remained functional and
continued to adjudicate disputes. The case of the Republic v. Director of Prisons; Ex
Parte Salifa642 is an early example of the newfound boldness of the courts during this era.
In this case, a fifteen-year-old boy was sent to Guinea by his father in 1965 to continue
his education. In 1967 he ran away from his guardian who was allegedly maltreating him.
He went to Sierra Leone where he asked the Ghana High Commissioner to help him to
return to his parents in Ghana. On his arrival in Accra, in June 1967, he was immediately
arrested by the police and detained at the Ussher Fort Prison. On 25th June 1968, Salifa’s
father filed an ex parte application for an order of habeas corpus on the ground that his
son’s detention was unlawful.
642
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Upon a notice of motion filed on 29 June 1968, for hearing on 2 July 1968, the
Director of Prisons made a return thereto by an affidavit annexing thereto a photostat
copy of a document, purporting to be a Decree signed by the Chairman of the National
Liberation Council, which authorized the arrest and detention of Salifa. The document
was not numbered, and neither was it published in the Gazette as required by the
Proclamation establishing the National Liberation Council. Counsel for the Director of
Prisons then referred the court to the Proclamation, particularly paragraph 3 (5) thereof
and contended that by virtue of that paragraph the National Liberation Council had an
unlimited power. The court however held that, the formal requirements of enacting a
decree involving gazetting and numbering etc. could not be legally dispensed with in the
making and issuing of a Decree that is to have the force of law. Consequently, since what
was presented was neither numbered nor published in the Gazette, it could not be
classified as a Decree.

In ordering the immediate and unconditional release of Salifa, the court further
held that: ‘The contention that the National Liberation Council had an unlimited power
was pitched too high – it undermined or undefined the purposes for which by the
Proclamation the National Liberation Council was established. According to the
preamble to the Proclamation, it was established in the interest of the people of Ghana,
and for the provision for the proper administration of the country and for the
maintenance of law and order. In effect the Proclamation provided for the eradication by
the National Liberation Council of illimitability of power in Ghana; for, autocracy in
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Ghana was given a decent burial on 24 February 1966.’643 It is clear here that even
during the military regime, the courts were ready to hold the government to account and
protect the rights of the people, contrary to what ensued under the ‘democratic’ and
‘constitutional’ regime between 1957 and 1966.

That notwithstanding, the government immediately re-arrested Salifa and brought
him before another High Court on the same facts. The case of Republic v. Director of
Special Branch; Ex Parte Salifa,644 had to do with Salifa, who had been detained under a
National Liberation Council Decree and had appeared in habeas corpus proceedings
before Anterkyi J. who had ordered his release on the grounds, that the Decree, being
unnumbered and unpublished, was invalid. Immediately after his release, Salifa was
however re-arrested without warrant and detained for suspected subversion under another
unnumbered and unpublished National Liberation Council Decree. Salifa's father filed
another application for a writ of habeas corpus for the immediate release of his son on
the grounds, inter alia, that the re-arrest without warrant was unlawful and further that the
subsequent unnumbered and unpublished Decree was also invalid. The court however
held that, the police had the right to arrest a person without a warrant who had been
suspected of having committed or about to commit an offence. The court thus failed to
invalidate a warrant that deprives people their right to freedom of movement even though
the warrant was not numbered and published and clearly invalid. The action of the court
in this instances represents a conflict of the courts at the time whether to enforce human
rights or not in a military regime where there was a high prevalence of abuse of rights.
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Fortunately, the military regime handed over power to a constitutionally elected
government in August 1969. The 1969 Constitution of Ghana also contained explicit
human rights guarantees and provisions that were entrenched in the Constitution and
could not be repealed except through a national referendum. This was in reaction to what
occurred during the previous era. However, the new government soon faced a challenge
in court regarding some action that it had taken upon its assumption of office, which
affected the rights of some citizens.

In the case of Sallah v Attorney General,645 the plaintiff was, on 16 October 1967,
appointed a manager of the Ghana National Trading Corporation (G.N.T.C.), a public
corporation that had been established in 1961. The plaintiff held that appointment until it
was terminated on 21 February 1970 by the Presidential Commission acting in pursuance
of section 9(1) of transitional provisions of the 1969 Constitution. He therefore sought a
declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of the said section 9(1) the
Government was not entitled to terminate his appointment because his office fell outside
the category of public offices to which section 9(1) was applicable. Neither party
disputed the fact that the G.N.T.C. was originally established in 1961. However, Counsel
for the government argued that to determine the offices contemplated by section 9(1) it
was necessary to analyze the legal consequences flowing from the 1966 revolution that
overthrew the Government of the First Republic and the Proclamation of the National
Liberation Council (N.L.C.).
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After referring to Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State, it was argued on
behalf of the government that the 1966 revolution repudiated the 1960 Constitution and
the laws thereunder and that the N.L.C. did not derive its authority from the 1960
Constitution but rather established a new legal order. Thus, all offices deriving their
sources from laws that historically existed before the N.L.C. were juristically established
by the N.L.C. by virtue of the proclamation. He submitted that “established” should be
given a technical meaning and ‘any offices established’ in section 9(1) should be
interpreted to mean ‘any office which derives its legal validity from the N.L.C’. Counsel
for the plaintiff however referred to the use of “establish” in local statutes, and contended
that the word should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning as defined in the Oxford
Dictionary. He submitted that establishing a new legal order was not the same as
establishing new offices and further that there was a distinction between “establish” and
to “continue in force”. The court however agreed with the plaintiff’s submissions, and
vindicated his rights i.e. that the government had overstepped in purporting to terminate
him from office. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld human rights and this signaled the birth
of a new dawn where the courts were willing to assert its authority in terms of the
enforcement of constitutional rights.

3. The Post-Second Republican and 1979 Constitutional Period (1972 – 1981)
The constitutional government elected under the 1969 Constitution was
overthrown in a military coup d’état in 1972. The new entity that took over was known as
the National Redemption Council (NRC). One of the important cases of this era was the
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case of Shalabi v. The Attorney General.646 The plaintiffs, formerly of British nationality,
took out a writ for a declaration that they were Ghanaian citizens and therefore entitled to
operate a transport business notwithstanding the provisions of the Ghanaian Business
(Promotion) Act, 1970 (Act 334). They had obtained Ghanaian passports in 1968 by
virtue of the Ghana Nationality Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D. 191), para. 1. For the AttorneyGeneral it was submitted inter alia that the National Liberation Council, being the
sovereign body of the land at the time, could do whatever it liked, including depriving
persons of their citizenship; and that by the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree,
1968 (N.L.C.D. 333), paragraph 1 of N.L.C.D. 191 had been obliterated by retrospective
substitution and consequently every person who acquired citizenship thereunder ought to
be deemed never to have acquired such citizenship.

It was held that, the National Liberation Council through the Proclamation, 1966,
established itself as an interim government recognizing the people of Ghana as the
repository of sovereignty. The court further held that: ‘As a constitutional interim
government its object was to uphold the suspended Constitution, excepting so far as it
had to derogate from it under the doctrine of necessity, thus re-establishing the rule of
law and other principles necessary for the proper functioning of democracy. By the
Proclamation, 1966, the National Liberation Council was established to provide “for the
proper administration of the country” and this did not include depriving Ghanaians of
their basic right, citizenship. Citizenship once conferred can only be lost by processes
specifically stated in the instrument conferring that citizenship and not by an ambiguity.’
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The NRC was subsequently overthrown on June 4th 1979 by the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which comprised of junior officers of the Ghana Armed
Forces. On 24th September 1979, the AFRC handed over power to a civilian
administration under the leadership of President Hilla Limann, who had been elected
under the 1979 Constitution. Limann’s administration did not last long as it was itself
overthrown on 31st December, 1981, however a few human rights related cases were
decided by the courts during this period. For instance, in the Republic v. Director of
Prisons; Ex Parte Oduro,647 the plaintiff Emmanuel Oduro brought an application for
habeas corpus in the interest of General I. K. Acheampong (leader of the NRC) who was
arrested and detained in the interest of national security after he had been overthrown as
Head of State. In his application, Oduro claimed to be a friend of Acheampong. However,
it was alleged that he did not have the authority of Acheampong to bring the application
and neither did he state in his affidavit that access to Acheampong in prison had been
denied.

In dismissing the application, the court held that the applicant was not included in
the categories of persons who could apply for habeas corpus. According to Act 244,648
Section 1(2), the categories of persons who could apply for habeas corpus were
persons alleging that they had been unlawfully detained; persons entitled to the custody
of a person alleged to be unlawfully detained; and persons acting on behalf of the person
alleged to have been detained. It further provided that, in the third category, the authority
of the person detained must be shown, unless it could be implied (as on the part of a
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husband applying for the release of his wife). Where authority could not be implied and
express authority was lacking, a relation or friend might still apply provided he could
show that access to the person alleged to be illegally detained had been denied so that it
was impossible to obtain instructions from him. The court thus concluded that the
applicant had not shown that he had the authority of Acheampong and his application
therefore was dismissed. This decision is interesting in the sense that, subsequent cases
uphold the rights of individuals to act as interested persons in such cases even where they
are not directly affected.

4. The Post-1979 Constitutional Period (1982 – 1992)
This era witnessed arguably the gravest abuse of human rights in the history of
Ghana. This is because, the PNDC arrogated all powers of government to themselves,
including judicial power – as they established public tribunals, that run parallel to the
regular courts. The power of the ordinary courts, although not abolished, was highly
diminished as evident in the famous case of Kwakye v Attorney General.649 The plaintiff,
a former Inspector General of Police, was purported to have been tried in absentia in
pursuance of a military decree and was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. The plaintiff
who was outside the country filed for a declaration that he was never tried, convicted or
sentenced by any court and that the purported sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment
imposed on him was void and of no effect whatsoever. The regime however sought to
have the suit dismissed on the basis of section 15(2) of the transitional provisions of the
1979 Constitution, which forbade courts to deal with or adjudicate on matters, including
executive, legislative and judicial actions that had been taken or were purported to have
649
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been taken by the AFRC regime. The court thus unanimously dismissed the plaintiff’s
application and held that the trial was lawful, and thus upheld Kwakye’s conviction and
sentence.

C) HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE 1992 CONSTITUTION

The 1992 Constitution was approved on 28 April 1992 through a national
referendum, and entered into force on 7th January 1993. The Constitution defines the
fundamental political principles establishing the structure, procedures, powers and duties
of the government, that of the judiciary and legislature, and spells out the fundamental
rights and duties of citizen. 650 The Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of
Ghanaians are provided for in Chapter 5 of the Constitution.651 These rights and freedoms
are to be respected and upheld by the all persons, including the government and other
organs and agencies, and are enforceable by the Courts.652 All persons in Ghana are
entitled to these fundamental human rights and freedoms irrespective of one’s race, place
of origin, colour, religion, creed or gender.653 Some of the these rights include the right to
life, personal liberty, respect for human dignity, protection from slavery and forced
labour, equality and freedom from discrimination, economic rights, educational rights
amongst others.654
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Article 140 of the Constitution however provides that ‘the High Court shall have
jurisdiction to enforce the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms guaranteed by this
Constitution.’ Thus, the High Court is the court of first instance when one alleges that
human rights have been violated. Thus, article 33(1) provides that:

Where a person who alleges that a provision of this Constitution on the
fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being or is likely to be
contravened in relation to him, then without prejudice to any other action that is
lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress.

Therefore, the Supreme Court’s power and jurisdiction in terms of the interpretation and
enforcement of the Constitution generally, and the enforcement of the Fundamental
Human Rights and Freedoms in particular is however subject to the jurisdiction of the
High Court first. Nevertheless, where one is dissatisfied with the decision of the High
Court, an appeal can be made to the Court of Appeal and ultimately to the Supreme
Court.

This Article provides the admissibility criteria by which the High Court will have
jurisdiction over the case. Firstly, the right should be part of Chapter 5 of the
Constitution. Secondly, either the violation has occurred, is occurring or likely to occur;
and finally the violation should be in relation to the person in question. The protection of
these rights by the courts are only in respect of the person who claims his or her rights are
being infringed upon or is likely to be contravened in relation to him. However, in Adjei-
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Ampofo v. Accra Metropolitan Assembly and the Attorney-General,655 (on the right to
dignity, discussed below) this legal requirement was modified. This case was decided in
the Supreme Court although it concerned enforcement of human rights, which as already
noted the High Court has original jurisdiction over.

The Supreme Court however, declared the case as admissible and held that it was
in the public interest of the country to do so. On the issue of the plaintiff not being
affected by the violation personally, the court held that the affected persons as well as
those likely to suffer did not know their rights and also did not have the monetary means
to initiate a case in court. Therefore, even though the High Court has original jurisdiction
over human rights matters, the Supreme Court in enforcing the Constitution as a whole
could adjudicate at first instance on human rights matters under certain circumstances.
This decision of the Supreme Court was likely borne out of the public interest nature of
the case, showing how our courts have gradually appreciated the importance of
fundamental human rights from the post-colonial era till date.

Also, in the case of Awuni & Others v. West African Examination Council,656 the
Supreme Court made provision for “monetary compensation”, a new remedy that is not
expressly provided for in the constitution. This case unlike the Adjei-Ampofo case was
instituted at the High Court, through the Court of Appeal and finally the Supreme Court
where the judgment was delivered. The provision of compensation in monetary value is a
new development as the court realized that the extent to which the fundamental human
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rights had been violated required further efforts by the courts to bring the affected
persons to their status quo. Finally, in the consolidated cases of Ahumah-Ocansey v. E.C;
Centre for Human Rights and Civil liberties (CHURCIL) v. A.G and E.C, the Supreme
Court held that prisoners had the right to vote, despite their incarceration.

In terms of sex work, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana does not even expressly
state the right to work generally as a fundamental human right. However article 33(5)
provides that the rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in the chapter does not
exclude other rights and freedoms which are to be considered to be inherent in a
democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of man. The Supreme Court in
The Ghana Lotto Operators Association v. National Lottery Authority 657 had an
opportunity therefore to clarify whether or not the right to work could be imported into
Ghanaian law under article 33(5) but failed to do so.

Article 14 of the constitution also speaks to the right to personal liberty and gives
the cases under which the right to personal liberty of a person can otherwise be deprived
from them. Clause 1(d) of this article is of importance in particular in relation to sex work
because it personal liberty may be deprived ‘in the case of a person suffering from an
infectious or contagious disease, a person of unsound mind, a person addicted to drugs
or alcohol or vagrant, for the purpose of his care or treatment or the protection of the
community’. A study conducted by the Ghana Aids Commission in 2014 disclosed that
5,720 representing 11% out of 52,000 female sex workers in Ghana were living with
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HIV.658 Deducing from this statistics, it can be said that, sex workers with sexually
transmitted infections and diseases cannot be entitled to the right of personal liberty for
the protection of the community. On one hand, it can be argued that, sex workers have
the right to personal liberty and can do what they see fit unless that liberty is curtailed
under the exceptions provided in the article 14(1)(d).

The constitution in article 15(1) similarly provides that ‘The dignity of all persons
shall be inviolable’. The Supreme Court in the Adjei-Ampofo case659 was confronted with
an interpretation of this article of the Constitution, as to whether or not the practice of
people carrying pan latrines on their heads as an employment given to them by the Accra
Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) amounted to a violation of the dignity of the employees.
Although the case was settled, it could be inferred from the consequential orders given by
the court and the agreement reached by the parties to the action that, the practice was
deemed to be undignifying. The question here is whether sex work and carrying a pan
latrine on the head can be put in the same category of jobs that are undignifying. The
inability of the court to make a pronouncement on the ambits or the metric of what makes
a thing lack dignity makes it open for all to decide.

The Constitution also talks about equality before the law and non-discrimination
in article 17. Clause (3) thus states: ‘For the purposes of this article, "discriminate"
means to give different treatment to different persons attributable only or mainly to their
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respective descriptions by race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, gender,
occupation, religion or creed, whereby persons of one description are subjected to
disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another description are not made subject
or are granted privileges or advantages which are not granted to persons of another
description.’ In Nartey v. Gati660, Dotse JSC, in his reasoned judgment stated that, article
17 should be read alongside article 12(2) which will give a clear indication that, all the
rights and freedoms contained in chapter 5 are to be enjoyed subject to the rights of
others and the public interest. In relation to sex work, the Constitution states that a person
should not be discriminated upon based on their occupation. An occupation can be said to
be job a person undertakes to earn a living. Sex work can be said to be an occupation
hence; it can be inferred from this that sex workers are not to be discriminated against
based mainly on the fact that they are sex workers. This notwithstanding, they can be
discriminated upon only when it is in pursuance of a public interest, and the fact that sex
work is generally prohibited makes this more likely.

Another right guaranteed under the Constitution, which is of importance to the
rights of sex workers in Ghana, is the right to freedom of thought, conscience and belief.
The right to freedom of thought, allows an individual to hold any view they deem fit and
worthy, independent of those of others. The framing of these set of rights makes it such
that, people are allowed to have their own belief systems that they identify with and
ascribe to without having to justify these to anyone. The right to freedom of thought,
conscience and belief can be interpreted to accommodate a person’s right of choice. This
is due to the fact that an individual’s thought, conscience and belief system informs the
660
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choices they make. Sex workers, by engaging in the acts they engage in, are exercising
their right of choice and rightfully so. This provision of the Constitution gives sex
workers like all other persons, the freedom of thought, conscience and belief so however
this right manifests in their life is clearly a matter of choice that is constitutionally
guaranteed.

The last set of rights which are relevant for the purposes of our discussion are:
economic rights; 661 educational rights; 662 cultural rights and practices; 663 women’s
rights;664 and children’s rights.665 Hence, article 24 of the Constitution is in relation to the
right of workers to work under satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions as well as
receiving equal pay for equal work without discrimination. This provision of the
Constitution makes provision for people who are employed. The article seeks to protect
workers from exploitation by their employers, hence demands that workers work under
satisfactory conditions, and are paid properly for the jobs they do. This provision of the
Constitution is reiterated in the Labour Act, in section 10. Article 24 of the Constitution
does not however in any way suggest that all persons are entitled to the right to work,
hence by extension, it does not necessarily guarantee the right to sex work. However,
what is abundantly clear is that all persons in Ghana are entitled to economic rights like
the right to work and to receive equal pay for equal work.
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Similarly, Ghanaians have a right to all the various forms of education without
any distinction whatsoever. Article 26(1) then provides that: ‘Every person is entitled to
enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, tradition or
religion subject to the provisions of this Constitution.’ However, article 26(2) adds that:
‘All customary practices which dehumanize or are injurious to the physical and mental
well-being of a person are prohibited.’ The importance of these provisions is of particular
relevance to any discussion of sex work in Ghana. This is because, culture has always
been one of the factors that have been often cited and relied upon in opposing the
recognition of the rights of sex workers by some. It is thus argued that Ghanaian culture
abhors such practices, which are expressed to be foreign to the traditional and cultural
identity of Ghana. This argument is however counter-intuitive if you consider the
numerous documented instances of traditional sex work that existed in the pre-colonial
times, which has already been examined in this dissertation.

Furthermore, such arguments are deficient in the sense that culture, which has
been universally described as the way of life of a people, is not static, but rather changes
over a period of time. Article 26(2) further buttresses this point because the drafters of the
Constitution realize that cultural practices, albeit long standing and potentially
unchangeable, may be injurious to the physical as well as mental well-being of humans,
and may even dehumanize them. Thus, many hitherto unquestionable cultural practices
like female genital mutilation666 and trokosi667 have been outlawed by virtue of this
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provision. It is also a notorious fact that even same-sex female relations, popularly
referred to as “supi” has been in existence in Ghana from time immemorial.668

Finally, there is the need for a brief examination of the residual human rights
clause of the Ghanaian Constitution i.e. Article 33(5). This article provides as follows:

The rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the fundamental human
rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter shall not be regarded
as excluding others not specifically mentioned which are considered to be
inherent in a democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of man.669

This means that, despite the fact that some specific human rights have been set out in
Chapter 5 of the Constitution, other rights which are not specifically or expressly stated,
but which are recognized as rights in other democratic states, especially where they are
intended to secure human dignity and freedom, shall be considered as rights in Ghana as
well. The question that then arises is whether or not the rights of sex workers can be
considered as one of such residual rights? The matter has not been adjudicated upon
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directly by the Supreme Court, but recent decisions by the court seem to point towards a
liberalization of the scope of the residual rights envisioned by article 33(5).670

For example in the case of Adjei-Ampofo v. Attorney-General,671 the Supreme
Court of Ghana held as follows:

This article clearly speaks of ‘rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating
to fundamental human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter
shall not be regarded as excluding other not specifically mentioned.’ The
reference to ‘others’ referred to in article 33(5) can only be those rights and
freedoms that have crystallized into widely or greatly accepted rights, duties,
declarations and guarantees through treaties, conventions, international or
regional accords, norms and usages.672

Similarly, in the case of Ghana Lotto Operators Association & Others v. National Lottery
Authority,673 the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Date-Bah in evaluating the
scope of article 33(5) held that “evidence of such rights can be obtained either from
provisions of international human rights instruments (and practice under them) or from
the national human rights legislation and practice of other states.”674

670

The Supreme Court of Ghana has pronounced on Article 33(5) in two notable cases. See Adjei-Ampofo v
Attorney-General [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 411; Ghana Lotto Operators Association & Others v National
Lottery Authority [2007-2008] SCGLR 1088.
671
See Adjei-Ampofo, supra.
672
Id.
673
See Ghana Lotto Operators Association, supra.
674
Id.

236

In Ghana therefore, although the rights of sex workers are not expressly provided
for and protected under the Constitution and other laws, article 33(5) of the Constitution
presents the best hope for future recognition. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned
cases has also left room for recognition of the rights of sex workers and other vulnerable
groups if the opportunity was to arise. It is not surprising therefore that the Constitution
Review Commission in its recommendations to the Government regarding the issue of
gay rights, stated that: ‘The Commission finally finds that …. there does not appear to be
any compelling reason for the Commission to address, let alone attempt to deal with, this
issue in the present context. The more advisable approach would seem to be to leave the
matter for settlement by the Supreme Court in due course. If and when there is enough
interest in the matter (and there is a sufficiently strong feeling about the issue), those who
wish to promote the idea will be able to seek an opinion from the Supreme Court, and the
Court will be able, soberly and in its own time, to consider the submissions put before it
and issue the interpretation of the Constitution in the light of the strength of the
arguments advanced. In doing so, the Court may also seek to take account of the
prevailing conditions and views in the country at the time.’675

Even though the Commission avoided taking a position one way or the other on
the rights of sexual minorities, but rather deferred to the Supreme Court if there was
“enough interest in the matter” (a position that was accepted by the Government of
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Ghana without any further comment),676 it seems as if the Commission offered some
general hope to sexual minorities in Ghana. Thus, in relation to the issue of
discrimination generally, under the subtheme of “Equality and Freedom from
Discrimination,”677 the main dimension of the issue was captured as: ‘whether to include
the grounds of discrimination in the Constitution to include sex, sexual orientation,
North-South discrimination, Natural resource discrimination, age and disability.’ The
Commission extensively reviewed the scope of Article 17 of the Ghanaian Constitution
and made the following findings:678

The Commission finds that the framers of the 1992 Constitution substituted “sex”
(which was in the 1979 Constitution) with “gender” for the following purpose: to
ensure the recognition of the natural/biological state of a woman and a man. The
Commission observes that including “sex” in the anti-discrimination clause of the
Constitution, in addition to “gender” would add to the legal arsenal of those who
argue that the Constitution abhors discrimination on the grounds of sexual
orientation …. The Commission observed that at the National Constitution
Review Conference, it was proposed that Article 17(2) should be amended to read
thus: A person shall not be discriminated against directly or indirectly on grounds
of sex, gender, race, color, ethnic origin, religion, creed, civil, political, social,
cultural, or economic status, disability or age or any other ground.679
676
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On this basis, the Commission therefore recommended to the Government of
Ghana that an Affirmative Action Act be enacted, which ‘should deal with all types of
discrimination against vulnerable groups and minorities.’ 680 It can be reasonably
deduced from the foregoing that the Commission intended to have the proposed
Affirmative Action Act protect the rights of sexual minorities as well as other vulnerable
groups like sex workers, in an equal manner. Interestingly, the Government of Ghana also
accepted this recommendation of the Commission in its White Paper in the following
terms: ‘The Government accepts that the recommended Affirmative Action Act should
deal with all types of discrimination against vulnerable groups and minorities.’681 Thus,
it appears that the country is slowly but steadily moving towards formal recognition of
the rights of sexual minorities, sex workers and other vulnerable groups; or at least the
opportunity to present arguments in favor of formal recognition and protection through a
public interest case that may be brought before the Supreme Court and/or the possible
enactment of the Affirmative Action Act in the near future.

However, a very important fact to be considered in the ascertainment of the rights
of sex workers is the essential criminalization of the work they engage in. As previously
noted, the Criminal Offences Act, Act 29, in chapter seven gives elaborate provisions on
offences against public morals. In section 274 (1) it is stated that ‘Any person
who knowingly lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution; or is proved to
have, for the purposes of gain, exercised control, direction or influence over the
movements of a prostitute in such manner as to aid, abet or compel the prostitution with

680
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Id. at 654.
See id. at 44.
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any person or generally, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour’. The title of this section of
the Act, is ‘Persons trading in prostitution’. From the wording of the section, nowhere
does it expressly ban sex work, what the section rather does, is to make it an offense for a
person to aid a sex worker. The persons who exercise any form of control or influence
over sex workers are pimps. So in effect, what the section does is to impute criminal
liability on pimps.

The first part of the section also says a person who lives wholly or in part on the
earnings of prostitution commits a misdemeanour. Once again, the Act does not expressly
ban the act of sex work per se. What the Act does is to make a person who lives on the
earnings on sex work, criminally liable. Invariably, a sex worker will have to live on their
earnings. Sex workers partake in this line of work because they need a means to earn a
living, hence they will definitely live on the money they make from the work they do.
This section is very wide in its scope. Also, we must consider the fact that sex workers
are not the only ones who live on their earnings. Most sex workers have relatives and in
some cases children who they take care of; so to the extent that all these people
knowingly live on the earnings of a family member who is a sex worker, they commit a
criminal offence – as untenable and unenforceable as that is.

The 1992 Constitution affords all persons human rights, which are subject to other
provisions of the Constitution and to the public interest. Of all the rights enumerated in
the Constitution, some of them seem to accommodate the rights of sex workers; for
example – the right to freedom of thought, conscience and belief. This right gives
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justification to sex workers for partaking in their chosen occupation. Similarly, the rights
to dignity and equality & non-discrimination seem applicable to all persons without
distinction, sex workers inclusive, deducing from the recommendations of the
Constitutional Review Commission. The rest of the rights discussed above may
accommodate the rights of sex workers but not without a lot of complications. An
important detail that need not be glossed over in the determination of whether or not sex
workers in Ghana have a right to engage in sex work is the fact that their activities are
indirectly barred by statute, which makes it difficult advocating for their rights in the first
place. This is a theme that is further explored in Chapter Six.

D) REGIONAL & INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS

1. The Banjul Charter
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Right, otherwise known as the Banjul
Charter was adopted in Nairobi in June 1981. Ghana has signed and ratified this Charter.
The Banjul Charter, which is a treaty that is unique in the sense that it does not only deal
exclusively with rights per se, but it also emphasizes responsibilities. It is also the only
regional human rights instrument that places a premium on communal rights or ‘peoples’
rights. Article 2 states:

Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind
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such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other
opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.

Article 3 deals with equality before the law, and equal protection of the law. Specifically,
article 3(2) states that, ‘Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.’
This provision of the Charter was clarified in the case of Modise v. Botswana,682 where
the court held that, the protection of the law here should not be limited to citizens only,
regardless of the content of their respective Constitutions.

Article 4 provides that: ‘Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall
be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily
deprived of this right.’683 In relation to the rights of sex workers, the Charter permits sex
workers like all other persons to be protected by the law. Article 5 also prohibits
exploitation and degradation of man ‘particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. This provision of the Banjul Charter
speaks to the right to dignity of all persons in the following terms: ‘Every individual shall
have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the
recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man
particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and
treatment shall be prohibited.’684
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The jurisprudence of the court in respect of this article, points to the fact that, the
court primarily looks at dignity from the standpoint of slavery, torture and other acts that
people do not consent to. This notwithstanding, the court had to determine in the case of
Thebus and Another v. The State,685 whether the conviction of a person amounted to an
abuse of their right to dignity. The court held in the negative that, the conviction and
subsequent incarceration of a person did not amount to the abuse of their right to dignity.
Under this provision, one cannot rightfully infer the rights of sex workers under the
Charter. The intention of the framers of the Charter and the jurisprudence of the court and
African Commission on Human Rights point to the fact that, the article was intended to
protect people from exploitation and abuse. Sex work, where the parties consent to,
which is the case in most situations does not involve the exploitation and or abuse of the
parties. Judging from this, it may be difficult to infer the right to sex work from this
article of the Charter.

Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights states that, ‘Every
individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be
deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law.
In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.’ The wording of this article
points to the fact that, the Charter wants to protect individuals from being unduly arrested
and detained by the State. It will not be unreasonable to deduce a right to sex work from
this provision of the charter. Article 8 also provides that freedom of conscience,
profession and the free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. It states that no one may,
subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these
685
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freedoms. The African court in Prince v South Africa,686 noted that, the right to religion
like all other rights, are limited to the laws of the State under the doctrine of margins of
appreciation. Also, the right to a profession has been stated in the Charter, but is yet to be
interpreted by the court. Although sex work can be argued to be a profession, it is
doubtful whether the court will accept such a postulation.

Article 15 of the African Charter is in relation to the right to work under equitable
and satisfactory conditions. The African Court of Human Rights has held in the case of
Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, 687 that, the applicants were
entitled to be paid for the work they did as well as the work they did under favorable
conditions. The failure of the State to provide this was tantamount to slavery in the
opinion of the court. Also, in Prince v. South Africa,688 the court in arriving at the
decision that South Africa was not in breach of the provision of the Charter, indicated
that, ‘One purpose of this Charter provision is to ensure that States respect and protect
the right of everyone to have access to the labour market without discrimination. The
protection should be construed to allow certain restrictions depending on the type of
employment and the requirements thereof. Given the legitimate interest the state has in
restricting the use and possession of cannabis as shown above, it is held that the
complainant's occupational challenge can be done away with should he chose to
accommodate these restrictions. Although he has the right to choose his occupational
call, the Commission should not give him or any one a leeway to bypass restrictions
legitimately laid down for the interest of the whole society. There is no violation, thus, of
686
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his right to choose his occupation as he himself chose instead to disqualify himself from
inclusion by choosing to confront the legitimate restrictions.’689

In relation to the right of sex workers in Ghana, it can be inferred from the
decisions of the court that, no such right to work as a sex worker will be acknowledged.
Act 29, prohibits sex work and to the extent that it has been barred under Ghanaian law,
for the purposes of protecting public morality, the court will not guarantee such a right.
To sum it up, the provisions of the African Charter coupled with the jurisprudence of the
African Court on Human Rights, seems to suggest that the right to sex work or
prostitution may not necessarily be generally guaranteed or accommodated just yet.

2. Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa
The Women’s Protocol in article 3 states, ‘Every woman shall have the right to
dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition and protection of her human
and legal rights. Every woman shall have the right to respect as a person and to the free
development of her personality’. The effect of this article reinforces the right to dignity
already provided for under the African Charter but adds an additional leg to this right i.e.
the free development of her personality. This additional provision to the right to dignity
can be construed to accommodate the rights of sex workers. This is due to the fact that, in
allowing a person to develop a personality of their own, their choices are very essential.
The decision to be a sex worker will invariably impact a person’s personality. The
protocol demands that, every woman’s personality development be respected and
protected.
689

Id.
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Article 4(2)(a) of the protocol states that, ‘States Parties shall take appropriate
and effective measures to enact and enforce laws to prohibit all forms of violence against
women including unwanted or forced sex whether the violence takes place in private or
public’. This article of the protocol relates to violence, including sexual violence. The
violence here however, could be extended to the sex workers who are abused. The ambits
of this article cannot be interpreted to mean or guarantee a right to sex work nonetheless.
The Protocol in article 13 is however dedicated to the protection of the economic and
social welfare of women. For the purposes of the right to sex work in Ghana, the relevant
clauses are, clause (d), which states, ‘State parties shall adopt and enforce legislative and
other measures to guarantee women the freedom to choose their occupation, and protect
them from exploitation by their employers violating and exploiting their fundamental
rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws and regulations in force.’
Clause (e) also provides that, ‘States Parties shall adopt and enforce legislative and other
measures to guarantee and create conditions to promote and support the occupations and
economic activities of women, in particular, within the informal sector.’

These two provisions seek to address the issue of exploitation of female workers
and the promotion of women in the informal sector. Generally, women in the informal
sector are women who are into agriculture, trading and other vocational jobs. Sex work,
cannot form part of the informal sector within the meaning of this provision of the
protocol because, from the wording of the article, the drafters envisaged women who
undertake generally accepted businesses of which sex work is not part. Also, it can be
argued that categorizing sex work as a type of work in the informal sector will more or
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less open the floodgates for the inclusion of other generally unacceptable “trades” as part
of the informal sector – for example armed robbery, fraud and other vices. The protocol
therefore demands of State parties to make sure women who already have jobs are not
discriminated against, and also to protect them from exploitation.

3. International Human Rights Obligations: CEDAW, ICCPR & ICESCR
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the United Nations in 1979 in resolution 340/180 and
entered into force in September 1981 as one of the UN international human right treaties.
In 1980, Ghana acceded to the CEDAW and subsequently in 1986, ratified this accession
without reservation. Article 1 of the Convention defines discrimination against women as
‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women,
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any
other field.’ This definition of discrimination is very wide in its application and scope. It
covers specifically, discrimination targeted at women in the favour of men. Sex work is
an occupation that is primarily undertaken by women and there is virtually no
discrimination in terms of sex work against men in any form. The type of discrimination
that can be argued that may exist is in terms of society’s perception of sex workers. It
cannot however be reasonably deduced from this provision that, a right to sex work exists
for women and should be protected from discrimination.
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Similarly, Article 11 of CEDAW states that, ‘States Parties shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of
employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights,
in particular: (a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings; (b) The
right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same
criteria for selection in matters of employment; (c) The right to free choice of profession
and employment, the right to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of
service and the right to receive vocational training and retraining, including
apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training.’ This provision
expressly guarantees women the right to work and enjoins State parties to the convention
to ensure that women are not discriminated against when it comes to issues of
employment, be it in the formal or informal sector.

Ghana signed and ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) on 7th September 2000. 690 The ICCPR 691 contains several provisions that
prohibit discrimination on stated grounds, and also guarantee equal protection of the law.
However, in terms of the protection and recognition of the rights of sex workers, the most
salient provisions of this treaty are Articles 2(1); 17; and 26. Article 2(1) states:

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
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in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.692

Also, article 17(1) provides that: ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on
his honor and reputation.’ Article 17(2) then states: ‘Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.’

Finally, article 26 provides that: ‘All persons are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.’ The ICCPR therefore provides for the right to inherent dignity of all persons, the
right to liberty and autonomy and the right to equality, equal protection of the law and
non-discrimination. On the other hand, Article 6 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) states that ‘States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the
opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take
appropriate steps to safeguard this right.’ This provision of the treaty is clear and
unambiguous. It gives all persons the right to work and goes ahead to provide that people
are entitled to choose any work they want to do, and the State must take steps to
692
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safeguard this right. This article of the treaty can be said to give all sex workers a right to
work and goes the extra mile to require of States to protect and safeguard the rights of sex
workers.

Thus, under article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, sex workers have a right to engage in sex work and also demand their
States to safeguard this right. The only problem is that sex work is generally criminalized,
and as a result, such an interpretation may be difficult to advance, especially in Africa.
On the other hand, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women does not necessarily guarantee the right to engage in sex work. What the
convention does however is to require State parties to eliminate all forms of
discrimination against women.

E) CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

All in all, the major lesson to be learned from the brief exposition of Ghana’s
human rights history and track record is that, the courts have gradually come to accept
human rights as part and parcel of the national identity. However, when it comes to
sexuality and sexual offences with a human rights nexus, the courts are yet to make a
definitive pronouncement. The conservative attitude of Ghanaians in general regarding
sexuality will probably be a determining factor in whether or not the rights of sex
workers and the right to sex work will be vindicated if such a matter were to present itself
for adjudication.
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What is important however is that, Ghana’s constitutional prescription of
fundamental human rights leaves room for the future incorporation of rights that have not
been expressly provided for in the Constitution, or those yet to be developed. Ghana’s
regional and international human rights obligations may also play a critical role if sex
worker rights are to be recognized, and the right to sex work guaranteed. However, it is
my considered opinion that for this to be achieved, we will have to critically examine the
law prohibiting sex work from a constitutional standpoint so as to provide legal
justification for the right to sex work, and the rights of sex workers. This is what Chapter
Six of this dissertation seeks to do.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATING INTIMACY AND SEXUAL MORALITY: APPLYING THE
D.I.E. FRAMEWORK

The question whether law should concern itself with the regulation of private morality in
general, and intimate human conduct and sexual morality in particular is not easy to
answer. Throughout the dissertation, I have however tried to establish that the public
policy underpinnings of laws that seek to regulate and/or curtail the individual’s “moral”
choices must remain neutral; hence, my proposal for the adoption of the D.I.E.
framework of public policy making, where the criminal law is concerned, especially in
relation to intimate human conduct and sexuality. It must be noted at this point that
contemporary debates regarding sex work and its propriety or otherwise in the modern
nation State have revolved around four key strategies for tackling the phenomenon.

These are: prohibition (criminalizing the buying and selling of sex); abolition
(providing penal sanctions for the buying of sex – for if there is no demand, supply will
necessarily be affected); regulation (sanitizing the trade by situating sex work within the
context of labour, healthcare and safety, urban planning etc.); and full legalization. This
part of the dissertation therefore examines the nexus between private and public morality
with particular emphasis on sex work, and whether or not we can deduce a constitutional
guarantee, prohibition, abolition or regulation of sex work under the 1992 Constitution of
Ghana, using the D.I.E. framework; and which of these four strategies for tackling the
phenomenon will be the most appropriate within the context of Ghana.
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Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Ghana has over the years laid down some
general guiding principles of constitutional interpretation. The constitutionality of the
criminalization of sex work generally under Act 29 is therefore examined in light of the
possible interpretations that may be ascribed to specific human rights provisions of the
Constitution (i.e. the right to dignity, individual autonomy and equality), based on the
principles of constitutional interpretation generally accepted in Ghana. These guiding
principles, which will be subsequently explored in some detail, are as follows:693

1) A national Constitution must be given a benevolent, broad, liberal and purposive
construction so as to promote the apparent policy of its framers i.e. the court must
avoid a strict, narrow, technical and legalistic approach;
2) A Constitution must be construed as a political document capable of growth;
3) A national Constitution is a document sui generis and must therefore be
interpreted according to the principles suitable to its character and necessarily
according to the ordinary rules and presumptions of statutory interpretation;
4) The Court must avoid importing into the Constitution what does not appear
therein;
5) The Court may have to take into account the spirit of the Constitution as a tool for
constitutional interpretation;
6) The provisions of the Interpretation Act may be relevant in construing provisions
of Ghana’s Constitution;
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7) The Court may resort to the Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter 6 of
the Constitution as a tool of constitutional interpretation;
8) The Court must ascertain the intention of the framers of the Constitution as
collected or gleaned from the provisions of the Constitution, and once ascertained,
it is the duty of the Court to give effect to that intention;
9) In construing a Constitution, the court must look at all the provisions thereof as a
whole;
10) In testing any law for unconstitutionality, the Court should not concern itself with
the propriety or expediency of that impugned law, but what the law itself provides
i.e. that the highest motives and best intentions are not enough to displace
constitutional obstacles; and
11) Public policy considerations should not be used as a tool for constitutional
interpretation just as public policy cannot be relied upon in statutory
interpretation. This is because public policy is usually vague and unsatisfactory,
and may lead to uncertainty and error i.e. public policy ‘is a very unruly horse’.

A) CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATING PRIVATE AND SEXUAL MORALITY

1. The Right to Human Dignity
As already noted in Chapter Three of the dissertation, respect for human dignity is
the fundamental basis of a rights-based regime. Human dignity is at the core of human
rights, and is to a large extent the catalyst for the respect, promotion and protection of all
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other rights in a democratic society.694 In Ghana, article 15 of the 1992 Constitution
provides for the respect of human dignity in the following terms:

(1) The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable.
(2) No person shall, whether or not he is arrested, restricted or detained, be
subject to–
(a) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) any other condition that detracts or is likely to detract from his dignity
and worth as a human being.
(3) A person who has not been convicted of a criminal offence shall not be treated
as a convicted person and shall be kept separately from convicted persons.
(4) A juvenile offender who is kept in lawful custody or detention shall be kept
separately from an adult offender.

The concept of human dignity from a constitutional perspective is therefore linked one
way or the other to the criminal justice system, as can be ascertained from article 15.
How then do we measure the inviolability of the dignity of individuals within that
context?

I have already proposed that for the sake of sound public policy, all laws that seek
to regulate intimate human conduct must have at its core the preservation and promotion
of the inherent dignity of the individual.695 Hence, criminal offences that hinge on some
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conception of societal moral precepts must fundamentally seek to safeguard the
inviolability of human dignity. The questions that remain to be resolved are as follows:
does the law prohibiting sex work respect, promote or safeguard the dignity of sex
workers? Better still, is there anything undignified about offering sex for money? What is
inherently offensive to society about such transactions? Finally, are the laws prohibiting
sex work constitutional? To answer these questions, it must be reiterated that Ghanaian
law prohibits the solicitation of sex in public places, procuration for sex, the exchange of
sex for money in brothels, the keeping of brothels, or living off the earnings of sex
workers.696

Sex work in its classical forms and manifestations cannot therefore be legally
engaged in save for limited circumstances.697 The law in Ghana all but classifies sex
workers as criminals as a result of their line of work. They are humiliated, looked down
upon and publicly shamed when their identities are exposed. But beyond the ‘false
consciousness’ ideology that the Catherine MacKinnon wing of feminism will have us
believe, is it not possible that people engaged in sex work are making rational economic
choices and decisions? Basic economic principles reveal that whenever there is a demand
for a commodity or service, a supply chain is created that increases sometimes
exponentially i.e. demand fuels supply. Is it therefore fair to degrade people and
essentially violate their ‘inviolable’ human dignity by criminalizing them, and their
rational economic choices simply because society is not comfortable?
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Some may however suggest that the same argument can be marshaled in defense
of armed robbers, whose activities are criminalized because it offends the public good.
The difference however between armed robbery and sex work is that, exchanging sex for
money is prima facie purely a consensual, often private and voluntary affair, whilst the
same cannot be said for the former. Armed robbers deprive people of their property,
usually in a violent manner that goes beyond the specific victim(s) in question. Sex work
however is purely transactional, and except for situations where it involves a minor (who
is not capable of consenting to sex anyway), or is linked with the forced trafficking of
persons and forced prostitution, genuine sex work should not offend the sensibilities of
society.

Then again, critics will postulate that engaging in sex work or soliciting for sex in
public places like street corners or brothels etc. offends the moral fiber of the society.
That it sends the wrong message to the youth about the society’s acceptance of an
inherently immoral act. But, what led society to come to this conclusion in the first place?
Is it the case that sex is generally bad and as such should not be openly alluded to in the
form of street or public solicitation? Surely that is not the case, for sex cannot be deemed
bad by any human society. If so, then it is because some other factors must have led to
this conclusion that in turn influenced the public policy direction that the law prohibiting
sex work epitomizes. These factors are conceptions of morality, mostly from religious
and cultural perspectives, as already noted in the previous chapters.
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The law does mirror the religious and cultural conception of moral uprightness
that sex work clearly runs counter to. It prioritizes the collective sense of morality
deduced from religion and notions of cultural heritage, over the individual’s private sense
of what is moral – a general acceptance of which has entrenched the belief in the ideals of
such laws. That notwithstanding, persons who freely choose to engage in activities like
sex work for a living are violated in the sense that no dignity is attached to this line of
work in Ghana. The law has made sure of this. In fact, degrading and insulting terms like
“ashawo” which translates to mean “prostitute” are reserved for sex workers, and indeed
any female who is deemed promiscuous – whereas no such equivalent terms exists for
their male counterparts. As a matter of fact, promiscuity in males in Ghana is celebrated,
encouraged and accepted as a socio-cultural norm.

It seems the law does not seek to promote the dignity of the sex worker because it
considers her/him prima facie as a criminal. What is however interesting is that the law
only focuses on the supply side of the equilibrium, to the total neglect of the demand side.
Presently, the law in Ghana does not sanction or concern itself with persons who pay for
sex. Is it the case that we consider it bad and immoral to sell one’s body for monetary
compensation, but we cannot really be bothered if you decide to pay money in exchange
for sex? Or is it that the policy of the law has been to degrade sex workers, mainly
female, from time immemorial, since such conduct is considered immoral? Such mixed
and contradictory signals that the law seemingly sends out is problematic because it
provides no focused and rational public policy basis for the law in the first place.
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Does the law therefore pass the constitutional test of upholding the inviolability of
human dignity? It is my considered view that for so long as there are laws that prohibit
sex work in Ghana, these laws will continue to inherently infringe on the inviolability of
the dignity of sex workers because it considers them criminals. Article 15(1) of the
Constitution makes no distinction as to the persons entitled to enjoy this basic human
right to dignity. Thus, unless some compelling reason(s) exists for prohibiting voluntary
and consensual sexual transactions between adults, the criminalization of such
transactions will not be rational and necessary in our contemporary world.

The religious and cultural arguments of maintaining the moral fiber of society can
no longer be justification for such repressive laws due to the fact that we live in a secular
State, where religion and the State are separate and must remain so, and the multi-cultural
world we live in has also become very dynamic. Religious and/or cultural conceptions of
morality can therefore no longer be the underpinnings of public policy where intimate
human conduct/behavior is concerned. The law prohibiting sex work in Ghana, in my
view, does not pass the constitutional test of inviolability of human dignity.

This is because, the main provision of the Criminal Offences Act that seek to
prohibit sex work, only does so in terms of street solicitation or importuning. Section
276(1) of Act 29 for example, provides that ‘A person who persistently solicits or
importunes in a public place or in sight of a public place for the purposes of prostitution
commits a criminal offence ..’ Thus, merely standing on the street corner in the middle of
the night in a manner that suggests that one is a sex worker can be deemed as solicitation;
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whilst approaching passers-by in vehicles for example would amount to importuning.
These acts are deemed criminal according to section 276(1) of Act 29. The issue
therefore is whether this provision is consistent with the admonishing for the respect of
human dignity under article 15 of the Constitution of Ghana, in particular, article 15(1)
and 15(2)(b).

The test of constitutionality and principles of constitutional interpretation as
outlined above involves eleven (11) important considerations. The first of these has to do
with the fact that constitutional provisions must be given a benevolent, broad, liberal and
purposive construction so as to promote the apparent policy of its framers i.e. the court
must avoid a strict, narrow, technical and legalistic approach. Thus, article 15(1) which
suggests that the dignity of all persons in Ghana are inviolable can clearly be given ‘a
benevolent, broad, liberal and purposive construction’ to apply without distinction to all
persons including sex workers. Thus, sex workers are also entitled to respect of their
inherent dignity.

Similarly, article 15(2)(b) which provides that no person regardless of
circumstances should be subjected to conditions that detract or is likely to detract from
their dignity and worth as human beings is also applicable to sex workers. Giving this
provision a liberal, benevolent, broad and purposive construction will probably negate
laws that criminalize the free and rational economic choice that sex workers make to
engage in that trade. The fact that the conduct of sex workers are criminalized by the law
clearly detracts from their dignity and worth, because as earlier suggested, absent
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religious and cultural conceptions of acceptable moral conduct, there is nothing
undignifying about offering sex for monetary reward. In fact as already noted, many of
the sexual relationships in Ghana are sometimes premised on pecuniary rewards. If no
dignity is involved in sex in exchange for reward (monetary or otherwise) and it is
inherently immoral, we might as well criminalize the conduct of persons who enter into
marriages with the sole purpose of achieving financial stability or benefiting from the
finances of the other spouse! Similarly, we should criminalize persons who maintain
multiple sexual partners simply because they are addicted to sex!

Also, if sex workers (roamers) cause such a nuisance in public places to the
extent that their activities ought to be criminalized, what about street hawkers and
beggars who are a constant nuisance in all the major cities of the country, but yet are
allowed to operate largely unhindered.698 At least, the most popular form of sex work in
Ghana only involves solicitation or importuning late at night when the general public and
majority of the people are asleep and not in public anyway. Thus, is it the case of
selective public policy making? Or is it that society does not consider begging and street
hawking as moral issues, grave enough as that of sex work? The bottom line is, by
criminalizing sex work in general, the dignity of the sex worker is violated as he or she is
deemed a criminal for rational and legitimate economic choices they have made.

We must also note that the Constitution is a political document capable of growth
and must be interpreted according to its own principles. Article 15 is clear and admits of
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It must be noted that there are laws that prohibit street hawking and general public nuisance in Ghana;
yet a distinctive feature of the urban areas in Ghana is the excessive street hawking menace.
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no ambiguity as it applies to all persons in Ghana regardless of their status. There is thus
no need to import words into article 15 to make it clearer, as the spirit of the constitution
itself will abhor violations of the dignity of the sex worker, because at the end of the day,
we are all human beings, deserving of respect of our dignity, regardless of our life
circumstances. In a similar manner, the directive principles of state policy contained in
Chapter 6 of the Constitution provides in part that ‘The State shall endeavor to secure
and protect a social order founded on the ideals and principles of freedom, equality,
justice, probity and accountability as enshrined in Chapter 5 of this Constitution; and in
particular, the State shall direct its policy towards ensuring that every citizen has
equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law’.699

Also, article 37(2)(b) provides that ‘The State shall enact appropriate laws to
assure– the protection and promotion of all basic human rights and freedoms, including
the rights of the disabled, the aged, children and other vulnerable groups in development
processes’. Sex workers are clearly a vulnerable group within the meaning of article
37(2)(b), due to the marginalization and social stigma they face; and as a result, the law
must protect them and promote their rights, including respect for the inviolability of their
dignity. The intention of the framers of the Constitution as can be gleaned from a reading
of the entire Constitution cannot therefore be compatible with disregard for the dignity of
sex workers. Indeed, the fact that a whole Chapter of the Constitution is devoted to the
promotion and protection of the rights of all persons in Ghana must be construed as a
direct intent on the part of the framers to protect all persons in Ghana from unjust laws
that criminalize conduct solely on the basis of religion or culture.
699

See article 37 of the 1992 Constitution.
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In this regard, it is my considered view that the propriety and expediency of the
law prohibiting sex work on the basis of religious and cultural conceptions of morality
cannot outweigh the constitutional precept of the inviolability of the human being. The
public policy dimension (safeguarding public morals) of criminalization of sex work is
also not a suitable justification for the state of the law because public policy has been said
to be an “unruly horse”. It can run in directions that may misrepresent the true state of
affairs regarding societal conceptions of morality or right and wrong. Thus, both these
two tests of constitutionality of the law prohibiting sex work, seem to reinforce the fact
that the inviolability of the dignity of all persons including sex workers cannot be
overridden by propriety and expediency of the law, or its public policy underpinnings of
maintaining the moral fiber of the Ghanaian society.

2. The Right to Individual Autonomy/Liberty
Individual autonomy or liberty is another important variable or principle, which
all laws seeking to regulate intimate human conduct must measure up to. Thus, I have
suggested that the individual’s ability to act in an autonomous manner free from social
coercion must be reflected in laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct. The
1992 Constitution of Ghana provides in Article 14(1) that ‘Every person shall be entitled
to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty …’ There
are however seven (7) exceptions to this general guarantee of individual autonomy and
liberty. These are: restrictions of liberty for the purposes of carrying out the sentence of a
court; in execution of an order of a court; for the purpose of bringing a person before a
court in execution of an order of the court; for the purpose of treatment or care of persons
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of unsound mind etc.; for the purposes of educating or providing the welfare of children
below 18 years; for preventing unlawful entry into Ghana or for expelling and extraditing
or removing persons from Ghana; and upon reasonable suspicion of the commission of a
criminal offence.700

Section 276(1) which criminalizes sex work clearly falls within the context of the
exceptions to the non-restriction of autonomy and liberty of the individual provision of
the Constitution. This is because, the law clearly makes it possible for a person’s liberty
to be restricted upon suspicion of the commission of an offence or upon suspicion that a
person is about to commit a criminal offence. However, the law prohibiting sex work in
itself is an affront to individual liberty and autonomy because it seeks to restrict such
autonomy on the basis that society finds it morally unacceptable. By categorizing all sex
workers as criminals, the law mandates and constitutionally sanctions the curtailment of
the liberty and autonomy of sex workers. However, this should not be the case as the
individual in a modern democratic society must be free to make rational economic
decisions and engage in occupations that are legitimate, and should not offend the law
simply because a section of society find it morally unacceptable on religious and cultural
grounds.701

3. The Right to Equality, Equal Protection of the Law and Nondiscrimination
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See Article 14(1) of the 1992 Constitution.
The individual’s right to occupation is further explored from the perspective of sex work and nondiscrimination principles in the next section.
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The Constitution of Ghana abhors discrimination. Article 17(1) of the
Constitution, which provides that ‘All persons shall be equal before the law’, is the
clearest indication of the constitutional guarantee of equality for all Ghanaians. Article
17(2) goes on further to prohibit discrimination on stated grounds. 702 Article 17(3)
explains what “discrimination” means for the purposes of the Constitution: ‘For the
purposes of this article, “discriminate” means to give different treatment to different
persons attributable only or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, place of
origin, political opinions, colour, gender, occupation, religion or creed, whereby persons
of one description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another
description are not made subject or are granted privileges or advantages which are not
granted to persons of another description.’

Even though discrimination on the basis of sex work is not explicitly stated in
article 17 or any other provision of the Constitution for that matter, the fact that article 17
prohibits discrimination on the basis of occupation, can encompass sex work. The goal
here is to examine the rights to equality, equal protection of the law and nondiscrimination having regard to the aforementioned guiding principles of constitutional
interpretation. This will enable us to determine whether or not article 17 protects sex
workers from discrimination on the basis of their occupation.

702

The grounds for non-discrimination under Ghana’s Constitution are: gender, race, color, ethnic origin,
religion, creed or social or economic status.
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The first question we need to resolve is what will be a ‘benevolent, broad, liberal
and purposive construction’ of article 17? In the case of Tuffuor v. Attorney-General,703
the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court of Ghana when called upon to construe
certain provisions of the 1979 Third Republican Constitution of Ghana held as follows:704

A written Constitution such as ours … embodies the will of a people. It also
mirrors their history. Account, therefore, needs to be taken of it as a landmark in a
people’s search for progress. It contains within it their aspirations and their hopes
for a better and fuller life … A broad and liberal spirit is required for its
interpretation. It does not admit of a narrow interpretation. A doctrinaire approach
to interpretation would not do. We must take account of its principles and bring
that consideration to bear, in bringing it into conformity with the needs of the
time.

Similarly, in New Patriotic Party v. Attorney-General (31st December Case),705 HayfronBenjamin JSC writing for the majority, held as follows: ‘My duty was to discover the
‘intent and meaning’ of … our Constitution and apply ‘a broad and liberal spirit’ in its
interpretation. There is no benefit in these modern times in applying a strict
interpretation to modern democratic Constitutions. So to do would mean that we forget
that Constitutions are made by men for the governance of men.’706
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Beginning with the premise that article 17(1) of the Constitution is intended to
apply to all persons in Ghana, and that articles 17(2) and (3) set out the grounds for nondiscrimination, a ‘benevolent, broad, liberal and purposive’ construction of the latter two
provisions will not admit of a conclusive and exhaustive non-discrimination criteria. To
argue that the omission of sexual orientation and sex work in these provisions and/or that
sex work cannot legitimately be an occupation within the meaning of these provisions is
conclusive of the intent of the framers not to protect that class of citizens, will be too
narrow a construction. This construction fails to bring the Constitution into conformity
with the needs of contemporary times – where admittedly sex workers do exist in Ghana,
and are in need of the protection of the laws of the country, just like every one else.

Similarly, since ‘a Constitution must be considered as a political document
capable of growth’, any construction of article 17 must be reflective of this principle. In
the Tuffuor case, it was held as follows:707

The Constitution has its letter of the law. Equally, the Constitution has its spirit. It
is the fountain-head for the authority which each of the three arms of government
possesses and exercises. It is a source of strength. It is a source of power … Its
language, therefore, must be considered as if it were a living organism capable of
growth and development. Indeed, it is a living organism capable of growth and
development, as the body politic of Ghana itself is capable of growth and
development.708
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Tuffuor supra.
Id.
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If the provisions of the Constitution are akin to living organisms capable of growth and
development, article 17 must have room to grow and develop since it is now over twentyfive (25) years old. Assuming that it was not the intent of the framers to protect or
legislate against discrimination on the basis of sex work as an occupation initially, article
17 is old enough now to recognize that, in a diverse society, equality before the law and
non-discrimination requires the protection of vulnerable groups, regardless of whether or
not a majority of the people agree.

The right to equality and non-discrimination as constitutional guarantees must
also be construed according to its peculiar character, since the Constitution itself is sui
generis and must be examined as a whole. So in Kuenyehia v. Archer,709 the Supreme
Court held that: ‘Any attempt to construe the various provisions of the Constitution 1992,
… must perforce start with an awareness that a constitutional instrument is a document
sui generis to be interpreted according to principles suitable to its peculiar character and
not necessarily according to the ordinary rules and presumptions of statutory
interpretation.’ 710 The right to equality and non-discrimination therefore must be
jealously guarded in light of this, and as a result sex workers should not be easily
discounted as falling outside the purview of persons entitled to this constitutional
protections.

The next principle of constitutional interpretation against which we must examine
article 17 is that ‘Courts must avoid importing into the Constitution what does not appear
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therein.’ This has been explained by Bimpong-Buta in the following words: ‘In other
words, the constitution must be interpreted in the light of its own wording and not on the
basis of words found in other constitutions. The court must therefore generally recognize
that judicial pronouncements in other common law jurisdictions founded on the wording
of their constitutions are not likely to be of assistance.’711 It may therefore be argued that
sex work may not necessarily be considered an occupation within the meaning of article
17(2) & (3), and that sex work as an occupation was not intended to be protected by the
Constitution, since we are admonished not to read into the Constitution words that are not
originally in there.

However, as has been shown, such a construction is not only archaic, but is also
inimical to the principle of the Constitution being a living organism capable of growth.
Thus, the fact that words must not necessarily be imported into the Constitution does not
however mean that, the guiding principles of constitutional interpretation are mutually
exclusive and cannot therefore co-exist. It is therefore my considered opinion that, as and
when the Supreme Court of Ghana is called upon to interpret the ambit of article 17 and
whether or not discrimination on the basis of sex work as an occupation is covered by
that provision, the Court will consider all the principles of constitutional interpretation it
has itself laid out, as a whole, and be guided by the need to construe the provision in a
manner that accords with common sense as well.

In this regard, the spirit of the Constitution as well as the intention of the framers
must be considered in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. So in the case of
711
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Sallah v. Attorney-General,712 the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court of Ghana
held, per Justice Sowah as follows:713

I consider that the best guide to interpretation is the letter and spirit of the
intention of the Constitution; if the intention of the Assembly … can be collected
from the words used and if that intention, when so collected, is in consonance
with the spirit of the Constitution, then there is no need for further aids.714

Sowah JSC once again in the celebrated case of Tuffour case, 715 noted that ‘The
Constitution has its letter of the law. Equally, the Constitution has its spirit. It is the
fountain-head for the authority which each of the three arms of government possesses
and exercises. It is a source of strength. It is a source of power … A broad and liberal
spirit is required for its interpretation.’716

Also, in the case of New Patriotic Party v. Attorney-General (31st December
Case), 717 the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether or not it was
unconstitutional for the government to proclaim and celebrate 31st December each year as
a national holiday, with State resources.

718

In declaring the celebrations as
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unconstitutional by a 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that, even if
there was no contradiction with the letter of the Constitution, the celebrations infringed
upon the spirit of the Constitution, since the Constitution made it clear that it abhorred
coup d’états. Thus, the State should not engage in celebrations that essentially glorified
the overthrow of a past Constitution, an occurrence that the present Constitution kicks
against and admonishes all citizens to prevent its overthrow.719

Francois JSC commenting on the essence and importance of the spirit of the
constitution as a guide to constitutional interpretation stated: ‘My own contribution to the
evaluation of a Constitution is that, a Constitution is the out-pouring of the soul of the
nation and its precious life-blood is its spirit. Accordingly, in interpreting the
Constitution, we fail in our duty if we ignore its spirit. Both the letter and the spirit of the
Constitution are essential fulcra which provide the leverage in the task of interpretation
… In every case, a true cognition of the Constitution can only proceed from the breadth
of understanding of its spirit … The necessary conclusion is that the written word and its
underlying spirit are inseparable bedfellows in the true interpretation of the Constitution
… For if the Constitution, 1992 frowns on violent overthrows of duly constituted
governments, and rejects acts that put a premium on unconstitutionalism to the extent of
even proscribing the promotion of one party state, it is naivety of the highest order, to
expect the Constitution, and in the same breadth, to sing Hallelujah’s in a paean of
praise to unconstitutional deviations, past or present. If the past is being buried, the spirit
of the Constitution, 1992 would frown on the resurrection of any of its limbs. That is the
the Supreme Military Council in 1979, and brought into power Jerry John Rawlings as Head of State for the
first time, until he handed over power to the democratically elected Hilla Limann in 1979.
719
See CONSTITUTION Art. 3 (1992) (Ghana).
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whole point of the cloak of indemnity conferred in section 34 of the transitional
provisions of the Constitution, 1992 … The admission that a violent overthrow of
government occurred on 31 December, forecloses any sanctioning of public celebration
in a constitutional era.’720

How then does the spirit of the Constitution apply towards the interpretation of
article 17 of the 1992 Constitution? It is submitted that the spirit underpinning article 17
is the fundamental principle that discrimination on the basis of differential characteristics
is not to be countenanced in Ghana. While there is no express mention of sex work as a
form of occupation as a ground for non-discrimination, the letter and spirit of the
Constitution are inseparable bedfellows, and the overarching purpose of the spirit of the
constitution is to reveal the true essence of a constitutional dictate or provision. Article 17
must therefore be interpreted to cover discrimination on the basis of occupation,
including sex work. I do not believe that it was the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to positively endorse discriminatory practices against sex workers with their
omission.

Furthermore, despite the generality of the word ‘occupation’ as used in article 17,
is it not discrimination where ordinary workers in other occupations are given different
treatment as opposed to sex workers, attributable only to their chosen occupation? If the
framers of the Constitution intended to exclude sex workers from the class of persons
who are to be equal before the law, they could have done so. To suggest therefore that
occupation as a ground for non-discrimination excludes sex work and that indicates the
720
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framers’ intent is too simplistic an argument, because it fails to consider the underlying
theme of the provision in question i.e. its spirit.

It has also been suggested that the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792) may be
relevant in construing the provisions of Ghana’s Constitution. Section 10 of this Act,
which is captioned ‘Aids to Interpretation or Construction’ provides in Section 10(4) that:
‘Without prejudice to any other provision of this section, a Court shall construe or
interpret a provision of the Constitution or any other law in a manner (a) that promotes
the rule of law and the values of good governance, (b) that advances human rights and
fundamental freedoms, (c) that permits the creative development of the provisions of the
Constitution and the laws of Ghana, and (d) that avoids technicalities and recourse to
niceties of form and language which defeat the purpose and spirit of the Constitution and
of the laws of Ghana.’ Emphasis added.

Clearly therefore, the Supreme Court is under a legal obligation to advance
human rights and fundamental freedoms. They are also to creatively develop the
provisions of the Constitution. In respect of article 17, the only way of advancing the
frontiers of human rights is to creatively construe the provision as protecting all persons
including sex workers from discrimination on the basis of their occupation. Such a
construction accords with common sense, and is essential in a democratic society such as
Ghana if we are to give true meaning to the principle of equality before the law. As
already indicated, the spirit of the law and the fact that the Constitution itself is to be
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treated like a living organism capable of growth, is justification enough for protecting sex
workers from discrimination.

Also, the Directive Principles of State Policy721 further reinforce the need to
protect sex workers from discrimination in accordance with article 17. This is because
article 34(1) of the Constitution provides that: ‘The Directive Principles of State Policy
contained in this Chapter shall guide all citizens, parliament, the President, the
Judiciary, the Council of State, the Cabinet, political parties and other bodies and
persons in applying or interpreting this Constitution or any other law and in taking and
implementing any policy decisions, for the establishment of a just and free society.’
Emphasis added. Therefore, the Supreme Court can resort to Chapter Six of the
Constitution as a guide when called upon to interpret provisions of the Constitution.

One of such important provision that is worth reproducing here is article 37,
which is captioned ‘Social Objectives’. It provides as follows:

(1) The State shall endeavor to secure and protect a social order founded on the
ideals and principles of freedom, equality, justice, probity and accountability as
enshrined in Chapter 5 of this Constitution; and in particular, the State shall direct
its policy towards ensuring that every citizen has equality of rights, obligations
and opportunities before the law.
(2) The State shall enact appropriate laws to assure–
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(a) the enjoyment of rights of effective participation in development
processes including rights to form their own associations free from state
interference ….
(b) the protection and promotion of all other basic human rights and
freedoms, including rights of the disabled, the aged, children and other
vulnerable groups in development processes.
(3) In the discharge of the obligations stated in clause (2) of this article, the State
shall be guided by international human rights instruments which recognize and
apply particular categories of basic human rights to development processes.

What this means therefore is that every citizen of Ghana is entitled to equality of rights
which is to be guaranteed by the State. Furthermore, the State is obligated to pass laws
that ensure the enjoyment of basic fundamental rights by all persons, including
vulnerable groups – a phrase that is not defined in the Constitution, but must definitely
include groups such as sex workers due to the marginalization and stigma they face.
Finally, the State is to be guided by international human rights norms and standards.

The conclusion that can be drawn here is that, using the Directive Principles of
State Policy as a guide, the Supreme Court can reasonably interpret article 17 of the
Constitution in a manner that will ensure greater equality for all vulnerable groups. In
terms of vulnerability, the socio-cultural context of Ghana means that sex workers are
one of the most vulnerable groups that exist. The marginalization and social stigma they
face reinforces this. Therefore, the State (including the Court) has a duty to ensure that
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the rights of such vulnerable groups are protected, and that they are not discriminated
against simply because of their chosen occupation/profession. Since public policy has
also been described as a “very unruly horse” it cannot aid in construing article 17. In any
case, any public policy concerns (protection of public morals, for example) regarding the
protection of sex workers from discrimination on the basis of their occupation, is
outweighed by the overarching need to protect such vulnerable groups, which the spirit of
article 17 demands.

As has been painstakingly demonstrated, article 17 of the Constitution which
provides for non-discrimination on the basis of occupation, must be interpreted to include
sex work as an occupation protected by the law. The question that remains is whether or
not in light of this, section 276(1) of Act 29 is constitutional. The Supreme Court in the
case of New Patriotic Party v. Attorney-General (Ciba Case),722 held that in testing the
constitutionality of any law, the Court must not concern itself with the appropriateness or
convenience of the impugned law, but rather the contents of the law. Bamford-Addo JSC
citing with approval, the dictum of Lord Diplock in the case of Hinds v. R,723 therefore
held that ‘the highest motives and the best intentions are not enough to displace
constitutional obstacles.’724

Section 276(1) of Act 29 however criminalizes private consensual adult sexual
intercourse involving the exchange of money. Since the court must not concern itself with
the propriety or convenience of the law, (standards that the entrenched Ghanaian socio722
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cultural context obviously endorses), the actual essence of the law must nonetheless be
examined, devoid of any biases and gender stereotypes. Such an examination only leads
to the conclusion that the law regulates sexual intercourse, plain and simple. It seeks to
categorize sex workers prima facie as criminals, and imposes a total ban or restriction on
their sexual life, the expression of their sexuality and the exercise of their occupation. As
we have concluded that article 17 protects sex workers from discrimination on the basis
of occupation, it follows that section 276(1) which seeks to curtail aspects of the
expression of the sexuality and free exercise of occupation of sex workers, cannot be
constitutional.

B) THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SEX WORK: APPLYING THE D.I.E. FRAMEWORK

From the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that the legal regime in Ghana
regarding sex work is one of partial prohibition, as it only criminalizes the supply side of
the trade. Following from this discovery, it can also be further concluded that the
provisions of Act 29 that partially prohibits sex work are at variance with certain
fundamental constitutional dictates i.e. the right to dignity, individual autonomy and
equality and non-discrimination. Thus, it is my position that the Constitution guarantees
the rights of sex workers in Ghana; and consequently there is a right to sex work in
contemporary Ghana. The strategy that must be adopted to make this right meaningful
and officially acknowledged, in my opinion, is structured regulation as opposed to full
legalization; and this will be discussed in the concluding chapter of the dissertation.
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1. Guiding Principles on the Right to Sex Work
The legal and regulatory framework that exists in Ghana today for the protection
of sex workers is more receptive than it seems at first sight. Thus, the guiding principles
in any formulation of the rights of sex workers generally, and the right to sex work in
Ghana in particular, must be premised on the constitutional guarantees of human dignity,
individual autonomy, liberty and freedom, and the equality, equal protection and nondiscrimination clauses of the 1992 Constitution. Collectively, they point to an inherent
recognition and protection of the rights of all Ghanaians, regardless of their status or
occupation.

Hence, all laws that seek to control intimate human conduct and sexual morality
for that matter must ensure human dignity, preserve the individual’s autonomy and
liberty, and must not be discriminatory. Public policy demands of a multi-cultural and
religious society like Ghana must not outweigh these three fundamental principles of
human rights enshrined in the Ghanaian Constitution. In terms of construing the
phenomenon of sex work, the D.I.E. framework can therefore be looked to as a rational
means of making public policy, rather than the sole reliance on the religious and cultural
conceptions of morality of the majority of the society, as has been the case since
independence in Ghana.

To reiterate, the Dignity, Individual Autonomy and Equality (D.I.E.) framework
for public policy making, which I have proposed in this dissertation are as follows:
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1) All laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct must have at its core the
objective of preserving and promoting the inherent dignity of the individual;

2) The individual’s ability to act in an autonomous manner free from social coercion
must be reflected in laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct; and

3) All laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct must have the quality of
equality about it i.e. it should not criminalize particular groups of people because
of personal choices that do not conform with societal standards.
It is within the context of this framework that I believe the right of sex workers and the
right to sex work can be guaranteed.

2. Legal Formulation and Justification
The inescapable conclusion that can be drawn from all the analysis of the law thus
far is that, the continuous criminalization of consensual sex work under the Criminal
Offences Act of Ghana, is an affront to the freedoms and liberties inherent in Ghana’s
Constitution. Therefore, to the extent that section 276(1) of the Criminal Offences Act of
Ghana prohibits sex work involving consenting adults, it is unconstitutional as it offends
basic freedoms under Ghana’s Constitution. In particular, the provisions of Act 29
regarding sex work does not preserve or promote the inherent dignity of sex workers;
neither does it guarantee sex workers their autonomy and liberty; and finally, it does not
ensure equality between all persons, as sex workers are treated in an unequal manner and
discriminated against, as though they were a lower class of human beings. Enforced sex
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work however, including control of sex workers by pimps, sex trafficking etc. fall outside
the scope of the constitutional protections and guarantees, and as such must remain
illegal.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Throughout this dissertation I have tried to advance the position that laws that criminalize
or seek to regulate intimate human conduct must have at its core certain fundamental
values. These values, I argue, must be considered along side the usual public policy
determinants of religion and culture in making laws that seek to restrict or prohibit
specific human conduct usually through the prescription of penal consequences. The
major recommendation that I propose as a result is not total decriminalization or full
legalization of sex work, as this may not be achievable in the foreseeable future; but
rather I propose the eventual regulation of sex work and the sex trade holistically through
multi-faceted means. The reason for regulation is simple. I have already intimated that
section 276(1) of Act 29 partially prohibits sex work and thus infringes on specific
freedoms and liberties contained under Ghana’s Constitution. Thus, there must be a way
of remedying this blatant unconstitutionality in a manner that does not necessarily offend
the sensibilities of a majority of the Ghanaian population, since cultural and religious
conceptions of morality will continue to dictate public policy. The only way to do this is
by developing a regulatory regime or framework that takes into consideration the mood
of the country, the rights of sex workers as well as public health, zoning demands, and
other concerns.

My proposal for the eventual regulation of sex work in Ghana, which is discussed
in detail in this chapter, is what I term the gradual systematic approach to influencing
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public policy. This approach is three-fold. Step One is the preparatory stage, which
essentially provides the foundation for regulation by setting the agenda and creating
public awareness. More specifically, it includes (1) the organization of stakeholders’
forums on law and morality; (2) the organization of nationwide/public forum(s) on
morality, its various manifestations and its proper role in maintaining law and order; and
(3) the provision of a platform for sex worker activism. Step Two is the formal proposals
stage. This stage is a follow up to the preparatory stage, and as such will include the
doing of one or all of the following: (1) drafting and presenting a formal proposal on the
need for a Sexual Offences Act to the Law Reform Commission; (2) petitioning
Parliament to amend specific provisions of the Criminal Offences Act; (3) advocating for
the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into sexuality and sexual offences in
Ghana; and (4) advocating for a sex workers’ regulatory body and regime. Finally, Step
Three involves litigation as a last resort.

I conclude the dissertation by discussing where and how theory can meet practice,
in particular whether my D.I.E. framework for public policy making and the gradual
systematic approach to influencing public policy I propose in this chapter can actually
work. It is my belief however that, although my recommendations and approach may
seem overly ambitious given the conservative nature of Ghana, if implemented in the
right way and in the gradual and systematic manner I propose, it will help move public
policy away from the era of sole reliance on religious and cultural conceptions of
morality to a new phase of human rights appreciation and enforcement. Indeed, the aim
of these recommendations is to lay the groundwork for dignity, autonomy and equality to
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be at the heart of public policy and reflect in laws that seek to curtail intimate human
conduct and behavior.

A) RECOMMENDATIONS

Before I begin to elaborate on my proposals, it is instructive that I make reference
to and briefly summarize some activities that have been undertaken in the past, which led
to several recommendations in relation to sex work in Ghana. It has been documented, for
instance, that since the 1970s, several attempts have been made towards addressing the
issue of sex work in Ghana.725 As a matter of fact, it is on record that the Department of
Social Welfare in Ghana undertook a series of studies regarding sex work in Ghana in the
1970s, which led to the establishment of Women’s Vocational Centres in all the ten
administrative regions of Ghana.726 As Pappoe puts it, ‘prostitutes were rounded up and
sent to the Centres for training, but the programme was soon abandoned.’727 This was
likely as a result of the fact that the allure of sex work, in particular the monetary reward
therein far outweighed any money that such “rehabilitated” sex workers would make after
learning a trade in these vocational centres.

Another attempt at tackling sex work in the 1970’s was when religious
organizations decided to take a stance. Thus, the Christian Council of Ghana’s women’s
committee sent a resolution to the government of Ghana that demanded that firm and
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concrete action be taken in relation to sex work in the country.728 Similarly, in the 1980s,
the National Council on Women and Development (NCWD), an entity whose sole
purpose was the elimination of sex work, which it identified as an affront to the
integration of women in the developmental process, organized a three-day consultative
meeting that led to various recommendations and proposals sent to the government.729 In
all, eighteen proposals were recommended to the government of Ghana, for it to consider
in curbing sex work in Ghana.

Prominent among these recommendations were as follows: (1) that job
opportunities should be made available to girls and women in general; (2) that women
who engage in prostitution on any level should be penalized; (3) that the government
should implement proposals of the Law Reform Commission on the law of intestate
succession to alleviate the plight of widows and children; (4) that as a matter of urgency,
the attention of churches and traditional institutions should be drawn to the high cost of
marriage with a view to reducing such cost; (5) that the Ministry of Education should
ensure that hobbies like basket weaving, smithing, backyard gardening and fish farming
are introduced into school syllabuses so that young people can learn to spend their leisure
time usefully in the future; and (6) that since social evils emanate from poor economic
situations, it was necessary that the economy be strengthened and job opportunities
created for young people especially.730
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It is doubtful that many of these recommendations saw the light of day, although
the Intestate Succession Law was passed in 1985.731 The fact however remains that, many
of the socio-economic conditions that were identified as factors that lead to young
women engaging in sex work still exist today. Women still remain marginalized in terms
of job opportunities, the economy has not improved dramatically, and vocational training
and other alternative livelihood and rehabilitation programs have not achieved any
meaningful results. Thus, the status quo of harsh economic realities remain, and as such
sex work is a potent area of opportunity that many young girls and women consider so as
to make ends meet to take care of themselves and sometimes their families as well. As a
result, any discussion of sex work in Ghana must take into consideration the socioeconomic situation as well as the cultural context of the country. It is for these reasons
that my recommendations for the eventual recognition of the rights of sex workers and
the regulation of the industry as a whole, albeit ambitious and radical, are structured in
various phases, with a view to gradually and systematically achieving progress. Below, I
discuss the three stages in a chronological order.

1. The Preparatory Stage
As already noted, this first step/stage towards the eventual regulation of sex work
in Ghana involves three separate but interrelated activities i.e. (1) the organization of
stakeholders’ forums on law and morality; (2) the organization of nationwide/public
forum(s) on morality, its various manifestations and its proper role in maintaining law
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and order; and (3) the provision of a platform for sex worker activism. I will briefly
provide an overview of all three activities, and their confluence points.

i.

Stakeholders Forum on law and morality

The preparatory stage begins with a proposal for the organization of stakeholders’
forums. The idea behind this proposal is to bring to the policy/decision-making table a
wide range of stakeholders within the criminal justice system like policy makers, law
enforcement agents and legislators as well as from academia, civil society, traditional
rulers, the clergy and religious organizations. The aim of this stakeholders’ forum is to
discuss ways in which the State can effectively regulate intimate human conduct or
behavior through the criminal law. Through these forums, dialogue on international best
practices and the ways of dealing with issues like sex work can be discussed and
deliberated upon in a congenial and a mutually respectful manner.

Aside the regular stakeholders’ consultative sessions that will be core to this
proposal, I also propose the organization of academic conferences on the theme of
sexuality, morality and the law generally. This is one way of getting leading academics
and advocates operating within the field of criminal law and justice to engage in rigorous
academic discourse on the subject matter. As a matter of fact, my home institution, the
School of Law at the Ghana Institute of Management & Public Administration (GIMPA)
is a recognized leader in pushing the frontiers of the law with annual conferences, as well
as monthly symposia on the law in Ghana generally. As such, I will propose and
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spearhead the organization of a conference on law, morality and sexuality in Ghana to be
held in the 2018/2019 academic year.

The major aim of these forums will be to provide a platform for recommending
public policy reforms to the appropriate authorities, in particular the Law Reform
Commission of Ghana. Such a move is important and will be beneficial in the long term
for the country as a whole. Having different stakeholder groups put forward their views
and consolidating these will definitely influence the ultimate decisions that are taken by
the decision makers, be it the Legislature and/or the Executive, in enacting legislation or
taking decisions that are rational and reflect contemporary legal thought, philosophy and
international best practice.

It is envisaged that the conferences/seminars and stakeholders’ consultative
sessions will therefore thoroughly discuss the role of religion and culture in public policy
making. With specific reference to sex work, the economic situation of the country will
be a key theme for discussion, as socio-economic factors are arguably the most important
consideration for those who enter into the sex trade. Also, it is important that the
discussions within these fora, tackle the issue of human trafficking, in particular sex
trafficking and child trafficking. This will ensure that all the various facets of sex work in
our contemporary world are considered, and distinguished for the purposes of effective
regulation eventually.

ii.

Consultative public assembly’s on law and morality
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Following on the heels of the stakeholders’ forums, it will be important and
prudent to organize a nationwide public forum(s) on the role of morality in the law
making process. I therefore propose that these forums be held throughout the country, in
the form of town hall meetings, for example, where ordinary people will have a platform
for voicing out their opinions. The importance of these forums will be to thoroughly
discuss the nature, scope and application of various conceptions of morality, and its
influence on the laws we have, in particular the criminal law.

More specifically, offences like engaging in sex work can de de-stigmatized
through such forums where the core issues pushing some people into sex work can be
dispassionately discussed on a wider scale. The fact that some people are making rational
economic choices to engage in sex work and out of their own free will should not
necessarily attract penal consequences. Rather, we as a society must find a way of
addressing the core issues that leads to such decisions (like poverty), and also critically
assess the role of religion and culture, especially their prescriptions of moral conduct and
their effect on our criminal laws.

If such public forums are held throughout the country, it is my belief that people
will start appreciating the proper role of the State in terms of regulating ‘moral’ conduct.
Human rights freedoms and guarantees can be discussed from many different
perspectives, and be balanced against the legitimate interest of the State in regulating
some aspects of intimate human conduct. Once there is this appreciation, public policy
can be made not solely based on cultural and religious conceptions of morality, but also
on rational principles, which all persons can relate to regardless of their opposition. I
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believe that a nationwide forum(s) on law and morality is long overdue, and can be done
if the right stakeholders are involved. Town hall style meetings can be organized in the
various universities as well as on a nationwide basis in the regional capitals, for example.

In addition, social media can be effectively used as a means of supplementing the
nationwide forums. In contemporary times, a lot more people receive their news and
other information through the various social media outlets like Facebook, twitter,
instagram etc. Thus, it is imperative that we use social media platforms to sensitize
Ghanaians about sexuality and the law generally, and the underlying factors that lead to
engagement in sex work. Regular media engagements, through the use of the traditional
media outlets, can also be an avenue of stimulating and generating public debate and
discourse as well.

iii.

Creating a platform for sex worker activism

Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) as well as other Civil
Society Organizations (CSO’s) and other groups must also be encouraged to provide a
platform for sex worker activism in Ghana. Given the conservative nature of Ghanaian
society, and our proclivity to ‘judging’ people who come out as being engaged in what
the broader society considers as morally questionable conduct, it is difficult to see a
situation where sex workers themselves can actively organize to push for and fight for
their rights. In actual fact, any attempt to register a non-profit entity for the sole purpose
of advocating for sex worker rights may prove futile. However, already existing CSO’s
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and NGO’s within the field of human rights and social protection can easily provide this
platform, which can be done in so many ways.

For example, activism in the form of sex workers’ health can ensure that the
authorities take issues of that nature much more seriously. Education for sex workers in
the form of outreach programs, can provide a safe space for some of these sex workers
who can then be provided with the necessary knowledge regarding issues of healthcare
like HIV Aids, as that is critical for their continued engagement in the trade. Sex workers
can then be empowered to organize themselves so as to gradually make demands on the
government, in terms of the recognition of their rights. Such grassroots organizing
together with the stakeholders’ and nationwide public forums will put the plight of sex
workers on the national agenda, and the government will be forced into action one way or
the other.

Such a platform, I believe is necessary in Ghana because the sex workers’
movement is taking seed in most parts of the continent, where active organizing is
reaping dividends for the movement.732 Even though issues pertaining to sex are usually
not publicly discussed in Ghana because of the discomfort it brings, the time is ripe for
there to be an honest and open discussion about the plight and future of sex workers. The
truth is that, regardless of the laws that exist, and even if the government decides to
tighten these laws, sex workers will continue to exist as long as demand for their services
exist. Since there is no way of cutting the demand chain of the equilibrium, concrete steps
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need to be taken to ensure that the industry is not driven further underground, as that will
have various consequences not just for the sex workers, but for the State as well.

As a result, I propose the production of a television documentary on the plight of
sex workers; similar to how documentaries have been produced in recent times that have
highlighted the plight of remand prisoners in Ghanaian prisons, and pregnant women in
the hospitals of Ghana. This is one of the surest ways of grabbing national attention, as
such documentaries tend to shock society into action. Thus, sex workers can be
interviewed to tell their story, in particular the underlying factors that got them into the
sex trade. Experts, including academics and practitioners’ within the fields of criminal
law and justice, as well as social scientists can also be interviewed to gain their
perspectives on the issue. At the end of the day, the general viewing public will be left to
decide on the way forward once such a documentary is produced and aired; as public
interest in the matter will be generated.

Ghanaian feminists should also be encouraged to take a stance in relation to sex
workers and sex work as a whole. For example, the nexus between legitimate sex work
(where women make rational economic choices) and domestic human/sex trafficking and
child trafficking for the purposes of sex work must be debated and resolved. It is also
proposed that empirical research be undertaken to appreciate the extent and proliferation
of sex work and sex workers in Ghana. All of the aforementioned strategies
(stakeholders’ forums & conferences, nationwide public forums and sex worker activism)
if executed well, I believe, can lead to the creation of a social movement, that will be
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armed with the arsenal needed to mount an assault on the status quo regarding sex work
in Ghana and the rights of sex workers.

2. The Formal Proposals Stage
The second step/stage towards the eventual regulation of sex work in Ghana
involves four separate, mutually exclusive or interconnected activities i.e. (1) the
proposal for a Sexual Offences Act to be submitted to the Law Reform Commission of
Ghana; (2) petition to Parliament to consider amending portions of Act 29; (3) petition to
Parliament, the President and the Council of State to consider establishing a Commission
of Inquiry into Sexuality and Sexual offences in Ghana; and (4) proposal for a sex
workers’ regulatory body. I will also briefly provide an overview of all four activities,
and their confluence points.

i.

Proposal for a Sexual Offences Act

Here, the recommendations, outcomes and reports produced in the preparatory
stage will now be formally organized into a concrete proposal to be submitted to the Law
Reform Commission of Ghana. The Law Reform Commission is established by virtue of
the Law Reform Commission Act, 2011 (Act 822). The main object of this Commission
is to promote law reform in Ghana.733 For the purposes of this proposal, it is imperative
that I set out the functions of this Commission in detail, to provide guidance on how my
proposal falls within the mandate of the commission. Section 3 of Act 822, captioned
‘Functions of the Commission’, provides as follows:
733
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To achieve the object, the Commission shall
(a) receive, consider and make proposals for the initiation and reform of any law
in the country;
(b) prepare and submit through the Minister proposals for the examination of
different aspects of the law including recommendations for the codification of
legislation;
(c) make practical proposals for the development, simplification and
modernization of the law;
(d) advise the Minister on policies for law reform;
(e) undertake the examination of particular areas of the law and formulate
proposals for reform after appropriate research;
(f) provide advice and information to Ministries, Departments, Agencies and the
private sector for the reform or amendment of a law;
(g) obtain information on the legal systems of other countries that may facilitate
the performance of its functions; and
(h) perform any other functions that are ancillary to the object of the
Commission.734

It is evident from its functions that the Commission is mandated to receive proposals for
reform on any aspect of the law in Ghana. Thus, a report containing proposals for reform
of sexual offences should be produced taking into consideration the outcomes of the
stakeholders’ consultative sessions, nationwide forums and the sex workers’ activism
strategy.
734
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In this regard, I propose in addition to the report a draft Sexual Offences Act,
which will consolidate the existing sexual offences in Act 29 into one separate Act. Thus,
a thorough review of all the sexual offences must be undertaken to ensure that the
proposal is sound, is backed by research and empirical data, and incorporates
contemporary human rights norms into the conceptualization of sexual offences to
guarantee its conformity with the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The lessons from the
UDHR drafting process must guide this phase, simply because the UDHR and its
subsequent popularity and general acceptance as customarily international law shows that
it is possible to enact legislation that takes into account different conceptions of rights,
regardless of conflict of moral values. At the worse, the Law Reform Commission will be
forced to examine this proposal and make its recommendations to the Attorney General
on whether or not to proceed with such reforms.

ii.

Proposal for the amendment of Act 29

The Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) has undergone some changes since its
enactment when Ghana attained Republican status in 1960. However, to ensure that the
provisions regarding public morality, in particular that which has to do with sex work
accords with contemporary human rights norms, it is imperative for a review of those
infringing provisions. To this effect, I propose maintaining the prohibition of enforced
sex work controlled by pimps and sex trafficking generally; however, the main provision
of Act 29 that I believe must be amended or repealed is section 276(1). This provision
makes it an offence to persistently solicit or importune in a public place or in sight of a
public place for the purposes of sex work.
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The difficulties associated with any rational implementation of section 276(1),
including but not limited to the constant reports of police abuse of sex workers, makes it
imperative for amendment. A weak law enforcement culture, and the lack of interest in
enforcing such laws, coupled with the resources needed for implementation means that an
amendment will be in order. For example, the law can be amended by the removal of its
classification as a misdemeanour, which carries jail time. Such a move will accord with
contemporary criminal justice thinking, where increasingly petty offences are not
punished with incarceration – and sex work shouldn't even be an offence in the first
place.

In addition to the de-classification of sex work as a misdemeanour, the law can
also be amended to specify the exact types of public places or spaces and times where
persistent solicitation or importuning may be regarded as a public nuisance. It has already
been pointed out that the night sex trade mainly takes place very late at night, outside the
normal scope of public awareness, although the areas of operation remain public places.
Thus, with the exception of law enforcement officials like the police that may be on
patrol late at night, and those persons enjoying nightlife or engaged in other legitimate
activities, as well as those making up the demand side of the sex trade equation, an
overwhelming majority of the public is technically oblivious to the solicitations and
importuning that occurs on specific streets (public places) at night.

Hence, even though areas like Cantonments and some parts of East Legon (Lagos
Avenue) for example, which are notorious for the sex trade at night, are all public places,
the law can be amended to reflect the reality and fact that these prima facie public places
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change character at night. Thus, sex workers may be prohibited from these same spaces
during daytime (which is the de facto case anyway), but it makes no sense to restrict them
from plying their trade there at night. The flip side to this argument is the idea that all
forms of solicitation in public places regardless of the time of day should be prohibited
i.e. the status quo must be maintained. I believe however that section 276(1) ought to be
amended to reflect present day realities; and at the least, the misdemeanour tag should be
removed as it serves no useful purpose to subject sex workers to incarceration as a
punishment. Public zoning laws must however be considered in any case, as the local
authorities in certain prime areas may want to avoid the tag of their areas being sex hubs.

The proposal for amendment of Act 29 to be sent to Parliament and the individual
Parliamentarians must therefore stress on the constitutional infringement on the rights to
dignity, autonomy/liberty and equality, that continuous criminalization of sex work and
other sexual offences portend. To ensure that our criminal laws do not advocate a
particular religious or cultural dictate or prescription, the sexual offences in Act 29 must
be thoroughly reviewed, and amended so as to bring our law in line with international
best practice.

iii.

Proposal for the establishment of a Commission of Enquiry

Under Ghana’s Constitution, specifically Article 278(1), the President can appoint
a Commission of Enquiry into any matter of public interest if he is so satisfied, or if the
Council of State advises him that it is in the public interest so to do, or if Parliament by a
resolution requests that he appoints such a Commission into a matter of public
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importance.735 In recent times, Commissions of Inquiries have been appointed into all
kinds of public interest matters in Ghana including: allegations of corruption regarding
the planning and execution of Ghana’s fiftieth independence celebrations; 736 a
commission to inquire into the state of judgment debts granted by the courts; 737 a
commission on allegations of corruption surrounding Ghana’s participation in the 2014
FIFA World Cup tournament in Brazil;738 a commission to inquire into the causes of a
stadium stampede; 739 a Reconciliation Commission mandated to inquire into past
atrocities committed by successive regimes in Ghana with a view to ensuring
reconciliation;740 and a Commission of Inquiry into the Creation of New Regions.741

It is therefore clear that once a matter garners enough attention to be deemed one
of public interest, there is the likelihood that a Commission of Inquiry may be appointed
to look into the issues at stake and make appropriate recommendations. It is for this
reason that this particular proposal must be advocated for in the second stage of reform
efforts, after the preparatory stage has been completed. Thus, by the time of submitting
this petition, a social movement will have been formed in respect of the reformation of
sexual offences generally, through the various social media campaigns as well as
nationwide forums and stakeholders’ meetings. There will therefore be sufficient public
interest in the matter to put pressure on the government to act. To ensure this, a petition
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can be sent to the President, the Council of State and Parliament in accordance with
article 278(1) of Ghana’s Constitution.

iv.

Proposal for a Sex Workers’ regulatory body

The final recommendation in this stage, which is in line with my position of
regulating the sex trade, is a proposal for the establishment of a sex workers’ regulatory
body and regime to be submitted to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender & Social
Protection. This is because, most sex workers in Ghana are female, and their plight in
terms of the continuous criminalization of their trade and abuse of their rights is an
indictment on the country’s human rights credentials. The proposed regulatory body, can
therefore be established, either through an Act of Parliament, or through some other
means to essentially attempt to control sex work in Ghana. As difficult and far-fetched as
this may sound to many, that may be the best way of checking and bringing the sex trade
into the realms of the law.

As it stands now, despite the essential (partial) prohibition of sex work, it is a
notorious fact that the trade is well and alive with little to no regulation whatsoever, and
as such, pimps and other sex traffickers continue their nefarious activities. Hardly has any
sex worker been fined or prosecuted for engaging in the trade; except the regular police
extortion schemes already noted. Yet, a drive through some of the major areas of urban
Accra after 10pm will reveal to the curious mind, a somewhat well organized, and active
sex market. The only law that applies is that which is dispensed by police officers on
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patrol, who are famously known for extracting sexual favours from sex workers to leave
them alone, and/or extorting and sometimes abusing them.

Thus, a proper legal and regulatory regime is needed to sanitize the sex trade one
way or the other. Although many countries in the world continue to prohibit and/or
restrict sex work by adopting various means, the sex trade hasn't been curbed in any part
of the world. If anything, it has been driven further underground. Yet, examples exists in
parts of the world where effective regulation has ensured a fairly sanitized trade –
Amsterdam’s famous Red Light District being a prime example. As morally opprobrious
as it may sound to many Ghanaian readers, regulating the sex trade in a manner like it
pertains in the Netherlands, will lead to huge benefits for the country.

First, there will be protection for the sex workers, as their trade will no longer be
necessarily considered as illegal. Thus, access to healthcare and health facilities may be
easier. The spread of veneral diseases like HIV Aids may be checked through intense safe
sex education and easy access to healthcare. Similarly, sex workers who want to exit the
trade can be guided to do so by the introduction of alternative livelihood programs, which
admittedly have failed in the past. That notwithstanding, where there are formal
structures in place with clear economic opportunities, it is possible that those desirous of
leaving the sex trade for lack of any employable skills may finally be able to do so in
their own time and at their own pace.

Also, transforming this informal trade to a semi-formal one may reap some
pecuniary benefits for the State, through licensing, fees and taxes. This will however be a
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difficult task because of the largely informal structure of the Ghanaian economy
generally, where even most small business owners pay no taxes whatsoever. Thus, it will
be difficult for the central government to spread its tentacles to cover individuals who
engage in the sex trade, no matter how organized it is. There will be a need to streamline
the industry as far as it is possible, for this proposal to have a chance of working.

Tourism may even be boosted as a result of regulation; but once again, this
proposal will definitely be condemned as preposterous and highly immoral due to
Ghana’s reputation as being a religious country. Thus, official sanction of what some
view as an inherently immoral profession or trade, may face severe backlash. However,
as I have advocated throughout this dissertation, I believe that it is about time that we
take the religious dimension of morality out of the equation when deciding or making
public policy. This will however be hard to do for obvious reasons; but at least it is a
conversation that must be had, and will be had at some point in time now or in the near
future.

The regulatory regime that can be established for the purposes of regulating the
sex trade can play a pivotal role in the overall development of the country. But this may
be impossible to achieve in the short term. However, beginning the conversation through
the stakeholders’ and nationwide public forums can be a start in this process. The
important factor of which sight must not be lost is the interest and well being of sex
workers. At the end of the day they are human beings, most of whom have made rational
economic choices, and must be protected just like all other people, instead of
criminalizing their conduct and line of work.
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All the aforementioned proposals discussed in this stage can either be pursued
separately, or alongside one another. The problem is that, it is possible that the Law
Reform Commission will not take any proposals on the reformation of sexual offences
serious enough to warrant a report being sent to the Attorney General for further action.
Similarly, Parliament may not be amenable to amending the sexual offences contained in
Act 29 since it may not be wise politically so to do for many of the Parliamentarians who
have one eye on re-election, and whose constituents are religious persons who regard
religious conceptions of morality as the overall determinant of public policy and law for
that matter.

Again, the petitions to the President, Parliament and the Council of State for the
establishment of a Commission of Inquiry may also prove futile; although I believe that is
probably the most promising of all the proposals in this stage, due to the public support
and interest that would have been garnered at this point. However, the recommendation
for a sex workers’ regulatory body may also not be successful. Thus, it is imperative that
we carefully consider which of these strategies or combinations thereof have the highest
likelihood of success and vigorously pursue it.

3. Litigation as a Last Resort
The final stage in the push for legal reform is the litigation stage. However, it is
my proposal that litigation must only be pursued as a last resort. Thus, if the first two
stages, as outlined above, fail to yield any positive outcomes, it may become necessary to
bring an action in the Supreme Court. The Constitution provides that anyone can bring an
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action in the Supreme Court if he or she is of the opinion that an enactment or anything
contained therein is inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution.742 The only
foreseeable problem with this strategy is navigating around the seemingly overlapping
jurisdictional prescriptions of the Supreme Court and High Court of Ghana. This is
because, even though the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in matters relating to
the interpretation and enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution generally,743 the
High Court has original jurisdiction, even to the exclusion of the Supreme Court, in
matters relating to actual infringements or potential infringements on the fundamental
human rights and freedoms contained in Chapter 5 of the Constitution.744

It is my opinion that, if litigation becomes necessary, it may be wise to begin from
the High Court, where it can be argued that provisions of the Criminal Offences Act
relating to sexual offences in general, and sex work in particular, infringe on the
fundamental human rights to dignity, autonomy/liberty and equality & nondiscrimination as enshrined in the Constitution. Thus, if the suit is unsuccessful at the
High Court level, there will still be the possibility of appealing the decision to the Court
of Appeal and subsequently to the Supreme Court.

Litigation as a strategy of last resort has varying levels of success. Some
advocates in equally conservative countries in Africa have been able to use this to bring
about legal change in terms of sexuality generally. For example, recently in Botswana,
the High Court for the first time held that by refusing to change the gender identity of a
742
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744
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man, who was born as a female but self identifies as a man, on his identity document, the
National Registration Registrar of Botswana had violated several of his basic human
rights.745 This was done even though the country is very religious, culturally conservative
and still maintains strict laws prohibiting homosexuality. Therefore, legal change is
possible through litigation, but probably as a last resort when public interest in such
matters has been sufficiently garnered.

B) CONCLUSION

The D.I.E. framework for public policy making, which I have advocated for in
this dissertation, is a theoretical framework that is not likely to be adopted in Ghana
without much debate. The underlying objective of this framework is the advancement of
the rights of vulnerable groups and persons like sex workers and sexual minorities. It
focuses on protection and promotion of fundamental human rights in contemporary
Africa. However, there is a new wave of human rights scholarship that suggests that too
much focus on substantive human rights in our world today has systematically increased
economic inequality.

In his book entitled Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World,746 Samuel
Moyn, for instance, explores why the rise and acceptance of human rights as our highest
ideals has led to grave economic inequalities.747 He suggests that the twentieth century

745
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wave of human rights that prevails today has led to an over-concentration on substantive
human rights, especially civil and political rights, to the neglect of broader social and
economic justice ideals.748 This criticism relates to my D.I.E. framework for public policy
making because, focusing on ensuring the protection of the rights of sex workers per se,
will not necessarily lead to the elimination of the major underlying factor that drives
people into the trade in the first place i.e. economic hardship.

Also, the human rights approach of my framework is likely to be criticized as
being foreign to the cultural ideals of traditional Ghanaian society. Thus, the theory for
reform is unlikely to receive much support on the ground initially because of the
skepticism that human rights scholarship is greeted with in Africa generally, where
certain sexual offences are concerned. Despite these criticisms and skepticism that is to
be expected, we still need to find a middle ground from which to proceed in ensuring law
reform because it is the right thing to do. How then do we achieve this?

As already suggested, getting broad based support for reform through a new wave
of social movement might be one of the surest ways of kick-starting the reform agenda.
The reason is simple, social change and law reforms have a common denominator – the
will of the people. So in addressing the issue of homosexuality and the rights of sexual
minorities in Ghana, the President of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo recently stated as
follows:

748

Id.
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This is a social, cultural issue, I don’t believe that in Ghana so far, a sufficiently
strong coalition has emerged which is having that impact on public opinion that
will say “change it, let’s now have a new paradigm in Ghana.” At the moment, I
don’t feel, I don’t see that in Ghana there is that strong current of opinion that is
saying this is something we need to deal with. It is not so far a matter that is on
the agenda … I grew up in England at the time that homosexuality was banned
there. It was illegal and I lived in a period where British politicians thought it was
an item not to even think about. But suddenly the activities of individuals and
groups, a certain awareness, a certain development grew and grew stronger and it
forced a change in law. I believe that those are the same processes that will bring
about changes in our situation.749

How then do we achieve a strong coalition that can impact public opinion and force a
change in the law? I believe increased public awareness and sensitization regarding the
irrationality of criminalizing sexual behaviour that does not conform to entrenched
societal standards can be a start.

It is for this reason that my proposals for change is structured in a gradual,
systematic manner, so as not to appear overly radical from the onset. To reiterate, the first
stage prepares the ground through public awareness drives, sensitization campaigns etc.
Once the matter has garnered substantial public interest over a period of time, then formal
proposals can be submitted to the authorities for law reform. If this second step is
749
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unsuccessful, litigation can then be resorted to as a last resort. It is my considered opinion
that such a strategy is the most appropriate in bringing about change in the law generally,
but especially in respect of sexual offences involving the curtailment of the individual’s
right to the legitimate expression of his or her sexuality, in particular.

In conclusion, the proscription of legitimate sex work has no place in a
contemporary democratic society where human rights and fundamental freedoms should
underpin public policy and law. Criminalizing such intimate human conduct does not
further any legitimate State interest, but rather perpetuates the religious and cultural
morality prescriptions that have long dictated public policy and law. It also drives such
activities further underground, and outside the remit and scope of any meaningful law
enforcement measures. I strongly believe however that the time has come to hold such
laws that seek to regulate intimate human behavior to higher standards. Thus, such laws
must measure up to fundamental human rights including dignity, liberty & autonomy and
equality. It is only when such a balancing act is done, that proper regulation can be
achieved.

The example of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which has
generally achieved universal acceptance as the standard of human rights the world over
should provide motivation for a rational public policy framework in regulating certain
intimate human conduct. The fact that diverse groups of people were able to generally
agree on fundamental rights and freedoms that should govern all persons the world over,
despite their differences, proves that it is possible to achieve compromise on moral
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standards. Thus, we must look to the example of the UDHR when coming up with public
policy prescriptions that underpin laws, in particular the criminal law – where intimate
human conduct involving sexuality is concerned. That is not to advocate a neglect of core
moral principles that are sound for public policy making, but in addition we must
emphasize on the respect for basic human rights as complementary and equally important
principles in the decision making process.
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